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Abstract
Despite the intentions of the State of Bahrain to implement significant economic and
social changes, and their full, or partial, sponsorship of intensive training
programmes, neither have the human resources available been exploited to their full
potential, nor have the vocational training programmes managed to equip
unemployed workers with the skills needed to compete effectively in the labour
market.
Indeed, the picture is hardly encouraging for future generations, and cries out for
fundamental changes. Bahrain has poured investments into projects aimed at
reaping the benefits of its relative advantages, into exploring and transforming its oil
and gas resources, into developing value added products, and human resources. But
changes since have created a whole new world, with no market to speak of but a
global one. Any decisions on investment should now be guided by the notion that
geographical location is no longer a real issue, and that competition is won more by
conceptual than by material advantage. A worker's personal opinion of his job has
as much impact on competition as the extent and quality of his training. An entirely
new system is therefore needed, one that provides social incentives and traditional
rewards for the creation of new concepts, ideas and perspectives.
The aim of this thesis, is firstly, to investigate labour supply in Bahrain in a dynamic
setting in the light of the neoclassical theory which is based mainly on that labour
supply is largely a function of real wage. Secondly, to diagnose the problems and
finally to suggest solutions. An econometric model of labour supply for different
groups: Bahrainis and non-Bahrainis, primary and secondary workers is introduced.
Use is made of cross-section time series data. The econometric contribution of this
thesis is the testing of relative wage theory besides the estimation and the
identification of labour supply elasticities that can serve as the basis for policy
decisions. Unemployment as the most serious economic problem facing
Governments is considered in this thesis. Unemployment model is presented and
analysed as a function of specific factors that may cause structural unemployment in
the economy of Bahrain. Use is made of secondary data. Then unemployment
policies are discussed and finally the conclusion of this thesis with prospects is
presented.
-V
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction 
The economics of labour has firmly become an area of theoretical and empirical
enquiry in the mainstream of economics. It involves all stages of scientific
analysis; development of a conceptual framework, hypothesis formulation,
hypothesis testing and evaluation of results. Labour is a distinctive field of
economics which does merit its own study; because firstly, because labour is an
essential ingredient in the production of nearly every commodity, secondly,
because labour is a source of income; wages, salaries and the wage component of
self employment produce the largest part of the national income of any economy
and thirdly, that labour is a human resource, with its impact on human
circumstances and social problems.
Because it is a human resource problem, an examination of labour's role within
an economic system is more complicated than first expected. Individuals do not
always act as if they were maximising a tangible goal, such as income. Because
for individuals at work the nature of their job may be as important as their
income. These considerations mean that good or ideal labour market theory is
difficult to develop.
The analysis of labour supply in particular has an important bearing on different
issues of economic and social policy. Debates about welfare and social security
inevitably involve questions about work incentives. Controversies about
unemployment and other macroeconomic problems often raise questions about
microeconomic choices and issues.
Because of its intrinsic interest, and of its relevance to other important issues,
human resources in the State of Bahrain form the basis of this thesis. The aim is
a thorough and comprehensive study of the behaviour of labour supply in
1
Bahrain, an investigation of unresolved problems, particularly unemployment, an
evaluation of the relevant policies and suggestions for some alternatives in the
light of basic economic theory.
Economic ability to create viable jobs, and the flexibility to transform these jobs
as circumstances change, both depend to some degree on the macroeconomic
environment, so Bahrain's economic environment, labour market conditions and
problems that have emerged will be the issues dealt with in the second, third and
fourth chapters respectively.
Potential economic growth depends on adequate levels of investment, which in
turn require sufficiently high flows of national savings or foreign aid or
investment. In the State of Bahrain since 1985 investments as a proportion of
gross national account have declined. In 1976 investment reached its peak and
then declined by almost 25 percent in 1985. The decline was attributed to both
public and private sector. Public consumption and transfer payments crowded
out public investment and growing public sector deficits crowded out private
investment and raised real interest rates. The recovery in 1991 brought public
sector finance into better balance, which is regarded as a key element of a
medium term growth strategy. But the years following the Gulf war were not as
promising as previously anticipated.
A stable economic environment depends also on price stability and a low
inflation rate which does not harm business and household decision making.
Effective structural adjustment requires that entrepreneurs, managers and
workers all receive undistorted price signals from the markets. Decisions are
adversely affected when relative price signals are confused by inflation.
In parallel to the stability, the efficiency and quality of public sector spending
should be maximised. Reviewing the main activities of the public sector and
implementing changes in the quality of budgets is a difficult and time-consuming
2
task, but the rewards are potentially great given the rapid increase in public
spending in the State of Bahrain. Experience suggests that setting
macroeconomic policy in a way that aims to boost growth at a cost of higher
inflation would be likely to result in accelerating inflation. Bringing it back
under control through the necessary subsequent tightening reflationary policy
would almost certainly result in lower average growth over a number of years,
implying a significant cost in terms of foregone output and employment and
hence income and national saving. In the State of Bahrain during the boom of
the 1970's and early 1980's, inflation recorded very high rates associated with
high growth rates, but this was followed, from the mid 1980s onwards by
relatively very low average growth rate during the attempt of Government policy
to curtail inflation.
However, Bahrain's economy through its two phases: oil-producing economy
and industrial-based economy, is summarised in the second chapter. It shows
that the industrial sector contributes a higher share to the national economy. A
comparison of Bahrain with other Gulf countries in terms of relative contribution
of oil and manufacturing sectors in GDP in 1993, reveals that while Bahrain's oil
contribution was 17.5% its manufacturing contribution was 26.4%, Kuwait's
were 35.0% and 10.0% respectively, Oman's 45.0% and 8.0%, Qatar's 34% and
18.5%, Saudi Arabia's 36% and 20% and UAE was 41% and 15% respectively.
This means that demand for human resources, particularly human skills must be
more important in volume and variety in the State of Bahrain. The investment of
capital as we will see in the second chapter must be arriving as a process
complementary with human investment, which will be the subject of the third
chapter, "Bahrain's labour market".
In Chapter Three, Bahrain's labour market conditions are investigated in the light
of the theoretical mechanism of the general labour market in comparison with
some industrial countries. Employment and problems arising from it, in
Bahrain's labour market are also covered in Chapter Four.
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In Chapter Five, the conceptual and theoretical econometric frameworks of
labour supply models are introduced. A neoclassical theory of labour supply
based on utility maximization in a dynamic setting is adopted in this study. Both
basic static and dynamic labour supply functions are illustrated. Dynamic
equilibrium and comparative dynamics functions are used to explain labour
participation decision. Also employment and unemployment functions are used
to explain labour market behaviour.
The analysis of life cycle labour supply has been an important topic for both
macro and micro economic research during the last thirty years. Beginning with
the pioneering work of Heckman (1974) and Mincer (1978) numerous studies
were carried out that take into account the various aspects of the labour supply
decision over the life cycle. Macurdy (1981 and 1985), Lambert (1988),
Laisney, Pohlmeier, Staat (1992) summarise the main results and features of the
most important papers until the nineties. Recent studies by Shaw (1992),
Francesconi (1996), Laisney and Lechner (1996), where various aspects closely
connected to labour supply behaviour are investigated, confirm the relevance of
research in this field. The main goal of any analysis of labour supply is the
identification of labour supply elasticities that can serve as the basis for policy
decisions.
In Chapter Six of this thesis a labour supply model in a life cycle setting for each
group of primary and secondary workers, Bahrainis and non-Bahrainis, is
introduced, measured by labour force participation function. Use is made of
cross-section time series data covering the period 1971-1994. The purpose of
this analysis is firstly to estimate labour supply as a function of four independent
variables: real wage, relative income, unemployment and inflation; secondly, to
identify the elasticity for each group, and finally to test permanent and relative
wage hypotheses.
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Unemployment as one of labour supply components is given special
consideration in Chapter Seven. Firstly, an overview of unemployment
explanation and other relevant issues is introduced, secondly, a background of
unemployment in Bahrain is discussed and finally an unemployment logistic
model is analysed. The goal of the unemployment analysis is to examine the
national unemployment rate as a function of some factors that may cause
structural unemployment. The model is applied on the individual level to all
native workers and unemployed, both male and female aged 15 to 60 years old.
Use is made of secondary data of Census 1991.
Because of the relevance of unemployment to labour supply on one hand and to
social and economic policy on the other hand, this issue is fully considered in
Chapter Eight "Unemployment Policies and Evaluation". It has been found that
active policies can strengthen the links between the growth of aggregate demand,
job creation and the supply of qualified labour. A higher public spending on
active employment schemes for the benefit of the unemployed and those at a
disadvantage in the labour market, may lead to wage moderation by
strengthening the ability of outsiders, particularly the long term unemployed and
first time job seekers, to compete more effectively for jobs. Intensified job
placement and counselling programmes aimed at encouraging effective job
search by the unemployed, have proved especially cost effective. Countries
which reject a policy of wage dispersions as a means to increase employment
will have to rely particularly heavily on active labour market education and
training programmes.
An effective public employment service is a key element in making active
measures (schemes) more effective. This involves integrating the traditional
functions of job placement and services with access to active programmes.
Ensuring that the public employment service has access to active programmes
helps job seekers even when there are few vacancies. The availability of training
or job creation programmes can serve as a 'work test' for job seekers.
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While it is important to provide training for the unemployed, broad training
programmes aimed at large groups of the unemployed have seldom proved a
good investment, whether for society or for the programme participants. It is
careful targeting that will pay dividends. All the protagonists: employers,
educational institutions and government should combine their efforts to develop
training programmes that respond to regional (local) needs.
Job creation measures are often an important component of active labour
policies. Focussing job creation on particular regions and groups can produce
better outcomes for programme participants and for society as a whole. In
general, young people and the long-term unemployed are the best targets.
However, alternative economic policies for dealing with both natural and non-
natural unemployment in the light of findings in this research are considered in
the conclusion, Chapter Nine of this thesis.
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CHAPTER TWO
Bahrain Economy
2.1	 Background 
2.1.1 For the last five thousand years Bahrain has been known firstly as
Dilmun, then Tylos, thereafter Awal and finally Bahrain. Located
within 20 miles of the eastern industrial province of Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain is approximately 30 miles to the west of Qatar, 270 miles
south-east of Kuwait and 270 miles north-east of the United Arab
Emirates. Thus an archipelago of nearly 36 islands lying in the
centre of the Gulf, endowed with sweet water and surrounded by
relatively shallow sea, Bahrain has tended to be an ideal trading post
since time immemorial. The wealth of the island is reflected in its
trading importance and the richness of its ancient pearling industry
attracted the attentions of armies of many peoples, who vied for
control.
2.1.2 Based on the 1991 Census Bahrain's total population was 508037
inhabitants, the population density is almost 731 persons per square
kilometre. Bahrain's population density is very high compared to
neighbouring states in the area, it is about 172 times the density/km of
Oman, 131 times the density/km of Saudi Arabia, 52 times the
density/km of the United Arab Emirate, 27 times that of Qatar and 6
times greater than that of Kuwait.
High population densities in the urban areas were relieved by
"suburbinisation" of the population and of economic activities. In fact
urbanisation was not associated with a flow of rural Bahrainis to
urban areas as the case in other countries, but rather with the influx of
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foreign immigrants in response to rapid economic development
specially during the years 1975 to 1985. The distribution of
population into rural and urban is not a relevant characteristic of
Bahrain but rather characterised as metropolitan (Table 2.1). Urban's
ratio is rapidly increasing from 56.5 in 1941 to 88.4 in 1991, by the
expansion of the city through the suburbinisation policy, the land
available for further development is rapidly shrinking.
Since 1941, rapid economic changes have been accompanied by a
high rate of population growth among Bahrainis and the increasing
numbers of foreign workers and their families. The breakdown into
Bahrainis and non-Bahrainis and the percentage distribution are
shown in Table 2.2, and the annual rate of population growth is
presented in Table 2.3. The percentage of non-Bahraini ranged from
17.7% in 1941 to 36.4% in 1991. The population growth of Bahrain
increased almost five fold between 1941 and 1991. The speed of
growth varied from time to time and the first peak in the early sixties
reached 4.3%. Then there was a remarkable drop in 1971 to 2.8%
followed by the highest level of growth of 5% in 1981, which means
that the population growth is positively associated with the economic
growth. This growth experienced another drop in the second half of
the eighties, as shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.1
Population by Urban and Rural
for the Year 1941-1991
Census Year Urban
_
Rural Total
Population
Urban Ratio
1941 50806
_
39164 89970 56.5
1950 69071 40579 109650 63.0
1959 112544 30591 143135 78.6
1965 143270 38933 182203 78.6
1971 168819 47259 216078 78.1
1981 283162 67636 350798 80.7
1991 449336 58701 508037 88.4
Source: The Population, Housing, Buildings and Establishments Census - 1991
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Table 2.2
The Percentage Distribution by Nationality for the Year 1941-1991
Year
Nationality 1941 1950 1959 1965 1971 1981 1991
Bahraini 82.2 83.2 83.0 78.9 82.5 68.0 63.6
Non-Bahraini 17.8 16.8 17.0 21.1 17.5 32.0 36.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 2.3
Annual Rate of Population Growth by Nationality for the Year 1941-1991
Year
1941 1950 1959 1965 1971 1981
Nationality 1950 1959 1965 1971 1981 1991
Bahraini 2.3 2.9 3.4 3.5 3.0 2.9
Non-Bahraini 1.6 3.1 8.2 -0.2 11.5 4.8
Total 2.2 3.0 4.3 2.8 5.0 3.6
Source: The Population, Housing, Buildings and Establishments Census - 1991
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2.1.3 Economic Development Characteristics
Bahrain has experienced rapid economic and social changes. These
changes stem from past development, whereas the economic
development of other Gulf states stems mainly from the increased
international importance of oil as the main source of energy. This
early development of Bahrain was due to the following three reasons:
Firstly, economic and social development in Bahrain began prior to
the epoch of oil, namely through "the epoch of pearls", which was
early in the twentieth century when education and health facilities
were established. Bahrain's development was facilitated by its ancient
commercial, trading and maritime tradition in the first place.
Secondly; Bahrain's oil exporting activity started at an early date in the
1930's, making Bahrain the first Gulf state to profit from oil revenues.
Thirdly; Bahrain's oil exports did not increase rapidly, therefore did
not result in rapid economic development such as that which occurred
after World War II in other Gulf states, especially in the sixties and
seventies. In fact oil production in Bahrain has always been relatively
limited. Accordingly, diversification policy is crucial to economic
development and has always been the goal of Bahrain's government.
In addition to refining activities, Bahrain became a major producer of
aluminium and petro-chemicals in the region. Bahrain is also a major
centre for financial, banking, communication and other services in the
region. The Bahrain installations of ship repairing and engineering
are among the largest and most advanced of their kind in the region.
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2.2	 The Oil Producing Economy
2.2.1 Introduction
Prior to the discovery of oil in 1932, Bahrain's economy had been
characterised by the pearl-fishing, agriculture and trade. The first two
attracted a large number of labourers. Trade, although it did not
employ a large number of workers, was nevertheless important in that
it provided the major source of revenue for the state. There were of
course many other smaller industries with less potential for
employment; e.g. copperwork, pottery, boat building and weaving.
These manufactures were limited and met local demand only, and they
did not represent a significant contribution to state revenues.
Regarding Bahrain's ancient pearling industry, Bahrain's pearls have
been famous from earliest times, and were recorded as the "fish eyes"
of Dilmun in an Assyrain inscription of 2000 B.C. With the
establishment of Bahrain's mercantile fleet in the 1780s, Bahrain had
a great influence on the pearl trade and market in the region.
Bahrain's pearl industry provided the major source of income and
employment for Bahrain's inhabitants. A small tax was levied on
each boat by the Government, and customs duties through the pearl
trade were the main source of Government revenue. It was not until
the 1930s, when the great depression extended to Bahrain, following
the 1920s international monetary crisis and the rise in importance of
the Japanese cultured pearl industry, that Bahrain's pearl trade fell by
40%.
The second most important economic source of income for Bahrain
was agriculture. The cultivation of date palms had been a major
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agricultural activity for hundreds of years. Dates constituted a major
part of the stable diet, and the palm provided materials for housing,
matting, fuel and fishing. By the early 20th century, and following the
increase in the number of artesian wells, as the reduced water-head
created water shortages, the dependence on agriculture generally
declined. On the other hand the discovery of oil increased prosperity
and the importation of food, which in turn reduced the demand for
local agricultural products.
2.2.2 On 1st June 1932 oil began to flow producing 9600 barrels per day
placing Bahrain as the first Gulf state that discovered oil.
In 1972 the production of crude oil continued to increase until it
reached its peak of 16 thousand barrels per day. Production started to
decline as the field became exhausted. In order to preserve such
wealth and to extend the oil's life, extensive techniques of
development and maintenance by the Government-owned company
(BANOCO) was carried out to maintain the production at a level of
42 thousand barrels a day, until the end of the century, with a gradual
decrease in the production of crude oil on shore.
Prospects for new oil discoveries are not high, although exploration,
especially offshore, which began in the 1980s has continued ever
since. A major source of oil revenue is Bahrain's share of output in
the "Abu Saafa" offshore oil field. This share is about 140 thousand
barrels per day.
Since diversification policy was implemented by the Government in
the 1970s, and as the industrial sector in Bahrain mainly relies on gas
as a source of energy, Bahrain National Gas Company (BANAGAS)
was set-up in 1979 to exploit gas resources, and to supply Bahrain's
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industries with their essential requirements, besides providing
employment and training opportunities for Bahraini nationals. Gas
reserves have an estimated life of about 60 years.
Bahrain took advantage of the presence of huge regional oil reserves
to develop a large refinery industry with a capacity of 250,000 barrels
per day. Most of the crude oil arrives via a submarine pipeline from
Saudi Arabia. More than 95 percent of production is exported, mainly
to the Gulf countries, Africa, Asia and the Far East. Plans are under
consideration to modernise and upgrade the refinery to maximise
output of high yield products.
Generally, the oil and gas industry has created sizeable opportunities
for Bahraini employment (more details in the second Chapter).
2.2.3 Of the traditional industries, fishing remains a relatively important
activity. Increased demand and costs highlighted the need to improve
on the traditional methods of fishing. A private company with 60%
Bahraini capital and 40% non Bahraini was established in 1967, using
a fleet of 15 trawlers for shrimp fishing. At first, the catch was
exported mainly to the USA and Japan until 1978 when Government
took over the industry and started selling the entire output
domestically.
Although there have been improvements in Bahrain's trawler fleet and
fishing methods which has resulted in a marked increase in output in
recent years, Gulf waters are unable to support a large modern fishing
industry. Furthermore, increasing pollution has slowed the growth in
fishing catches. In order to narrow the gap between the local demand
and supply, Government policy is directed towards developing new
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facilities, new techniques and the provision of incentives such as
subsidised equipment.
Because of the strategic location of Bahrain as a distribution centre,
the growth of foreign trade encouraged expansion of the merchant
sector which by means of duties and tariffs contributed the major part
of the national economy. Customs and duties accounted for 97% of
total Government revenue in 1930. In 1953, the time of international
economic recovery, after the war, Bahrain's Government decided to
construct a deep water anchorage at the capital, Manama to improve
ship loading capability.
2.2.4 Generally, during the 1950s and 1960s, Bahrain's economic
development progressed rapidly. Government revenue increased by
247% from 1940 to 1950, oil revenue increased by 198% while non
oil revenue increased by 335%. Total expenditure for the same
period, from 1940 to 1950, increased by 332%, from which recurrent
expenditure rose by 243% while capital expenditure rose by 1053%.
During the period from the 1950s to the 1960s social and economic
development improved significantly. Capital expenditure on social
and economic services increased by 235%, while on the infrastructure
base, it increased by 201% and on public administration by 880%.
During the same period oil revenue increased by 464% and non-oil
revenue rose by 213%, which constituted total revenue increase of
351%.
Compared to the period from the 1960s to the 1970s, the total revenue
increased by 89%, in which the oil revenue increased by 85%, while
the non-oil revenue increased by 97%. In terms of capital expenditure
on social and economic services, there was a decline of 16% and on
public administration a decline of 12%, while the capital expenditure
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on the infrastructure sector showed a significant increase of 385%.
Recurrent expenditure during the same period recorded an increase of
260% on public administration, 212% on social and economic services
and a 242% increase on the infrastructure sector. These figures
reflected the stability of the infrastructure development that was
necessary to meet the requirements of social and economic
development programmes. During the 1960s to 1970s, Bahrain's
gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 140%, a growth rate of
nearly 14 percent per annum. Gross national product per capita
doubled by the end of the decade.
2.2.5 Having mentioned some economic developments over the past forty
years, we could conclude that, the discovery of oil in the early 1930s,
after the collapse of the pearl industry in Bahrain, is considered a
turning point in the social economic history of Bahrain. Oil has
become the main resource and national income of the state. State
wealth has transformed the economy of the pearl-trade, fishing and
agriculture phase into a more evolving economy of an industrial phase.
Although the oil revenue has constituted the major source of
Government income for the last fifty years, it started declining, as is
shown in Table 2.4. This clearly reflected the Government policy of
diversification of Bahrain's economy when it established the
Development Bureau in 1967 (currently the Ministry of Oil and
Industry).
However, growing revenues from oil wealth enabled the Government
to accelerate social and economic development programs, as
mentioned earlier. Funds became available to build the well-
developed infrastructure of Bahrain's economy and to establish new
energy-intensive oil-based industries through the Government's
investment. Table 2.5 shows the increase in this investment until it
started to decline in the mid 1980s when the deficit problem occurred.
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Table 2.4
Percentage of Oil Revenue and Budgetary Status
for the Period 1974-1994 (in Million BD)
Year Total
Revenue
Oil
Revenue
Oil Revenue
%
Total
Expenditure
Surplus
Deficit
1974 124.0 104.0 83.8 78.0 45.9
1975 135.0 111.2 82.4 122.0 13.2
1976 191.3 157.0 81.9 202.0 -10.4
1977 261.0 181.2 69.5 256.3 4.3
1978 274.0 192.3 70.2 282.1 -8.1
1979 304.2 161.0 52.8 250.1 54.1
1980 446.0 321.0 71.9 308.1 137.9
1981 537.0 399.2 74.4 375.0 161.9
1982 555.0 402.0 72.4 454.0 101.0
1983 484.1 327.0 67.9 518.0 -33.8
1984 511.5 354.5 69.5 528.0 -16.4
1985 531.4 374.0 70.6 496.8 34.6
1986 425.0 246.1 58.2 476.6 -51.6
1987 427.1 247.1 58.2 455.0 -27.9
1988 401.3 209.9 52.3 482.1 -80.8
1989 438.0 247.4 56.5 495.8 -57.8
1990 497.6 306.7 61.6 536.8 -39.2
1991 511.8 306.3 59.8 534.3 -22.5
1992 511:8 289.0 56.5 583.6 -71.8
1993 561.5 347.3 61.8 626.4 -64.9
1994 526.6 285.1 54.1 656.8 -130.2
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Table 2.5
Percentage of Investment to Total Public Expenditure
for the Period 1974-1994 (in Thousand BD)
Year Total
Expenditure
Current
Expenditure
Investment
Expenditure
Investment as ')/0
of Total
Expenditure
1974 77856 44302 33554 43.1
1975 121768 67586 54182 44.5
1976 201735 86851 114884 56.9
1977 256309 113721 142588 55.6
1978 282078 133760 148318 52.6
1979 250084 152371 97713 39.1
1980 308133 183382 124751 40.5
1981 374706 224707 149999 40.0
1982 453832 279470 174362 38.4
1983 517875 295539 222336 42.9
1984 527576 317590 209986 39.8
1985 508548 344200 164348 32.3
1986 473424 333175 140249 29.6
1987 456905 346460 110445 24.2
1988 478607 373529 105078 22.0
1989 495962 391787 104175 21.0
1990 536649 415305 121344 22.6
1991 534300 433800 100500 18.8
1992 583600 469900 113700 19.5
1993 626500 513500 113000 18.0
1994 656800 529100 127700 19.4
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2.3	 The Industrial-based Economy
2.3.1 In view of the likely exhaustion of the country's oil resources the
Government was fully aware of the need to diversify the economic
base in Bahrain's long-term strategies.
In 1975, the Ministry of Development and Industry was established to
implement the diversification strategy that was planned by the
Development Bureau. The main objectives of the new strategy beside
economic base diversity was to increase employment opportunities
and foreign currency revenues, and to create an impetus for
developing private sector investment taking part in building an
industrial based economy. Prospects for expansion of the industrial
base to utilise indigenous resources were given priority, for example,
the utilisation of gas either as a fuel or as raw material for chemical
industries.
Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (GPIC), a project established
in 1979 by Bahrain's Government in co-operation with public and
private sectors in neighbouring countries, was a project which
contributed towards employing more national manpower.
The transition of Bahrain's economy from its dependency on the
primary production of oil can be broadly gauged by the components of
GDP through the years 1975-1994 (Table 2.6); the oil GDP
contribution declined rapidly from 32.0% in 1975 to 15% of total
GDP in 1994 and the non-oil GDP contribution climbed from 68.0%
in 1975 to 84.2% of the total GDP in 1994.
The strategic choices for planning a sustained long-term industrial-
based economy, could be clearly demonstrated by figures in Table 2.7.
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Despite the fluctuations in the GDP components growth rate due to
instability, manufacturing's component sustained almost the same
growth rate. Although it climbed from 25.1% in 1976 to 50.1% in
1979, it remained, despite the recession, at a growth rate of 25.0%
during 1994. Meanwhile, the trade component growth rate actually
declined from 71.2% in 1976 to 5.6% in 1994. Similarly, the GDP
component of the finance and real estate services declined from
99.7% in 1976 to -0.8% in 1994. This decline was due to instability
caused by the first Gulf war during the 1980s, followed by the second
Gulf war in 1990.
But since there was no large local market for domestic products in the
country, reviewed plans were, therefore, considered towards
promoting capital and energy intensive industries with a strong export
orientation. One of the most noteworthy successful projects was
Aluminium Bahrain (ALBA), established in 1971. ALBA's smelter
utilises natural gas and it is the largest source of employment.
Another major project is the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard
(ASRY) dry-dock, which was established in 1974. ASRY's location
at the heart of one of the world's busiest lanes, combined with the
advantage of skilled labour and a well developed infrastructure, made
Bahrain an appropriate choice as the site for this joint venture.
In order to boost its industrial policy, the Bahrain Government
expanded the industrial free zone to up to 8 million square feet; firms
are exempted from import tax on most capital goods and all raw
materials. There are incentives to encourage investments in the
private sector, such as: free land, provision of natural gas at nominal
prices, absence of income tax and customs duties and of restrictions
on profit repatriation and other facilities at subsidised rates.
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Table 2.6
Oil and Non-oil GDP Contribution for the Period 1975-1994
(in Million BD)
Year
Total
GDP
Oil
Million
BD
GDP
%
Non Oil
Million
BD
GDP
%
1975 382.2 122.2 32.0 260.0 68.0
1976 550.3 157.1 28.5 393.2 71.5
1977 692.2 187.4 27.1 504.8 72.9
1978 774.2 202.3 26.1 571.9 73.9
1979 909.3 233.9 25.7 675.4 74.3
1980 1167.9 402.1 34.4 765.8 65.6
1981 1309.0 429.4 32.8 879.6 67.2
1982 1376.7 404.4 29.4 972.3 70.6
1983 1440.2 347.7 24.1 1092.5 75.9
1984 1483.5 347.0 23.4 1136.5 76.6
1985 1373.1 384.4 28.0 988.7 72.0
1986 1147.7 210.1 18.3 937.6 81.7
1987 1166.1 207.9 17.8 958.2 82.2
1988 1280.5 178.3 13.9 1102.2 86.1
1989 1374.1 224.0 16.3 1150.1 83.7
1990 1506.3 312.9 20.8 1193.4 79.2
1991 1594.8 282.3 17.7 1312.5 82.3
1992 1666.8 279.2 16.8 1387.6 83.2
1993 1747.6 292.5 16.7 1455.1 83.3
1994 1803.3 284.4 15.8 1518.9 84.2
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Table 2.7
Non-oil GDP Growth Rate for Main Economic Activities for the Period 1975-1994
At Current Market Prices (in Million BD)
Year Million
BD
Manufacturing
Growth
Rate
Trade, Hotel
Million
BD
& Rest
Growth
Rate
Million
BD
Finance,
Growth
Rate
1975 63.8 - 48.7 - 32.5 -
1976 79.8 25.1 83.4 71.2 64.9 99.7
1977 82.7 3.6 101.3 21.5 93.0 43.3
1978 91.5 10.6 104.6 3.2 124.0 33.3
1979 137.3 50.1 107.2 2.5 130.5 5.2
1980 187.9 36.9 135.3 26.2 175.7 34.6
1981 202.3 7.7 139.7 3.3 260.3 48.2
1982 170.1 -15.9 158.7 13.6 355.6 36.6
1983 167.2 -1.7 177.2 11.7 404.0 13.6
1984 182.8 9.3 141.9 -19.9 410.0 1.5
1985 138.8 -24.1 119.5 -15.8 326.7 -20.3
1986 164.2 18.3 109.0 -8.8 267.3 -18.2
1987 190.9 16.3 117.8 8.1 216.4 -19.0
1988 235.9 23.5 135.5 15.0 289.9 33.9
1989 232.2 -1.6 137.1 1.2 289.5 -0.1
1990 251.9 8.5 147.9 7.9 272.8 -5.8
1991 265.5 5.4 168.6 14.0 275.2 0.9
1992 251.6 -5.2 201.1 19.3 323.5 17.6
1993 257.3 2.3 197.4 -1.8 369.3 14.2
1994 321.6 25.0 208.4 5.6 366.2 -0.8
2.3.2 Unlike other Gulf countries, Bahrain's strategy of economic planning
has been outward looking. With a lack of natural resources, but with
a large-scale dependence on export growth, Bahrain has become a
centre of international trade and financial services besides developing
an export oriented industrial sector. The credit facilities offered by
the banks working in the state to the commercial sectors increased by
146% from 1981 to 1984, manufacturing and trade had the biggest
share of these facilities. OBUs played an important role as
contributors to the nation's income and foreign exchange earnings
through commercial registration and licence fees. Banking services
were an important source for national employment but since the
recession in the mid 1980s, growth rates of the main sectors of the
economy have dropped as presented in Table 2.7. Consequently,
levels of employment have declined remarkably. This issue will be
considered in the following Chapters.
For development planning, Bahrain's fiscal policy has been to rely on
external credits for those projects which, over a period of time, are
likely to generate sufficient foreign exchange to service the related
foreign debt obligations. Generally, external project financing is not
encouraged because the benefits derived from such funding tend to be
somewhat smaller than the external costs. It has been found that the
development of national resources for financing is a better strategy,
the funds involved remain within the domestic economy. The recent
policy is, therefore, to discourage financing schemes which rely on
foreign borrowing and gradually, to move towards schemes and
projects which can be financed from domestic resources.
However, Bahrain's fiscal policy and its influence on levels of
employment over the past two decades will be considered in Chapter
Eight and Nine of this Thesis.
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CIIAPTER THREE
Bahrain's Labour Market
3.1	 The Nature of Labour Market Analysis
Of the many markets that exist in a modern economy the market for
labour is the most important. It is from selling their services in this
market that most families deiive their income, it is also in this market that
they spend the single longest part of their working hours. When not
working many individuals devote a large part of the remaining time to
acquiring the skills necessary for effective performance in this market.
On the other hand, the education and training of individuals during their
lives is chiefly designed to equip them with skills which enhance their
performance in the labour market. Moreover from their activities in the
labour market individuals derive their self-esteem and form friendships
and ties that determine many of the parameters of their social life.
Mainly, for most people work is a source of disutility and they therefore
require payment to compensate them for the time they devote to it. In the
market for labour the essential transaction is therefore the exchange of
work for pay. The efficiency with which exchange in the labour market is
accomplished is a principal determinant of the efficiency of the economy
as a whole. Delays and impediments in exchange result in costs which
take the form of output that is forgone, output that could have been
produced had labour been available. These occurrences diminish the
volume of goods and services available to support the standard of living
of the citizen of the country and therefore the efficiency of labour market
exchange is of a vital concern to policy makers.
In the labour market, whether it is competitive or monopolized, exchange
will often be governed by rules, informal understandings or practices of a
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customary nature which influence the behaviour of both parties, buyer
and seller of labour services. These rules often emphasize consideration
of fairness, but the meaning of such a concept is likely to differ
substantially between countries.
3.2	 Labour Market Mechanism Interpretation
In fact analytical framework for interpreting labour market is provided by
the microeconomic concepts of supply and demand. A supply function
representing the behaviour of the sellers of labour (workers) and a
demand function representing the behaviour of the buyers or demanders
of labour (employer) are developed for each labour market. The price
(wage) and quantity (employment) of labour exchanged are determined by
the point of interaction of the two functions:
Labour supply: A supply curve as depicted in Figure 3.1 is drawn to
indicate the amount of labour that individuals are willing to supply at each
wage rate. There can be many sellers and therefore competition in
supply, or just one seller, a case of monopolist.
Labour demand: A labour demand curve (Figure 3.1) representing the
demand for labour by a single firm or number of funs. Buyers of labour
require the services of labour not as an end in itself, but in order to
produce commodities that are for sale or deliveiy in some product market.
The demand for labour is therefore a derived demand, derived from the
demand for the final commodity that labour produces and the price that
the buyer of labour is willing to pay is related to the market value of an
employee's output.
25
W*
Wo
Lo L*
Labour Market Equilibrium
Figure 3.1
Equilibrium in the labour market is described by the point at which the labour
supply and the labour demand curves intersect. W*IP and L* represent the
equilibrium real wage and level of employment respectively. If the wage were
initially established below this, at a level Wo / P, there would be an excess
demand for labour, equal to L 1 — Lo . Competition among buyers of labour
would then bid up the wage until it reached W* /P. Only at W*IP and L*
there is no tendency for the wage and employment to change.
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3.3	 Labour Market Equilibrium 
Obviously demand and supply exert coordinated influences on wages.
The two blades of the scissors taken together (Figure 3.1) illustrate the
determination of equilibrium price and quantity. The point at which the
amount of labour that sellers wish to supply is exactly equal to the amount
of labour that is demanded, any competition among employers for the
available labour would lead them to bid up money wages and at
unchanged general prices, this would result in a rise in real wages. The
effect of this rising in turn would be both to reduce the excess demand for
labour and to induce additional labour supply. As a result labour demand
would fall back and labour supply would rise. Equilibrium would thus be
established as a result of employers cutting back their labour requirements
in the face of rising wages and more individuals being attracted to work
by the higher wages on offer. At this point where no tendency for wages
or employment to change is a position of equilibrium.
3.4 Labour Market Flows
The equilibrium depicted in Figure 3.1 comprised a stock of individuals
with jobs and when out of equilibrium a further stock of individuals who
were involuntarily unemployed. Lying behind these two was a further
stock, the population of working age and (as detailed in the coming
Chapters) the positive slope to the labour supply function suggested that
as the real wage rose an increasing proportion of this stock sought work.
The size of each of these stocks differs substantially from Countiy to
Country and they are in a constant state of flux. There are continuous
flows of individuals between employment and unemployment and into
and out of the labour force. Most individuals who leave one job take
another immediately, but some people have no job waiting, and either
retire from the labour force or enter unemployment.
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Most analysis of labour market rely on information that offer only a one-
off snapshot or at best a series of snapshots of the state of the labour
market at different points in time. Therefore the analysis tends to focus
on stocks rather than flows in order to build up a picture of such flows.
Figure 3.2 presents snap-shots of the magnitude of the major labour
market stocks (the employed, the unemployed and the labour force) for
the State of Bahrain in 1991. The population of age 15 and over is
increased by flows of immigrants and is diminished by deaths or by back
to the sending Country. In 1971 the working age population numbered
120579 while it was 85523 in 1959. By 1991 the population of working
age had increased to 347202. In any one year there will be a change in the
labour market of a substantial labour force. Those leaving education for
the first time constitute the majority of new entrants to the labour force.
Alongside there will be re-entrants among whom married women
returning after a temporary absence. There are also large flows in the
other direction reflecting similar arguments to those. In terms of leavers,
retirement is prominent among those leaving the labour force, married
women to perform other forms of non-market work and individuals of
both sexes who either re-enter full-time education or drop out of the
labour force because they fail at finding a job. These later are referred to
as discouraged workers. In Bahrain's labour market, the labour force
increased from 60011 in 1971 to 226448 in 1991.
Within the labour force there is constant turnover as workers voluntarily
leave one job before entering another, these are quits. Quits are one of the
routes by which individuals enter unemployment. Redundancies are
involuntarily job loss. In the State of Bahrain unemployed people raised
from 8241 in 1981 to 14378 in 1991.
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Labour Market Flows in the State of Bahrain in 1991
Immigration
i
Employed
212070
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Figure 3.2
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3.5.1 Labour Market Development
Equilibrium wages and employment are constantly changing. Over
the period from 1960 to 1985 there was a rise in real wages and
employment in almost all countries. It is most striking, that old and
new equilibrium of price and employment in different countries is
different.
Changes in growth of wage and employment over the period 1971-
1994 in the State of Bahrain is considered in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
Change in the money wages rose by 189.2 per cent from 1971-
1994. Comparing with major industrialized countries, it rose by
307.5 per cent in USA and 500.5 in Germany, 1153.1 in UK and
1058.3 in Japan for the period 1960-1985.
Change in money wages W has evidently been accompanied by a
change in prices P in the same direction. For the change in real
wages WI P over the same period is dramatically less. In the
State of Bahrain it rose by 4.3 per cent for the period 1971-1994,
while it raised by 13.2 in USA, 131.5 in Germany, 69.4 in UK and
152.3 percent in Japan for the period 1960-1985.
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Table 3.1
The Growth of Wage During the Period 1971-1994
Money (%) Real (%)
1971-1979 120.2 2.5
1980-1986 61.2 3.2
1987-1994 7.8 1.2
1971-1994 189.2 4.3
Table 3.2
Employment Growth 1971-1994
Percentage Change
1971-1979 58243-122044 109.5
1980-1986 129956-173576 33.6
1987-1994 178312-230357 29.1
1971-1994 58243-230357 295.4
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3.5.2 Changes in Employment
Over almost the quarter of a century, from 1971-1994 employment
has increased by 295.4 percent in the State of Bahrain, comparing
with major industrialised countries, it rose by 61.0 in USA, -2.7 in
Germany, 1.8 in UK and 30.9 in Japan during the period 1960-
1985. The magnitude of the rise in employment and the
accompanying much more modest rise in real wages suggests that
both labour supply and demand have risen substantially in the State
of Bahrain.
3.5.3 Changes in Labour Supply
The long-run changes in labour supply as mentioned earlier can
result from either a change in the working age population or a
change in participation rate. The number of working age
population in the State of Bahrain has by far a very large growth in
these age groups. It grew by 189.9 percent through the period
1971-1991. In USA, working age population grew by 50.4
percent, 18.8 in Germany, 13.4 in UK and by 45.1 in Japan through
the quarter of a century 1960-1985. In terms of participation rate,
in Bahrain it has increased by 14.9 percent over the period 1971 to
1991, while it has grown by 5.4 percent in USA, has diminished by
-7.0 in Germany, -1.8 in UK and -6.2 in Japan through the period
1960-1985.
3.5.4 Changes in Labour Demand
Substantial increases in labour demand were required to
accommodate the accelerating increase in labour supply that is
found. One positive aspect in the growth of labour demand is
labour productivity, output per unit of labour employed. An
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increase in the amount of output each person produces will result
in an increase in the labour demand schedule and at unchanged
wage rates will result in more people being employed.
Evidently, the rate of productivity growth is varied substantially
across different countries. In the State of Bahrain labour
productivity growth was 14.4 percent for the period 1971-1994. In
USA it is 38.1 percent, 119.8 in Germany, 72.3 in UK and 290.5 in
Japan for the period 1960-1985. However, as we have seen from
Tables 3.1 and 3.2, both real wages and employment rose. The
growth in productivity has therefore facilitated an increase in both
real wages and employment. A measure of the growth in real
labour demand can be obtained by taking the product of
multiplying real wage growth in Table 3.1 (4.3) and employment
growth in Table 3.2 (295.4). Thus in the State of Bahrain the
growth in real labour demand 1270.22 was sufficient to support a
growth in real wages of 4.3 percent over the period 1971 to 1994
and a growth in employment of 295.4 percent over the same
period.. In the USA real growth in labour demand was 182.3
percent, 225.2 percent in Germany, 172.4 in the UK and 330.3
percent in Japan over the period 1960 to 1985.
In fact these results emphasize the striking differences in the
experience of these countries. Thus the real growth in labour
demand in Bahrain, even was more than in the UK. But while this
growth largely went into creating extra jobs, in the UK it was
almost wholly channeled into extra pay. However, we can see that
this in part was because the extra workers in Bahrain labour market
were more readily available than in the UK. Firstly as a result of
the growth in working age population and secondly as a
consequence of Bahrain policies to allow more immigrants into
the country (more details later). While in the UK the large wage
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rises captured almost completely the gain from the real growth in
labour demand.
3.6 The Economic Determinants of Population Changes 
In fact, there are two principal aspects of labour supply in the long run;
the size of the population of working age and the skills possessed by that
population. In terms of population changes, economics has a large effect
on these changes. Although the population size was determined by both
fertality and mortality rates, the essential check on population is the
subsistence level of income. The modern approach to fertality regards
children as a consumption good and therefore the demand for children is
analysed within the framework of consumer demand theory. In the simple
model the input of time of the household is assumed fixed, parents devote
a constant proportion of their time to rearing their children. Accordingly,
if members of the household decide to offer less market work this leaves
more time for other non-market activities or leisure. However the number
of children is associated with income, whether positively or negatively it
depends on the household's taste.
3.7	 Migration Effect on Population Changes
For many countries in the world, migration has been an important
contribution to changes in labour supply. For some among them it has
been the single most important contribution to the changes in labour
supply that have taken place over the past forty years.
International Migration, as economic and political fortunes ebb and flow,
so do the patterns of labour migration. Gulf states and other oil producing
countries were the principal recipients of migrants since 1960s. Migrants
have flowed to the State of Bahrain mainly from Indian subcontinent.
Some measure of the scale of this migration can be noticed from the
34
following figures. Foreign or non-Bahraini population as a percentage of
total population has climbed from 21% in 1965 to 36% in 1991, while it
was 17% in 1941, participation rate of non-Bahrainis has climbed from
77.1 in 1959 to 87.3 in 1991 as indicated in Table 3.3. This is an evidence
that the Island has been a host country prior to the oil era.
3.7.1 Permanent and Temporary Migration
Temporary migrants are typically prime age workers who leave
most of their family, including their wives and children at home
while they migrate to participate in the labour force of another
country. Temporary migrants therefore have very high attachment
to the labour force of the host country. The participation rate of
non-Bahraini was 78.8 percent in 1971 and climbed to 87.3 in
1991. In Germany the participation rate among foreign nationals in
1960s and 1970s was in excess of 80 percent. On the other hand,
permanent migrants typically comprise households headed by
prime age workers who bring their wives and children with them.
The average participation rate of the members of the households of
permanent migrants is as a result far lower than that for temporary
migrants. Temporary migrants remit a great part of their earnings
to the sending country. Table 3.4 shows the foreign workers
remittance to their countries, it accounted for 55 percent of over all
balance of payment in 1980 in the State of Bahrain, workers
remittance has grown, over the period 1980-1986 it increased by
174 percent.
More recently the distinction between temporary and permanent
migrants has become blurred. A pattern has now emerged in which
the initial migrant is followed in turn by other working members of
the migrant's family, to be followed by non-working dependents,
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Table 3.4
Balance of Payment and Workers Remittances
for the Period 1977-1994 (in Million BD)
Year Trade
Balances
(Net)
Services &
Transfers
Capital
(Net)
Overall
Balance
Transfers or
workers
remittance
1977 -72.4 76.4 4.0 120.0
1978 -59.2 103.2 44.0 150.0
1979 2.7 9.2 11.9 106.4
1980 44.5 147.8 192.3 106.6
1981 83.6 220.4 304.0 .119.4
1982 65.9 -11 64.8 121.1
1983 -53.8 100.2 46.4 112.2
1984 -103.6 110.4 6.8 125.4
1985 -78.9 308.7 229.8 •	 151.2
1986 76.3 112.0 35.7 185.6
1987 -106.8 -9.8 -116.6 174.3
1988 -68.4 258.5 190.1 73.0
1989 -113.7 184.5 70.8 74.7
1990 18.4 8.4 26.8 95.2
1991 -226.4 314.3 87.9 114.1
1992 -300.3 145.1 -155.2 101.8
1993 -55.6 32.0 -23.6 121.3
1994 •	 -106.2 146.0 39.8 123.9
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wives, children and even elderly relatives. According to the 1981
Census the number of foreign (non-Bahraini) private household
was 18,867 which comprises 32 percent of total household in the
State of Bahrain, while collective non-Bahraini household
accounted for 10 percent of total household. The number of
private non-Bahraini household climbed to 26.740 in 1991.
3.7.2 Determinants of Migration of Labour
Migration as investment decision it involves incurring costs now
for expected benefits some time in the future. The expected
benefits of migration result from being able to sell one's labour in
a market in which it commands a higher price.
Because the benefits of migration occur in the future they need to
be discounted to reflect the lower value we assign to income
received in the future. Generally, individuals are not indifferent to
the distinction between income that occurs in the future and
income that occurs today. All other things being equal, individual
prefer present income and consumption to future income and
consumption.
It should be recognised that besides the migration benefits there
may be substantial impediments to migration. Perhaps, more than
any other aspect of the labour market international migration is
heavily regulated by Governments, every country places
restrictions on the scale of immigration. Quantity or quality
controls are imposed. However, migration decision by individuals
is affected by principal considerations that fall into two groups:
38
1.	 Pecuniary consideration
a) The difference in real wages and fringe benefits
between the sending and host countries.
b) The probabilities of employment in the sending and
host countries.
c) Differences in the prospects of promotion and
advancement in each country.
d) The costs of moving.
2.	 Social considerations
a) Social and cultural environment differences.
b) Differences in the physical environment.
c) The political climate in the sending and host
countries.
Individuals will weigh each of these aspects differently depending
on their current circumstances and tastes. Pecuniaiy
considerations, specially wages rates and employment prospects
have been shown to play a central role in individuals decisions to
migrate. Higher wage rates and lower unemployment rates in the
host country are reported as the two most important reasons for
migration to Gulf states. Consistent with this there appears to be
an inverse relationship between unemployment in the host country
and the level of migration.
Estimates of the private returns to migrants suggest that at the
beginning, the earnings of immigrants are often lower than the
earnings of native workers. However it has also been found that
over the years the earnings of migrants to Bahrain grew more
rapidly than those of native workers. After 10-15 years the
earnings profiles of migrants and native workers crossed with the
result that after 20 years the earnings of migrants were higher than
39
those of native workers. These results are in part due to the fact
that during the final stages of life cycle, when earnings are highest,
only the most successful migrants remain. It is not implausible to
say that immigrants might eventually earn more than natives.
3.7.3 The Economic Consequences of Migration
Migration will have economic consequences for both the host and
the sending countries.
The effects will differ according to the type of labour that is
migrating and the state of the labour market in the host and sending
countries. Indian subcontinent has a large supply of unskilled
labour and wages just above subsistence level. In contrast, in the
Gulf countries, wages are high to compensate for the perceived
disamenity associated with unskilled workers. Individuals from the
sending country are prepared to migrate and they require a wage
only slightly higher than that of the sending country to defray the
costs of migration. Migration on this scale increases the labour
supply in the host country. Because in Bahrain labour demand
remains unchanged, wages rapidly decrease and employment rises.
Some natives retain their jobs and some have lost their jobs so that
now fewer natives are employed at higher wages.
Migrants appear to be better off at the expense of the employment.
and wages of natives of the host county. Indeed there are still
gains from migration since the difference between the wage rates
in the host and sending countries more than covers the costs of
migration. In fact the migration will be expected to continue until
the gains will be eliminated, that is until wages in the two countries
differ by only the cost of migration between the two countries.
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This picture reflects the first round as a result of static rather than
dynamic. Looking at the wider picture it is clear that the fall in
wages in Bahrain reduces the costs of production of the goods and
services that were being produced by unskilled labour. If the
product market is competitive, this will result in lower prices and
an expansion of the demand for these goods and services, assuming
that the demand for these products is almost elastic. The second
stage will therefore be an increase in labour demand and then as a
consequence wages will rise and employment expand, and if there
is no further immigration employment among natives will now rise.
Whether employment and wages will return to their previous level
cannot be predicted without exact knowledge of the elasticity's of
demand for unskilled labour and the products they contribute to
produce.
If the product market is monopolized the initial fall in labour costs
may result in higher profits because final product prices have been
held. In this case the outcome depends on the disposition of these
profits.. If they are immediately reinvested, to increase the scale of
production of these or other products, there will be an increase for
labour. If alternatively, profits are distributed as income to the
owners of the firm and this leads them to increase their
consumption and investment expenditure, it will again generate
additional jobs. In addition there is the probability of increased
expenditure by the expanded workforce. The change in the total
earnings of labour in Bahrain will depend on the elasticity of
demand for unskilled labour. If this is elastic, the earnings of the
unskilled and their total expenditure will rise, if inelastic, total
earnings and expenditure will fall.
Evidently it is hard to predict the outcome of the immigration
process in the State of Bahrain, but one thing which is to focus on
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is the initial displacement of immigrants by native workers which
is only part of the picture.
Distribution of manpower in the State of Bahrain has grown
rapidly as indicated in Table 3.3. Through the period 1959 to 1991
it grew from 85523 to 339852. The increase in Bahrain's
manpower from 64991 in 1959 to 184277 in 1991 is due to two
factors, mainly the rapid increase of graduates at different levels of
education and specialization and secondly the increase of women's
participation rate, it increased from 3% in 1959 to almost 19
percent in 1991.
The size of non-Bahraini's manpower has fluctuated with the
direction and volume of immigration. Immigration between 1959
and 1965 resulted in a 36 percent increase in the manpower.
Through the period 1971 to 1981 which was characterised by a
high-oil revenue, there was a great demand for labour. Non-
Bahraini's manpower increased from 28293 in 1971 to 94707 in
1981 almost 40 percent of total manpower. The proportion of
married immigrants has increased, it amounted to almost 67
percent of total immigrants. This has enhanced the notion that the
island has been exposed to a flux of unskilled immigrants since the
pearl era.
In the following Chapter we will focus on the employment and its
influence on the labour market. In Chapter Six, the labour supply
models will reveal the economic problems related to wages and
unemployment rate prevailing in the market.
CHAPTER FOUR
Employment and the Emerged Problems
4.1	 Background 
The overall aims of Bahrainis four year economic and social development
plan (1982-1986) were to forge greater cooperation between various
sectors of the economy so as to optimise the use of available human and
financial resources. The main objective was to create additional jobs for
Bahrainis in a setting of economic growth.
Obviously expansion and development of Bahrain's economy has
generated much greater growth in some occupations than in others.
Changes in the occupational structure of the labour force reflect changes
in the manpower requirements of industries in Bahrain. Four economic
activities expanded more rapidly over the years 1959-1991,
manufacturing, construction, financing and wholesale, retail trade,
restaurants and hotels. Agriculture and fishing industry has been decline
over the years 1965-1981, but started increasing throughout the years
1981-1991 due to the diversification policy. Transport and
communication occupations has increased sharply from 1959 to 1971
during which the fundamental infrastructure was built. Community,
social and personal services occupations reached the peak in 1981 and
then started growing more steadily in the late 1980s. Men work more in
the industrial sector while women, are relatively more in the community,
social and personal services occupations.
Employment in Banking and insurance sector has grown vely rapidly.
The contribution of expatriate in this sector has declined from 47.5
percent in 1979 to 31 percent in 1983 and to 26.7 in 1994.
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Oil and gas industries created sizable employment in the labour market.
Also Government policy of encouraging domestic and foreign private
investment required availability of skilled workers. Therefore Although
in the initial stages of Bahrain's economic growth, there was a disparity
between domestic skilled workers and the newly created opportunities in
the Bahrain market. This problem was solved by implementing
programmes which were directed through a strong portfolio of training
courses, seminars and workshops supported by one-to-one coaching. This
in addition to a great deal of support for hundreds of workers in higher
education through a scholarship and sponsorship programme.
Obviously extensive training programmes were set up in public sector in
order to qualify Bahrainis to take over the administrative and technical
jobs. Contribution of Bahrainis reached almost 83 percent of the total
workers in the oil and gas industry, and about 80 percent in the aluminum
industry in 1994. This represents the Government's determination not
only to achieve its Bahrainization strategy, but also to invest the country's
human resources. In the private sector, despite Balu-ainization plan which
was set up by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs for 1989-1994,
Bahrain's market is influenced by different factors that determine its
labour demand in the long-run. In both the short-run and long-run the
elasticity of labour demand will be different in each case. The demand
for labour, as defined by the formal theory, is a demand derived from that
for the final product which labour cooperates to produce. Firms in the
private sector demand labour simply because it is an input into the
production process and they produce in order to make profits. The
ultimate reason why firms demand labour because it is profitable to do so.
Precisely how much labour firms demand depends on a number of factors.
First the technical nature of the production process, second the revenue
that results from selling the output of labour and finally the prices of the
factors of production.
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4.2	 The Nature of Production Process
The nature of the production process could be measured by the marginal
rate of technical substitution between the factors of production. It tells us
for a given production technology, the rate at which labour must be
substituted for capital in order to maintain a constant level of output.
4.3	 The Marginal Product of Labour
In the short run, a period in which labour is the only variable factor of
production, if a firm wishes to increase output it has to increase the use of
labour. This addition to output that results from one extra unit of labour
is called the marginal product of labour. In fact the total output produced
by adding successive increment of labour to the fixed capital, first
increases at an increasing rate and then increases at a decreasing rate until
output reaches a peak. The marginal product of labour depends on first,
the nature of production function, second, the size of the capital stock and
third, the number of previous units of labour employed, because before
last unit of labour was employed, all the other units of labour employed
had more capital at their disposal. This means with last unit of labour the
available capital is spread more thinly among the workers.
4.4 The Marginal Revenue Product of Labour
The firm is concerned not just with how much output a worker produces
but also with the price obtained for this output when it is sold in the
market. The price the firm obtains will depend on whether the firm is a
price-taker, a perfectly competitive firm or a price-maker, a monopoly in
the product market. In the competitive case the firm faces a peifectly
elastic demand for its product, this means the price equals the average
revenue which in turn equals the marginal revenue. So the firm can sell
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all it wants at the prevailing price. In contrast, a monopoly has to lower
the price of its output if it wants to sell more. In this case the price does
not equal marginal revenue that it lies below the average revenue for there
is an additional force at work. In both cases the additional to revenue
resulting from selling the product of the last unit of labour employed.
MRPL can be found by multiplying MPL by MR= MRPL . Accordingly
MRPL curve is expected to decline more sharply for monopolistic
industry than competitive one.
4.5 The Firms Labour Demand in the Short Run
Having defined the firm's MRPL , we are now in a position to describe
the labour demand. A profit maximizing firm is concerned to equate
marginal cost MC to marginal revenue MR. Assume that it purchases
labour in a perfectly competitive market, the firm faces an elastic labour
supply of labour and the marginal cost of employing an extra unit of
labour is the wage rate. In this case MC =W and since MR= MRPL
then W = MRPL.
The above arguments enable us to identify how much labour the firm will
wish to employ at each wage rate, that is to identify the firm's labour
demand. The profit maximizing firm will equate MR to MC subject to
(average) AR> AC. In labour market terms this means that the profit
maximizing firm takes employment up to the point at which MRPL=W
subject to the ARPL >W . If the wage exceeds the ARPL the firm would
be making losses and clearly will not demand labour at wage in excess of
the maximum of the average revenue product of labour
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4.6 The Firm's Labour Demand in the Lon2 Run
In the long run both labour and capital are variable. The firm no longer
has to work with a particular level of capital. The constraints on the
firm's activities are two, technical possibilities open to the firm and
second the financial resources of the firm.
In equilibrium each factor of production is employed up to the point of
equality between the ratio of its marginal product to the price of that
input. This means that the last BD1 spend on capital was as productive
no more and no less that the last BD1 spent on labour. In fact this shows
the essential conditions for cost minimizing which is in turn an essential
precondition for maximizing profits.
To obtain firm's long-run demand for labour we recognize that a change
or say a fall in the wage rate does two-things. First it changes relative
prices, it lowers wage relative to the price of capital services. Second it
makes the firm better off, it reduces the cost of producing a given level of
output and therefore either enables the firm to produce the same output
for a smaller budget or to produce more output from a given budget.
As we have mentioned earlier the greater the volume of capital that labour
has to work with the higher is the marginal product and hence the greater
is the value of marginal revenue product of labour at any given level of
labour input. In the long-run, the firm is free to valy the amount of
capital it uses and it might no longer operate with a given capital, instead
the firm chose to buy more capital to increase its capital stock. This
larger capital stock gives rise in its marginal revenue product of labour
which associated with the new lower wage.
Firm's option whether to use more labour or more capital in facing a fall
in wages depends on the substitution and scale effects of the wage rate
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change. The substitution effect distinguishes the firm's reaction to the
change in the relative price of capital and labour, holding constant the
scale of production. The scale or output effect distinguishes the change in
the level of output while abstracting from the change in relative prices.
We expect the perfectly competitive firms to produce more output for it
can sell all it can produce at the prevailing market price, and the fall in the
wage rate has increased the profitability of its operation. In monopoly
market, where producers have market power, this may not always occur.
If the nature of the production is such that an increase in output results in
a fall in total revenue, the firm may decide not to increase output. In this
case the final outcome will be determined purely by the substitution
effect, and will involve the use of more labour and less capital.
In summary, if the scale effect > substitution effect, more capital will be
used and the long run labour demand curve will be shallower (lesser) than
the case of the short run curves. If the scale effect < substitution effect
less capital will be used and the long run demand curve will be steeper
(more) than the case of short run.
4.7 The Elasticity of Demand for Labour
Total wage bill, or the total earnings received by the category of labour
changes subject to the elasticity of demand for labour. If the demand is
elastic a fall in the wage rate increases the wage bill and a rise in the wage
rate reduces the wage bill. On the other hand inelastic demand means a
fall in the wage rate reduces the wage bill and a rise in the wage increases
the bill.
According to Hicks - Marshall rules the wage elasticity of demand will be
higher:
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1.	 The higher is the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand
for the final product labour produces.
2. The more easily can other factors of production be substituted for
labour.
3. The more elastic the supply of other factors of production.
4. The larger is the share of labour in total costs.
4.8 The Problems of Bahrain's Labour Market 
Having summarized general labour market mechanism, now it is easier to
view Bahrain's labour market in the light of this mechanization. The
most common feature of this market is the recognition of employment as
Bahraini and non-Bahraini or expatriate. Table 4.1 shows the
contribution of Bahraini's employment in the industrial establishments,
only about 39 percent of total job opportunities is occupied by Bahrainis.
The establishments of average employment size 500 and above
contributed to almost 65 percent of this share. The establishment of
employment size less than 100 employees has Bahrainized only a
percentage of maximum 18.8 percent of their labours. The establishments
size of 5-9 employees has only 363 Bahrainis of total 3932 job
opportunities, almost 9 percent only is offered to Bahraini workers.
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the average output product of labour by adding
extra unit of labour to the fixed capital, first increase of labour at an
increasing rate until it reaches a peak and then starts decreasing unless an
addition to the capital stock occurs. A relatively flexible labour market
besides the unstable global prices lead large firms to determine its
outcome under the constraint of scale effect; e.g. Aluminum Indust-1y.
The establishment of employment size 500 and above chose to work with
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Table 4.1
PERCENTAGE OF BAHRAINI EMPLOYMENT TO TOTAL
EMPLOYMENT BY AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT SIZE IN
INDUSTRIAL FIRMS: 1992
Average
Employment
size in Indl. Firms
Total
Employment
Percentage
of Total
Employment
Bahraini
Employees
Bahrainis
Percentage
1	 -	 4 2740 7.8 310 11.3
5	 -	 9 3932 11.2 363 9.1
10	 -	 19 2416 6.9 304 12.6
20	 -	 49 2465 7.0 445 18.0
50	 -	 99 3023 8.6 567 18.8
100	 - 199 3905 11.1 1219 31.2
200	 - 499 5021 14.3 1615 32.1
500	 - 999 3826 10.9 2727 71.3
1000 + 7749 22.2 6098 78.7
Total 35077 100.0 13648 38.9
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Table 4.2
VALUE OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT PER EMPLOYEE
BY AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT SIZE OF INDUSTRIAL
FIRMS: 1992
IN THOUSAND BD
Average
Employment
size in
Indl. Firms
Total Output Total Employees Output Per
Employee
1	 -	 4 16363 2740 6.0
5	 -	 9 25225 3932 6.4
10	 -	 19 27276 2416 11.3
20	 -	 49 34915 2465 14.2
50	 -	 99 52778 3023 17.4
100	 -	 199 86904 3905 22.2
200 - 499 145806 5021 29.0
500	 -	 999 813877 3826 212.7
1000+ 271483 7749 35.0
Total • 1474629 35077 42.0
Table 4.3
VALUE ADDED PER EMPLOYEE IN THE INDL
SECTOR BY AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT SIZE OF
INDUSTRIAL FIRMS: 1992
IN THOUSAND BD
Average
Employment
size
Output
Value
Input Value Number of
Employees
Value added
per
Employee
3.21	 -	 4 16363 7443 2740
5	 -	 9 25225 11458 3932 3.5
10	 -	 19 27276 15406 2416 4.9
20	 -	 49 34915 18615 2465 6.6
50	 -	 99 52778 25645 3023 9.0
100 -	 199 86904 49507 3905 9.50
200 -	 499 145806 71149 5021 14.9
500 -
	 999 813877 414990 3826 104.2
1000+ 271483 148421 7749 15.9
Total 1474629 762633 35077 20.1
a great volume of capital uses more skilled workers and technology than
the case of other establishments of lesser employment size which are
likely to act by the effect of substitution. A profit maximizing firm is
concerned to equate marginal cost to marginal revenue. Assume that it
purchases labour in a competitive market. The establishment faces
relatively elastic labour supply of expatriate (non-Bahrain) labour, its
marginal cost of employing an extra employee is the wage rate. In this
case, the total cost of compensation of hiring Bahraini labour is much
higher than the expatriate labour, Bahraini's employee compensation is
three times the expatriates. Obviously small size establishments chose to
employ expatriate labour in order to maximize its profits as it is shown in
Table 4.4.
Generally, job growth during 1970s and 1980s had taken place in the
public and joint sector. However during 1990s, public sector job growth
slowed considerably. Self-employment has been rapidly decreasing
throughout the last two decades. Unemployment rate among Balu-ainis
has been increased in almost all the regions in the state represents a waste
of human resources, reflects an amount of inefficiency in the economic
system and causes a disturbing degree of social distress to the extent that
makes it worthwhile considering in Chapter Eight of this Thesis.
The incidence of unemployment rate differs considerably by age-group.
Young people typically face a very high rate. Generally, weak
employment growth since mid 1980s in the public sector, has been
accompanied by a low productivity of growth, achieved mostly through
labour-shedding in traditional sectors rather than through shifts of
production to high-technology and skill-intensive activities. Wage
differentials have widened and real wages for the low-paid workers have
fallen. According to latest income and expenditure survey conducted in
1994-1995, average income of non-Bahraini household is much greater
than average income of Bahraini household and unemployment rate of
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Table 4.4
TOTAL COMPENSATION OF BAHRAINI EMPLOYEES
TO TOTAL EMPLOYEES BY AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT
SIZE OF INDUSTRIAL FIRMS: 1992
IN THOUSAND BD
Average
Employment
size
Total
Compensation
of Employees
Bahraini's
Employees
Compensation
% as Bahraini
Compensation
1	 -	 4 2350 85 3.6
5	 -	 9 4338 256 5.9
10	 -	 19 3271 504 15.4
20	 -	 49 4497 1255 27.9
50	 -	 99 6929 1643 23.7
100 -	 199 9778 3793 38.8
200 -	 499 18163 9004 49.6
500 -	 999 27852 22470 80.1
1000+ 66226 48180 72.7
Total 143405 87189 60.8
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Bahrainis climbed to 15 percent. An important incidence of long-term
unemployment suggesting poorly functioning labour market. However,
further evidence is in the subsequent Chapters.
55
CHAPTER FIVE
The Conceptual and the Theoretical Framework
5.1	 The Basic Static Model of Labour Supply
5.1.1 Introduction
Economic agents may be taken to reach their decisions in the light
of what they want and what they can get. Thus in neoclassical
models, labour supply decisions, like consumption and all other
decisions, are the result of utility maximization (what agents want)
subject to constraints (what they can get). In this framework we
shall be dealing with two basic functions: firstly the static supply
function and secondly the dynamic supply function.
In the basic static model of the labour supply, the individual's
utility U depends, besides his taste, on the amount of market goods
C (consumption) and hours of leisure time L that he consumes per
period.
In maximising utility, the individual faces several constraints: First,
the price of a unit of C is P and the price of a unit (an hour) of L is
a fixed amount W the wage per hour; that is the individual must
forgo or sacrifice W when he devotes an hour to leisure rather than
to work. Second, the total amount of time available per period is
fixed at T hours and may be allocated to work hours H and leisure
hours L. Finally, in the absence of borrowing and saving, spending
on market goods PC must equal total income from work WH and
other income V derived from other sources.
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In formal terms, the individual's problem is to maximise utility,
which is a function of C and L that is,
u = u(c, L)	 (5.1)
by choosing C and L values that give him the highest value of U
which is consistent with the budget constraint that is:
PC =WH +V 	 (5.2)
where total available time per period, T may be allocated between
leisure and work that is:
H + L=T	 (5.3)
where the full income is equal to the expenditure on leisure plus
the expenditure on the consumer goods that is:
WT +V =WL + PC	 (5.4)
That is the maximum income attainable when all time is devoted to
work.
The optimal combination of C and L is
MU L I MU =W I P or MU L I W = MU c I P (5.5)
where the marginal utility (MU) that would be gained (lost) from
spending one more (less) money unit on C and one less (more) on
L would be just offset by the marginal utility that would be lost
(gained) by the reduction (increase) in L. Any further reallocation
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of time from leisure to work, or vice versa would therefore be
pointless in case, if wage fell to the extent that is:
MU L I W> MU c. I P at the optimum. This has a simple and
natural economic interpretation: leisure is so cheap (W is low)
relative to the price level P and the individual's income V and the
utility 'lost' by transforming time from leisure to work is so large
in relation to what would be gained from work that the individual
devotes all avaiable time to leisure and none to work.
Thus in the basic model, the 'value' of the time of people who do
work is given by their wage rate W; but the marginal value of time
to non-workers exceeds the wage they could earn and depends on
their value of V. Of course if V changes, other things being equal,
people with less income cannot afford to be choosy about working
and will be prepared to work for a low wage.
The effects of changes in variables such as W, V or P on the
variables L,H and C are usually discussed in terms of income and
substitution effects. First consider the effect of a wage increase on
L. A wage increase makes it possible to earn more income and get
greater utility at any given relative wage price ratio W/P; it will
therefore have an income effect on leisure. By definition, if leisure
is a normal good, then the income effect of the wage increase will
cause leisure time to rise and labour supply to fall. The wage
increase makes the individual better off, so he can afford to
consume more leisure time. However a wage increase also makes
an hour of leisure more "expensive" relative to market goods at any
level of income. Thus a wage increase will also have a negative
substitution effect on the consumption of leisure time and a
positive substitution effect on labour supply. The wage increase
makes work more attractive so the individual consumes less leisure
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time and works longer, thus substituting consumption goods for
leisure.
So labour supply schedules may have positive or negative slopes
depending on whether the income effect of a wage increase on
labour supply is smaller or larger than the substitution effect. For
example, if the substitution effect dominates at low wage levels but
is outweighed by the income effect at higher wage levels, then the
labour supply schedule will bend backwards, with first a positive
and then a negative slope.
Other factor, that is differences in tastes may play a powerful role
in individual differences in labour supply. Responses to changes
in V (income) or P (price) can also be analysed in terms of income
and substitution effects. A change in consumer prices gives rise to
both income and substitution effects (the former because a change
in prices alters purchasing power and hence alters income in real
terms, the later because a change in prices alters the price of leisure
relative to the price of consumption goods). A change in V income
affects income but not the relative price W = WI P and so has a
pure income effect only. The total effect of simultaneous changes
in W, and P will obviously depend on the relative magnitudes of
these changes; but an interesting implication of the model is that if
W, P and V ail changes by the same percentage then leisure time
(and labour supply) will not change at all. This means that labour
supply is not subject to money illusion and that labour supply
behaviour is determined by real wage and real income.
5.1.2 The Labour Supply Function
The labour supply function for the individual can be illustrated as:
H=H(W,V,P) or	 H=H(W I P,V I P)	 (5.6)
This defines the optimal or utility maximizing level of labour
supply.
By the same definition the optimal C for the individual may be
written as:
c= c(w p, v p)	 (5.7)
Since, U = U(C,
and H + L=T
U =(C,T — 	 (5.8)
substitute the C and H function into the expression from utility
(5.8) we obtain
U* =U[C(W I P, I7 I	 — H(W I P,V I 19)]	 (5.9)
where U* is the individual's maximum utility of composites C and
H functions.
This is "indirect" or maximised utility function, because the key
economic variables W, V and P determine the optimal levels of C
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and H (and therefore L) for a given individual with given tastes, so
they also determine the individual's maximised utility (I*• Since
the C and L functions are derived from a utility function, it follows
that demand function for C and L (or, equivalent, H =T — L)
necessarily imply some kind of utility function and vice versa.
This relation between the demand function for C and L and the
indirect utility function (5.9) is identified by Roy [147] as follows:
H =T — L = MUw I MU,/	 (5.10)
C = —MU p I MU,	 (5.11)
(5.10) means that at the optimum, the amount of labour supplied is
equal to the ratio of the marginal utility of a higher wage to the
marginal utility of income as indicated in (5.9). (5.11) says that at
the optimum, the amount of the consumer good C demanded is
equal to the ratio of the negative of the marginal utility of a higher
price to the marginal utility of more income as indicated in (5.9)
too.
This implies that given MUw function of wages and MU p
function of prices and income which is homogenous of degree zero
in all its arguments, demand function for C and L (or
equivalently a supply function of H) is fully consistent with utility
theory.
5.1.3 Extension of Basic Model of Labour Supply
The simple model as represented by equation (5.6)
H = H(W,V,P) is not one that is suitable for empirical
application, because it focuses on the role of pecuniary variables.
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However, this does not mean that the model implies that such
factors explain all of an individual's labour supply decision or that
individual responds only to changes of pecuniary variables, the
simple model also implies that tastes, that is preferences affect
labour supply decision.
Beside wage, income and price variables other factors such as
market conditions, trends, denoted by the array ;e1- are added to the
model. The extended model can be represented as:
H= 11(W,v,13,A)+ E	 (5.12)
where E is a random error accounts for unobservable variables
(including tastes) measurement errors.
Considering how the simple model works during the course of the
business cycle, the participation decision and the hours of work
decision are really one and the same measure of labour supply.
P = P(W, V, P,71)+ E	 (5.13)
where P denotes the labour force participation rate (the ratio of
employed and unemployed who seek job to the working population
15 years and over).
The adopted labour supply may be written as:
P = ao+ai W+ a2 V +a3 P+a4 11.+ E	 (5.14)
Where
a:	 represents constant parameter.
u:	 is unemployment rate variables.
E:	 normally distributed random errors term.
The parameters are then estimated using least squares technique for
various groups.
Besides the theoretical notion of income and substitution effects
which has proven to be a particularly useful and analytical
construct. The simple model has a very useful feature that helps to
understand two important stylized facts about labour supply
behaviour during the course of the business cycle. On the one
hand overall labour force participation generally falls as the overall
unemployment rate rises, a phenomenon that is called the
discouraged-worked effect. On the other hand, labour force
participation rises among secondary workers as the overall
unemployment rises: e.g. married women whose husbands are
unemployed, a phenomenon is called the added worker effect.
5.2 Dynamic Labour Supply Function
5.2.1 Introduction
Labour supply model in a dynamic setting have attracted increasing
attention in recent years simply because of analyzing the way in
which labour supply decisions are taken with an eye to the future
and in which the consequences of decisions are spread over time.
It involves developing a coherent approach that can explain and
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illuminate a wide variety of "stylized empirical facts" about the
lifecycle behaviour of people that appear with surprising regularity
in a variety of different kinds of data, such stylized facts about the
lifecyle include the following features:
1. In general, data for men suggests that the time profiles of
labour supply, wage rates and annually earnings are all
concave. That is each of these variables tends to rise
rapidly early in life and then rise slowly in middle age.
2. The typical man spends the first part of his life in school,
often starting to work while still attending school, after
leaving school, he generally works more or less
continuously until retirement, then he remains out of labour
force until death.
3. The typical woman cycles between working in the home
and in the market after leaving school. However many
women work more or less continuously until retirement.
In fact the simplest way to extend the static model (one period)
labour supply to (multiple periods) dynamic model is to consider
leisure at any two different dates as two different goods and
similarly for consumption. Thus the function for lifetime utility U
is:
U = U[C(0), L(0), C(l), L(1), ..., CM, L(T)] 	 (5.15)
where:
qt):	 is consumption during period t.
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L(t) :	 is leisure during period 1.
(I):	 is the individual's lifetime start at t = 0 and ends at
t = T .
The next step is to specify the dynamic or lifetime budget
constraint subject to which lifetime utility U is maximised. In
most dynamic labour supply models, it is assumed that credit
markets are perfect, so that the individual may save or bon-ow at a
given market rate of interest r, another assumption is that the
individual has a positive or zero net worth, Z at the end of his life.
Let the level of net worth that the individual possesses at the start
of his life denoted by Z(0) . then the individual's net worth Z will
change over time according to the relation.
Z(t + 0 — Z(t) = rZ(t) + W (OH (t) — P(t) CO)	 (5.16)
where:
Z(t):	 is the individuals net worth at time I.
W(t) :	 is the wage rate at time t.
P(t):	 is the price level at time t.
rZ(t) :
	 is the interest earnings on the individual's net worth
at time t (equivalent to the V of the static model).
Z(t + :	 is the individual net worth at time (1 +1), the
requirement is that Z(1 + 1)	 .
With Z(0) = Z0 an exogenously given constant.
Note that the equation (5.16) is identical to (5.2) the budget
constraint of the static model, and that Z(t + 1) — Z(t) is the
change in the individual's net worth between I and t + 1, need not
be zero. If the right-hand side of (5.16) is positive, meaning that
the individual's income rZ(t)+W(t) H(t) exceeds his
expenditures on consumption good P(t) C(t) then the individual
is saving (adding to his net worth) whereas if the right-hand side of
the equation (5.16) is negative meaning that the individual's
income is less than his consumption expenditure, then he is
borrowing (reducing his net worth). So equation (5.16) indicates
that property or assets Z can be accumulated or decumulated over
time and therefore in a life cycle framework rZ(t) is a choice
variable, because it is a result of prior decision to borrow or save
and so forth that affect today's net worth Z(t) .
It is worth mentioning that the individual must have non-negative
net worth when he dies (that is have Z(t +
	 0 because, by
definition, a world of perfect credit markets is one in which the
individual must be able to repay all his debts by the time he dies.
Moreover, if the individual does not desire to leave inheritances to
other person when he dies there is no reason for him to have a
positive net worth (that is Z(t + > 0). Becker [34], to simplify
the analysis assumed that the individual does not desire to leave
any inheritances and that he has Z(t + 1) = 0, using the fact that
L(t) =1— Mt) .
Following Beckers assumption the equation (5.16) would be as
follows:
(1 + Z(0) + ±(1 +	 W (t) =	 +
t=0	 1=0
[w(I)L(1) + P(t)C(1)1
	 (5.17)
where the left-hand side represents a "full-wealth" or "maximum"
present value of the level of wealth attainable by the individual,
since he devotes all available time each period to working (that is
L(t)= 0 for all 0 and to save and earn-interest on all his earnings
in each period (that is C(t)= 0 for all 0 .
As illustrated, the similarity between the dynamic model's full
wealth and the static model's full income (V +14) is obvious; so
is the similarity between the dynamic model's expenditure stream
1=1 
+	 [W(t) L(t)+ P(1)0)1 and the static model's
expenditure WL + PC.
In both static and dynamic models analysis is concerned mainly
with two points, the nature of equilibrium and displacement from
equilibrium, either "comparative statics or comparative dynamics".
Thus, while static equilibrium is concerned with the levels of C
and L in response to given values of W, P and V with the
determinants of points of such marginal utility, dynamic
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equilibrium is concerned with sets of levels of C and L in response
to a net of values (time profiles) for W, P and a value of initial net
worth Z(0) with the determinants of points of such marginal
utility movement over time. In other words comparative dynamics
is concerned with low differences across individuals in initial net
worth or in wage or price time profile which will lead to
differences in time profiles for labour supply.
Having viewed these terms, then general dynamic model of labour
supply fits fairly into the analytical framework presented in
previous parts of this chapter. In large all measures that are
convenient for static models remain useful in a dynamic context.
For example, consider the comparative dynamic effect of an
increase in Z(0), provided consumption and leisure at all points in
the life cycle are normal goods, both C(t) and L(t) will rise in
response to the increase in Z(0) "an initial wealth effect".
Similarly, consider the comparative dynamics effect of a rise in
leisure's price W(t) at time t, coupled with a simultaneous
adjustment in initial assets Z(0) that keeps lifetime utility U
unchanged. Then L(t) will fall in response to this "income
compensated" or "initial wealth-compensated" rise in its own price
or own substitution effect.
By reviewing the family labour supply model (see Kaiksow [99]),
one can consider the comparative dynamics effect of an income
compensated (or initial wealth-compensated) rise in W(t) on
leisure at time t' L(r), where 1' # t . this is a cross-substitution
effect, one that will be positive or negative depending on whether
L(t) and L(t 1) are net substitutes or net complements. It is
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obvious then that the cross-substitution effect on L(t) of a rise in
W(e) will be equal to the cross-substitution effect on L(t i) of a
rise in W(t): provided that is to replace 'husband' with (t) and
'wife' with (t'). The decision-making unit in the family labour
supply static model is concerned with numerous persons, in the
dynamic model it is concerned with numerous periods.
Despite the formal similarity between static and dynamic labour
supply models, the later are more complex from an analytical
standpoint, and potentially more useful and comprehensive from an
empirical standpoint. For example, analysis of equilibrium in a
static labour supply model yields little or nothing. In contrast, in
the dynamic model, the analysis of equilibrium can yield a set of
predictions about the equilibrium behaviour of labour supply over
time.
Finally, according to this discussion, dynamic labour supply as
function of participation rate is specified as:
P(i) = P(t)[Z(0), W(0), W(i), ..., W(i), P(0), P(i), ...,
P(i)A(0), T4(1),...,74(t)]
where:
P:	 denotes the participation rate and 71 denotes any other
variables added to the model.
5.2.2 The Dynamic Equilibrium of Labour Supply Model
Dynamic equilibrium, the optimum in a dynamic labour supply
model with exogenous wages as defined by Killingsworth [103] is
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a set of equilibrium time profiles for labour supply and
consumption determined for a given value of initial wealth Z(0) ,
and time profiles of wages W(t) and price P(t) for all period t.
To show how will equilibrium labour supply behave over the
lifecycle, it is worth mentioning three factors or motives that affect
the shape of the equilibrium labour supply profile. First and main
factor is an efficiency effect that makes individual working more
during periods when the wage (the opportunity cost of leisure) is
highest. Second, the interest rate effect, the fact that the individual
may invest his earnings at compound interest will induce him to
work relatively much at first, bank his earnings and reduce his
labour supply at advancing age. Third, on the other hand, time
preference effect; that is in more formal term, the individual would
prefer to enjoy leisure now rather than later, provided leisure is a
normal good, this will induce him to work relatively little at first,
meaning that labour supply will tend to rise as time passes.
The rate of change of labour supply over time due to the efficiency
effect will be positive when the rate of change in the wage is
positive and will be larger (smaller) in absolute value whenever the
rate of change in the wage is larger (smaller) in absolute value.
The interest rate effect on labour is proportional to the negative of
the rate of interest, -r, whereas the time preference effect on labour
supply is proportional to the subjective rate of time preference p.
These two effects can be collapsed into a single time effect. Thus
the rate of change of labour supply over time due to the time effect,
that is the net result ofp, r will be positive or negative depending
on whether p — r is positive or negative.
Thus for example if p = r (offset each other), then H or labour
supply and W will always move in the same direction over the
lifecycle as the individual fulfills his equilibrium plan over time.
On the other hand, if p <r then H (labour supply) and W may
move in opposite directions for a part of the lifecycle. Suppose
that both p <r and wage rises slowly later on. Then early in the
lifecycle both wage and labour supply will rise, but later on labour
supply will peak and then start to fall, whereas wages will go on
increasing but at a slower rate.
Accordingly, earnings will also increase early in the lifecycle but
will fall later on. Finally, the optimum in a dynamic model may
entail a "corner solution" in which hours of work during one or
more period will be zero. This means that hours of work will be
zero at any moment in the lifecycle when the wage rate is
sufficiently low, lower than the minimum wage level required to
induce the individual to participate. Hours of work or labour
supply will remain at zero even if the wage is rising rapidly as long
as the wage level remains below the minimum.
5.2.3. Dynamic Equilibrium Function
To set up the dynamic equilibrium effects Weiss [171] assumed
that the lifetime equilibrium does not involve any corners and
suggested an 'interior solution' involving positive labour supply
H(t) at all 1. Accordingly, lifecycle is to be treated as a
continuous sequence of infinite small instants and the individual's
lifetime utility U as:
U . TS CPI 1I[C(t), L(i)idi	 (5.18)
0
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where:
u:	 is the instantaneous utility function.
C(t):	 is the consumption of goods at time t.
L(t):	 is the leisure of time t.
pt:	 is the individual's subjective rate of time preference.
That is the present value of the individual's lifetime utility (1 as the
'sum' (integral) of utilities u received at each distinct instant in the
lifecycle from t = 0 to t = T.
The instantaneous utility function u(t) is assumed to be well
behaved. This means that the marginal utility of consumption of
goods and leisure at any moment t is positive but diminishes with
the amount of C(t) and L(t) that is:
u(i)>O, uL (t)> 0, u(i)<O, zia (t) <0
Thus, at any moment t, indifference curves showing the
combinations of C(t) and L(t) that yield the same instantaneous
utility U(t) so that:
Al 
= ucc(t) ua (1)- 'la (i) uLc(t) > 0
	 (5.19)
In order to simplify Killingsworth [103] assumed "for a moment"
that the lifecycle consisted of only one period and that the
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individual were forced to pick C(t) and L(t) so to maximize
single period utility 11(1) (rather than lifetime utility U) subject to
the conventional constraint:
P(t) C(t) = W(t) H(t) + V(t)	 (5.20)
where:
V(t):	 is the amount of income received by the individual
during period t.
Thus income effect on C(t) or L(t) as a change in V(t) is:
YCV ( I ) = C (I) 11 LL ( I ) L (I ) I CL ( I )] (5.21)I A(I)
YLV (t) = -[1 L (I) 1I CC (I) t ( I) 1I LC (I )] / A(1)	 (5.22)
where:
YCV (I)
	
is the income effect of a change in V(t) on
consumer goods.
LV (I)	 is the income effect of a change in V(t) on leisure.
Also the substitution effect on C(t) and L(t) of a change in its
price CP(t), W(t) is:
S(i) =	 (l) 1 4 a (1) / A(t)	 (5.23)
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S LW ( I ) = U L( I) U CC ( 1 ) I A(I)
	 (5.24)
where:
Scp (t):	 is the substitution effect of a change in price on
consumer goods.
Sni,(t):	 is the substitution effect of a change in wage on
leisure.
Then the efficiency effect and time effect that affect the dynamic
equilibrium can be obtained as Weiss [171] stated:
Mt) = —Sim, (1) [W(t)/ WO)] + Yn, (t) (p - r)	 (5.25)
where:
if (1) :	 is the change of hours of work (labour supply) over
time.
And the first term on the right-hand side of the above equation is
the efficiency effect, the second term is the time effect.
It is more appropriate to imply an efficiency effect and a time
effect in the equilibrium dynamics, while refer to the same as
substitution effect and income (wealth) effect in a comparative
dynamics.
5.3	 Comparative Dynamics
The comparative dynamics properties of dynamic labour supply models
depend on the relative magnitudes of dynamic income (or wealth) own
substitution, and cross substitution effects. The magnitudes and the
directions of these effects depend crucially on the extent to which changes
in exogenous variables (e.g. wage rate) in a given period t are anticipated,
also these effects depend on whether the individual is at a "corner"
(unemployed) or not during part of the lifecycle. If so then changes in the
wage profile need not have any effect on labour supply during periods
when the wage rate is well below the reservation or the minimum level,
although such changes may have effects on labour supply during other
periods. To illustrate the effect of unanticipated increase in income (or
net wealth), suppose that the individual suddenly learns at time 0 that at
time t* > 0 he will receive a previously unexpected lump sum transfer
payment A. The present value of this payment is (1 + r)_ fx A, so its
impact on comsumption and leisure at all dates will be identical to its
effect if it is paid at time 0. But if the individual already knows at time 0
that he will receive that payment at t * nothing will have happened
because the individual already formulated his lifecycle optimization
strategy according to his previous knowledge, there is no element of
surprise.
Next, consider the effect of an increase in the wage of the individual at
time t W(t) on both, labour supply at the same time H(t) and labour
supply at other dates Mt') where t' # t. If the individual knows about
this 'increase' at time0, this knowledge will already have been built into
the plan at time 0, for supplying at time t, t' and every other time. This
kind of wage increase is fully anticipated and does not cause labour
supply at time t or any other times. On the other hand, if the increase in
wage comes as a complete surprise to the individual, there will be both
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income and substitution effects on labour supply at time t and all future
periods.
The income effect leads to reduction in labour supply, because the
increase in the wage raises the individual's income (or wealth). On the
other hand, the wage increase makes leisure at time t more expensive
(worker sells leisure to employer) and makes leisure at other dates t' t
relatively less expensive than the individual thought would be at time 0,
when he formulated his lifecyle plan. This will raise labour supply and
reduce leisure time at time t, due to an own substitution effect and will
raise labour supply and reduce leisure at other time t' t due to a cross
substitution effect depending on whether leisure at t' is a net substitute or
a net complement for leisure at time I.
Finally the comparative dynamics refers not only to shifts of labour
supply in profiles that facing a given individual but also to differences in
profiles facing different individuals. To illustrate, suppose individual A
faces a wage profile that is uniformly higher than the wage profile facing
individual B. Then the difference between the labour supply of A and B
at any date t may be decomposed into the following:
A positive own-substitution effect arising from the fact the A's
wage at t is higher than B's wage.
II	 A cross-substitution effect, arising from the fact that A's wages at
all time t' t are higher than B's which will be positive (negative)
if leisure times at different dates are complements (substitutes).
III	 An income (wealth) effect, arising from the fact that A's full
income exceeds B's, which will be negative on labour supply,
provided leisure is a normal good.
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If A's wages are higher than B's by the same proportion at all time one
can say (by the composite commodity theorem) that composite leisure
will be lower and therefore lifetime earning will be higher for A than for
B.
5.4 Unemployment and Employment Function
From a theoretical point of view the stock of unemployment in an
economy at a particular moment in time is defined as
(5.26)
Where:
(7, = numbers unemployed
L,	 = total labour force
E,	 = number employed.
In percentage terms:
U., I L, =(i—E, 1 4)100 = U,
U, =U, 11— E,
(5.27)
(5.28)
When we measure the stock of unemployment we are seeking a measure
of the degree of underutilization of labour in the economy. However, this
meausre of utilization is only accurate if we assume the unemployed are
wholly unemployed and the employed are fully utilized. Bornstein [38]
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has drawn attention to this problem when comparing unemployment in
capitalist market economies like Britain and socialist centrally planned
economies like former USSR. Generally unemployment or 'disguised'
employment occurs when workers have jobs but are underutilized, for
example part-time. Such underutilization of employed labour does not
only occur in socialist and capitalist economies. Economists have
emphasised its incidence in developing economies.
In Bahrain economy, underemployment can be considered in two
categories. Firstly, workers can simply be required to work fewer hours
than they are able or willing to work. Secondly, production per unit of
labour time can be lower than is possible given the capital stock available.
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CHAPTER SIX
Labour Supply Model
6.1	 Introduction
The aggregate labour supply function is a cornerstone of both neoclassical
theory and short-run keynesian-type employment theory. In the long-run,
it is generally assumed that the supply of labour from any fixed
population is an inelastic function of the real wage rate. In the short-run,
on the other hand, it is commonly assumed that the labour supply is
infinitely elastic at some rigid real or money wage rate. Researchers have
found it necessary to proceed on the basis of certain widely accepted
assumptions. The purpose of this chapter is firstly to estimate the labour
supply mainly as a function of real wage and identifying the elasticity in
which dynamic and comparative dynamics assumptions could be
examined on annual time series of labour force in the state of Bahrain
covering the period 1971-1994. Secondly to test the two hypotheses
relative wage and permanent wage that is adopted in some research i.e.
Wacher [169] and finally to test discouraged and added-workers effect of
unemployment. Use is made of cross-section data and published
estimates issued by The Central Statistics Organisation and the Ministry
of Finance and National Economy.
Because of sensitivity of some age-groups of labour force to variations in
unemployment and wage rate, it may be fruitful to regard the working
population as consisting of only two categories: (1) the primary workers;
those who are more permanently attached to the reported labour force
(prime-age males); and (2) those who, are in the reported labour force
only when employed and tend to drop out of it when not employed
(secondary workers). The participation rate of the primary workers would
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be expected to be approximately constant at a high level and that of the
secondary workers to be considerably smaller and more variable.
The model is applied to Bahraini males secondary workers: 15-19 age and
65 and over and all females. It is also applied to primary workers;
Bahraini males and non-Bahraini males and females, for the period 197 1-
1994.
The labour supply model is constructed in the following equation:
logLIPt =B0 +131 W*+B2 WIW*+B3 PI P*+B4U+E
Where
is the labour force employed and unemployed people of each
group.
Pt
	 is the working population 15 years and over of each group.
LIP,:Labour force participation rate of each group at time t, which is
defined as the ratio of employed and unemployed who seek jobs by
the working population 15 years and over of that group.
These groups are defined as follows:
TLI P:
	
Labour force participation of total working population,
Bahraini and non-Bahraini.
MLI P:	 Labour force participation of working males population,
Bahraini and non-Bahraini.
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FL I P:	 Labour force participation of females working population,
Bahraini and non-Bahraini.
TL I PB :	 Labour force participation of total Bahraini working
population.
ML I PB:	 Labour force participation of Bahraini males working
population.
FL I PB:	 Labour force participation of Bahraini females working
population (secondary workers).
L I P15-19 •	 Labour force participation rate of Bahraini working
population 15-19 age group (secondary workers).
L I P65÷ :	 Labour force participation of Bahraini working population
65 age group and over (secondary workers).
TNL I P:	 Labour force participation of total non-Bahraini working
population.
MNL I P:	 Labour force participation of males non-Bahraini working
population.
FNL I P:	 Labour force participation of non-Bahraini females working
population.
W* is the average permanent real wage.
W	 is the average current wage.
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W/W* is a proxy for "relative wage or income".
P	 is the actual consumer price.
P*	 is the perceived price.
P/P* is the inflation (money illusion).
U	 is the aggregate unemployment rate.
E	 is the error term.
In this model where all variables are in logarithmic form, suppliers of
labour as reacting primary to four variables; an anticipated 'normal' or
permanent real wage; a relative income or a relative wage; a money
illusion, the deviation of the actual price from its perceived price; and
aggregate unemployment rate.
6.2	 Definition of Variables
The variable wage W is represented by average monthly earnings
excluding over-time in the private sector. The decision to use earnings
data and not compensation is based on the notion that pecuniary benefits
may not be relevant or at least as relevant as current wage employee can
expect to receive if employed.
Permanent Wage (W*):
The permanent wage theory is used to estimate the shape of the traditional
labour supply curve of the various groups or the underlying work-leisure
trade-off. The permanent real wage (W*) is a distributed lag variable of
current and past values of W. It is built directly into the variable after best
result is obtained when wage (W) is lagged by one year.
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In the dynamic labour supply function, current wage may not yield
meaningful results. Instead, it is essential to analyse labour supply by
decomposing the observed current wage W(t) into two components
W(t) and W * . Such that labour supply does respond to permanent wage
W * but does not respond to current wage W. Permanent wage reflects
earnings prospects in lifetime while a current wage does not.
Relative Wage or Income (W/W*):
W/W* variable is a proxy for relative wage or relative income that is
today's standard of living in relation to the past standard. The relative
income theory has been explored by W Kaiksow [94] when labour supply
model was applied to Bahraini females. It showed that the greater the
income, the lower the rate of labour force participation of females. The
direct effect of the variable W/W* as a relative standard of living on
labour supply may be illustrated when past wages are high relative to
present wages, all secondary workers, especially wives may tempt to
sacrifice their leisure and enter the labour market to supplement their
family's income.
The Inflation or Money Illusion Variable (P/P*):
In the labour supply model, labour force participation rate is viewed as a
function of the real wage, to the extent that perceived prices P*, (which is
a distributed lag variable of current and past values of P) are not equal to
actual prices (P). The perceived price level as well as the real wage could
be a determinant of the labour supply. For example, whereas workers
contracts are in money wages, workers may tend to evaluate money wages
by deflating by price level.
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The influence of money illusion or the inflation variable, however, may be
represented as the excess demand for goods, so it may act as an indicator
for excess demand for labour.
Unemployment Rate or Labour Market Variable (U):
The unemployment rate variable is measured by the ratio of unemployed
to the labour force those who are unemployed and looking for
employment plus employed. The model implies that labour supply
partially depends on labour market conditions or labour demand, so
potential entrants to labour market and hence to labour force may respond
to job opportunities. In this model discouraged and added workers
hypothesis is tested.
The results showed that the greater the unemployment rate, the smaller the
actual labour supply among secondary workers in relation to the
equilibrium of frill-employment labour supply, at the prevailing real wage
W*. For a person to be included in labour supply at the real wage W*, the
work-leisure trade-off must indicate that the cost of leisure (foregone) at
most equals the benefits of working. When unemployment exists
(disequilibrium) a new costs element is introduced which is dependent on
the probability of not finding a job and includes both the pecuniary costs
of the job search and the psychic costs if turned down. Since this new
cost is included in the individual's decision process, an increase in
unemployment will make the cost of a job outweigh the potential reward
for those on the borderline (secondary workers) of labour force
participation. On the other hand, conversely, that a rising level of
unemployment brings additional of those secondary workers into the
labour market to support their unemployed family's members.
84
6.3	 Procedure of Estimation 
In this study the labour supply as a function of four explanatory variables
is estimated by a multiple regression equation for the period 1971-1994.
Ordinary least squares technique is used to estimate the regression
equations. All the variables (real wage, relative wage (income), inflation
rate and unemployment rate) are transformed into logarithmic form in
order to improve the estimation. The following points must be taken into
consideration for the purpose of estimating the equation:
Firstly, for the estimation purpose, some assumptions must be made
concerning the dynamic features of the model. In particular permanent
real wage W* and perceived price P* are to be replaced with observable
series. Consequently, these variables are measured as distributed lags of
present and past values of the observable wage and price series. This
consists of building lags directly into the equations to obtain the long-run
coefficients. It is found that lagging by one year is the most convenient
(i.e. best model).
Secondly, account must be taken of the fact that errors in the current
unemployment rate may be correlated with errors in the labour force
participation rate, so that the coefficient of the unemployment rate is
biased toward larger negative values. Since the labour supply may be
adjusted with a lag to the unemployment rate, this lag effect can be taken
into account and so the possible bias is reduced, by replacing the
unemployment rate with a distributed lag series of current and past values.
It is found that a lag of one year unemployment is the best result obtained.
In order to explore and improve the estimation a dummy variable is
introduced taking into account the values of unemployment rate between
the period 1984 to 1994. The results did not show any significant
changes. (It is therefore omitted from the equation). It is possible that the
relation between the labour force participation and unemployment
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depends mainly on: firstly, the probability of secondaiy workers finding a
job may decrease in a discontinuous manner with increase in
unemployment. An explanation of this, is that at high levels of
unemployment and, especially at very high levels (chronical) the
probability of secondary workers being hired falls significantly.
Secondly, the search costs rise discontinuously with the unemployment
rate so that a worker who is willing to work at the prevailing real wage
may only become discouraged and leaves the labour force after he is
likely to have devoted some time to his job search.
Finally, although the essential requirements to reduce the errors
correlation has been taken into account upon building the main structure
of the model, obtaining a best model for each group required additional
statistical techniques. In this regard and in order to get the best estimation
stepwise on exogenous and lag on both endogenous and exogenous
techniques are computed taking into account the following important and
sensitive points: firstly, in this thesis labour supply behaviour of each
group is measured as a function of main observable percunaiiy variables
on the basis of neoclassical economic theory; work-leisure trade off.
Secondly, theory of permanent wage is tested. The permanent and relative
wage hypotheses suggest different signs for the magnitude B2 - B 1 in the
equation, so it is possible to test their importance. It is expected that both
theories are operating.
The best models with their results are presented in Appendix I. Analysis
of the results in detail are following the introduction of the permanent
wage theory.
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6.4	 The Results
Introduction of the Permanent Wage Theory
In this chapter the purpose of the wage variable is to estimate the shape of
labour supply curve of the various groups or the underlying work-leisure
trade-off (as described in the previous chapter).
The response of the labour force to changes in wages is composed of two
components: a substitution and an income effects. The substitution effect
is positve since an increase in the real wage (with income is constant)
increase the opportunity cost of leisure time (in this case leisure is an
expensive good) thus encouraging individuals to enter the labour force.
The income effect is negative since an increase in wage (thus income)
provides workers with the opportunity of increasing both their
consumption of goods and leisure. A positive income effect would
indicate that the increase in wage is low and that leisure is an inferior
good.
The supply curve of labour as depicted in Figure 6, combines the
substitution and income effects and therefore be either positive or
negative sloped depending on whether the income effect of a wage
increase is smaller or larger than the substitution effect. If the substitution
effect dominates at low wage level and then is outweighed by the income
effect the labour supply curve will be negatively sloped. During optimum
lifetime in equilibrium dynamic model, hours of work in one or more
period will be zero (corner solution detailed in previous chapter). This
means, when labour supply curve is strongly negative, the wage rate is
sufficiently lower than the minimum permanent wage (I/V < W I
required to induce the individual to participate in labour supply.
Accordingly even when the wage is rising rapidly, participation will
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remain at zero so long as the wage is not "efficient". It is a main factor in
equilibrium lifecycle (efficiency effect is detailed in the previous chapter)
that shapes labour supply profile.
Since the supply curve is an equilibrium concept, its argument is a
permanent wage variable (W*) where its parameter assumed to be
positive. A change in this permanent wage mean displacement from
equilibrium. The disequilibrium transitory wage effect is represented in
W / W * where W is the real current wage. This transitory effect can be
identified with the substitution effect since it relates to the response of the
labour force to a change in the current wage (W) with a constant
permanent wage (W*). The basic hypothesis which is represented in the
efficiency effect theory, is that workers time their labour market with
period when the current wage (W) is high relative to the permanent W *.
If we assume that W * is fixed in the short-run, thus an increase in W to
point (b) in Figure 6 with W * constant causes a movement upward in
short-run labour supply curve. In otherwords increase in W *. This
displacement from equilibrium (comparative dynamics detailed in the
previous chapter) or increase in W * so that W* = W causes declines in
the labour supply to its equilibrium (a). A new S(W/ W*) then intersects
S (TY  *) at (a) with slope again B2 > B1 when another wage increase
occurs.
In addition to the indirect effects of the variable W / W * which
introduces the substitution effect as previously mentioned. It may also
have direct effects on labour force participation as well. For example
when current standards of living are above those expected on the basis of
past experience that is W> W * . Secondary workers choose leisure or
producing more children.
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Having introduced the permanent wage theory, now labour supply
equation in logarithmic form of each of the underlying groups as follows:
1 - Total Labour Supply Model
Total labour force participation model showed a positive serial correlation
when first fitted by ordinary least squares method. Then stepwise and
differences techniques were applied to the model. A lag of four times and
exclusion of inflation variable produced the best fitted model for the
change of labour supply. In Figure 6.1 the normal probability plots of
residual across the regression line ensured normality and chart of the
residuals reveals that the series is smooth across the zero axis.
The results of least squares fitting of the equation are as follows:
TL/P = 0.977 - 0.183W* - 0.0042W/W* + 0.0460 U
dif 4 lags	 (10.42)	 (9.34)	 (2.92)	 (2.98)
R-sq = 90.6%
	
F = 51.40	 DW = 1.81
(t-values are given within parenthesis)
D-W, Durbin and Watson statistic, test for serial correlation indicates no
positive autocorrelation at 5% level of significance.
R-sq is the multiple correlation coefficient. F-statistic is used to test
hypothesis involving multiple parameters.
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The model indicates a very good fit to the participation function. It
almost explained 90 percent of the variation in the labour supply
behaviour in Bahraini labour market. F distribution is highly significant
at 5% level of significance.
The coefficient estimate of the permanent wage variable is negative and
highly significant and indicates that a change of participation with respect
to wage change is inelastic. It is -0.18. This is consistent with the general
assumption of long-run labour supply. Also, this finding highly supports
the "efficiency effect" theory that mentioned in the previous chapter. This
result showed how well the efficiency effect dominates during
equilibrium labour market which takes four periods of time to clear.
Also transitory labour supply wage to disequalibrium is inelastic. It is -
0.004. So the relative wage or income is negative. Its coefficient is
greater than the permanent wage coefficient B2 > B1 but both permanent
and relative wage are negative. In other words a change of real wage
prevailing in the labour market remains lower than acceptable over four
periods of lifecycle . (This supports permanent wage theory). Some
labour is supplied at disequalibrium wage which is higher than market
clearing wage as it is shown in Figure 6.2
In this case change on labour supply curve is constant at (a) efficient
equilibrium wage as depicted in Figure 6.2. During four periods of
lifetime, participation of some individuals of this group in one or more
periods will be zero. The permanent wage rate is relatively lower than
required to induce more suppliers to participate in the labour market.
Labour supply will remain at zero for some individuals as long as the
wage is ineffective. The most probable reason is an increase of natural
unemployment due to fractional unemployment resulting from a very slow
clearing process in the labour market.
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Unemployment rate coefficient shows a statistically significant positive
sign on change of labour supply over four periods of lifecycle. This
means that either added workers effect dominates over the four periods of
lifetime or it is outweighed by this effect following the discouraged
worker effect over one or more period. Because this model includes both
Bahraini and non-Bahrainis in competitive labour market, so its
equilibrium treats unequal equally. The outcome is high unemployment
rate particularly among Bahrainis who believe that permanent wage is
unfairly established in the inefficient labour market, which clears very
slowly each four periods of lifecylce. In conclusion of this model is that a
significant increase of unemployment rate due to inefficient wage,
associated with structural unemployment due to slow clearing process
exists in Bahrain's economy together with excess in labour supply that
restores clearing wage at a low level. Prices are also low besides a
deficiency of demand that makes market force mechanism in terms of
price and wage inefficiently operates in a slump economy with
unemployment stock significantly increases.
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2 - Total Male Labour Supply Model
Total male labour supply model upon fitting the least squares method
showed a negative serial correlation. To solve this problem and obtain
unbaised estimate of change of the independent variables; W*,WIW*.
U and inflation PI P* on the change of labour supplied by this group, a
sum of three periods of time has produced the required best model. In
Figure 6.3 plot and histogram of the residuals clearly confirm the
normality of errors and chart of residuals shows a smooth fitting while
volatile fluctuations are eliminated.
Results of the model are as follows:
ML/P	 =	 0.948 + 0.0639W* - 0.0102W/W*
Add 3 lags
	 (11.22)	 (7.43)	 (3.24)
+ 0.00149U + 0.113P/P*
(0.18)	 (2.26)
R-sq = 92% F = 45.96	 DW = 1.63
(t-values are given within parenthesis)
There is no autocorrelation.
The model indicates a very good fit for total male, it explained 92% of the
variation of labour at a high statistical significant level supplied by total
male (primary workers).
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The coefficient of the permanent wage W* is positive and significant it is
0.06. The transitory wage is negative, it is -0.012. These indicate that a
change of labour supply with respect to change of wage is rather inelastic.
A change in wage showed significantly the substitution effect on the
change of labour supply through disequilibrium labour market. The
relative wage or income coefficient WI W* is negative. It showed the
income effect on a change of labour supply. When males have relatively
better income than the wage rate prevailing through disequilbrium labour
market they choose leisure. It is more expensive than hours of work.
Since B2 <B1 , this supports relative wage hypotheses. Change on labour
supply curve of this group is constant at disequilibrium wage which is
higher than permanent or market clearing wage.
The coefficient of unemployment although is not significant it is
outweighed by the additional worker effect over three periods of lifetime.
For primary workers, such findings seem normal as these groups are
responsible for their families. Accordingly an increase in the
unemployment rate does not prevent them from participation in the labour
market. Generally, there is an excess of labour supplied by this group
with involuntary unemployment due in particular to inefficient wage.
The coefficient of the inflation variable significantly indicates a positive
response to participation over three periods of lifetime. However, this
variable may represent an excess demand for labour as a result of excess
demand for goods.
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3 - Total Female Labour Supply Model
Total female labour supply model for Bahrainis and non-Bahrainis
showed a positive serial correlation when first is fitted by O.L.S. method.
To solve this problem on the basis of the proceeded criteria, particularly
bais and variance, the change of female labour supply is best obtained
when data are lagged by three periods of time. In Figure 6.4, the plot of
the residuals across the regression line is almost normal and the
fluctuations are smoothed in the differenced data.
Results of the model are as follows:
FL/P = 3.639 - 0.696W* - 0.499W/W* + 0.237U
diff 3 lags
	 (7.12)	 (-6.52)	 (-1.03)	 (2.64)
• R-sq = 77.4%	 F = 19.44	 DW = 1.40
(t-values are given within parenthesis)
There is no autocorrelation at 1% level of significance.
Females participation model showed a good fit, R 2 is 77.4% and is highly
statistically significant. The coefficient estimate of the permanent wage
variable is negative but significant. It indicates that an efficiency effect
on labour supply dominates over three periods of lifecycle. The change of
females participation to change in wage is inelastic. It is -0.69. This
inelasticity of change on labour supply to wage indicates the dominance
of efficiency effect during disequilibrium labour market among females
which takes three periods of lifetime to clear through 1971-1994.
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The change of the labour participation to changes in relative wage or
income W/ W* showed an income effect, but is not statistically
significant. Its coefficient is greater than permanent wage coefficient
B2 > B 1 . The real wage prevailing in the labour market is lower than
acceptable over three periods of lifetime. (This support permanent wage
hypothesis). The relative income W/ W* variable may also have direct
effect as current standards of living to the past standards, that is W> W *.
In this case females (secondary workers) choose leisure or stay home and
produce more children. Change on labour supply curve of females is
strongly backward sloped due to inefficient wages.
Conversely, unemployment rate coefficient significantly indicates a
positive sign. An increase in unemployment rate induces more wives to
enter the labour market to offset their unemployed husband, or to keep up
. to their standard of living. This strongly supports the explanation of
ineffeciency of wage and the existence of involuntary unemployment in
loose labour market due to deficiency of demand.
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4 - Total Bahraini Labour Supply Model
Total Bahraini labour supply model showed a first order autocorrelation
when first is fitted by ordinary least squares method. Then difference and
lags technique were applied. The best model obtained for a change on
labour supply by change of these exogenous varaibles is a lag of one
period of time. In Figure 6.5, the plot of the residuals of the differenced
data across the regression line is normal. Also the chart of residuals
illustrates a non correlated series across the zero axis except the irregular
long-run fluctuations.
Results of the model are as follows:
TL/PB = 0.00199 + 0.160W* + 0.0517 W/W* - 0.0036U
diff I lag
	 (0.41)	 (2.82)	 (3.54)	 (2.11)
R-sq = 55% F= 7.75	 DW= 1.70
(t-values are given within parenthesis)
According to Durbin-Watson statistic test, there is no autocorrelation at
5% level of significance.
In this integrated Bahraini labour force participation (primary and
secondary workers), the model explains 55 percent of the variation in their
behaviour as a function of the permanent wage, relative income and
unemployment rate explanatory variables. The coefficient of the wage
variable is significantly positive. The coefficient of relative wage or
income presented by W I W * is also significant. The coefficient of wage
is greater than the coefficient of relative wage or relative income B 2 <B1
this support the relative wage hypothesis. Elasticity of change on
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participation with respect to change in wage is 0.16. The substitution
effect of change on wage induces individual to substitute leisure by work
over disequilibrium labour market. Change on labour supply curve of
Bahraini workers is strongly sloped upward at (b) as depicted in Figure
6.6. Unemployment coefficient showed a discouraged-worker effect. It is
significant. In this case, search cost, particularly psychological cost is
rather high to Bahrainis. This means that Bahraini workers respond
partially to job opportunities. This finding supports aggregate demand
policy. Based on the discouraged worker theory maintaining that a stimuli
to aggregate demand not only would provide more employment
opportunities but would absorb the labour force of workers who earlier
had either left the labour force when jobs became scarce or who were
prevented from entering it at all (labour reserve). As a result of the
existence of these workers, Government's effort to reduce the increase of
unemployment rate via market clearing device would be hard. The reason
is clearly illustrated in Figure 6.6, any unemployment along a to b due to
deficiency of demand is involuntary associated with natural
unemployment (equilibrium) resulting from an inefficient wage.
Although transitory labour supply elasticity is positive; 0.05 but clearly is
very low. It indicates clearly the existence of disequilibrium
unemployment character among Bahrainis labour force together with
excess labour supply.
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5 - Male Bahraini Labour Supply Model
Male Bahraini labour supply model showed a first order autocorrelation
when first is fitted by O.L.S. method. Similar to the model of total
Bahraini suppliers, the change of male labour supply in response to
changes on permanent wage, relative income and unemployment rate is
best obtained where these variables are lagged by one period of time.
Also stepwise technique produced a good fit when inflation variable is
excluded. Figure 6.7, similar to 6.6. In Figure 6.7, the differenced series
is almost normal across the regression line and is smoothed out of the
fluctuations.
Results of the model are as follows:
ML/PB = 0.00162 + 0.0725W* + 0.0656W/W* + 0.0072U
diff I lag	 (-0.48)
	
(1.82)	 (6.41)	 (0.32)
R-sq = 71.8%
	
F = 16.09	 DW = 1.79
(t-values are given within parenthesis)
There is no autocorrelation at 5% level of significance based on Durbin-
Watson test statistic. The model significantly indicates a good fit for
Bahraini primary workers.
The model explained almost 72% of the variation on male labour supply
behaviour in response to change on permanent wage, relative wage and
unemployment rate. In this model the substitution effect of change on
relative or transitory wage (W / W 1 has significantly predominated. Its
parameter is smaller than the permanent wage (W1 parameter, B 2 < B1 ,
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this supports relative wage theory. Elasticity of change on participation
for Bahraini males with respect to wage change is 7%, it is greater than
the elasticity of total males model.
Change on labour supply curve of Bahraini males through disequalibrium
labour market is strongly sloped upward. The substitution effect
dominates at a current wage prevailing in the market, which is higher than
permanent wage. To interpret this phenomenon with respect to
comparative dynamics properties. Individual response to change on
labour supply depends on the relative magnitude of his income or wealth,
own substitution (income or wealth of time 0 and cross-substitution
(income or wealth of t' where t' = t —1) effects. The magnitude of this
effect depends on the extent to which changes in his wage in this two
periods of time are anticipated, also depend on whether the individual is
employed or unemployed during this two periods of his lifetime.
Accordingly, the increasing labour supply of Bahraini primary workers is
caused by either, individual gets an unanticipated increase in his
permanent wage, or he was unemployed.
Unemployment rate variable's coefficient shows an added-worker effect.
Conversely to the discouraged worker effect. Additional worker
hypothesis asserts that rising levels of unemployment bring additional
workers into the labour market.
However, the model for this group is similar to total Bahrainis labour
force, both are characterised by excess labour supply.
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6- Model of Secondary Workers Bahrainis Males 15-19 Age Group
Labour Supply 
In the secondary workers males 15-19 age group model, dummy time
variable is included in the equation, in order to resolve correlation. As we
proceeded on the other models, stepwise and differences lag techniques is
applied. The best model was obtained when both labour supply and the
explanatory variables are differenced four times. Similarly to total and
male groups in Figure 6.6 and 6.7. In Figure 6.8, the residuals of the
differenced series seems almost normal across the regression line and the
fluctuations are smoothed out.
Results of the model are as follows:
UP1549 = 0.274 - 0.765W* + 0.158 W/W* + 0.778t1 - 0.408T
diff 4 lag (1.96) (-2.40) (0.94)	 (1.88) (-3.77)
R-sq = 59.1%
	
F= 5.43	 DW= 1.81
(t-values are given within parenthesis)
There is no autocorrelation at 5% level of significance.
The model explained 59% of the variation on the participation of this
group. The coefficient of wage although negative is highly significant.
The response to change of participation with respect to wage change for
this group is inelastic (-0.76).
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This result represents a very strong support for the "efficiency effect"
theory. The relative wage or income coefficient is positive, but is not
significant B2 > B 1 . This result support permanent wage theory.
Although relative wage coefficient shows a substitution effect on change
of participation, the change on wage rate prevailing in the labour market
is lower than anticipated which prevents age group 15-19 males from
entering labour force during equilibrium employment of four periods of
lifetime. This finding supports "labour reserve" theory. For this group
the substitution effect insignificantly operates at low wage level over
disequilibrium of lifetime. Transitory labour supply elasticity of this
group although very low; 0.15, it is greater than Bahrainis primary
workers. It is quite evident that these 15-19 age group suffers of high and
long duration of natural unemployment over equilibrium labour market
due to low employment opportunities which could be converted into
structural unemployment.
The unemployment variable coefficient indicates a positive attitude
towards participation in the labour force. An added worker effect is
outweighed over four periods of lifetime.
Time effect of this group on changes of participation is a highly significantly
negative: that is in more formal terms, the individual of this group would
prefer to enjoy leisure at this period of lifetime rather than later, this will
induce him to work relatively little at first, devoting more time for schooling,
meaning that labour supply will tend to rise as time passes.
Generally, the findings of this model of secondary worker is reasonably
good and accurate in the absence of schooling effect. The findings are
consistent with the neoclassical based theory work-leisure trade-off. On
the other hand the results reveal excess labour supplied by this group
associated with increase of unemployment which is a character of slump
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7 - Model of Labour Supply of Secondary Workers Bahrainis Males
Age Group 65 and Over
The model of secondary workers males age group 65 and over showed a
positive serial correlation when first fitted by O.L.S. method. In order to
solve this problem differences and stepwise techniques were applied.
Time variable also is included in the model. The best mode produced is
when labour supply is differenced four lags. In Figure 6.9, the most
smoothed series is illustrated. The plot of the residuals across the
regression is almost normal.
Results of the model are as follows:
LIP 65+	 =	 31.9 + 0.647W* + 0.262W/W*
diff 4 lag
	 (2.48)	 (2.57)	 (0.45)
+ 0.269U - 0.395P/P* - 7.60T
(0.96)	 (-0.74)	 (-2.48)
R-sq = 65%
	
F= 5.20	 DW= 1.74
(t-values are given within parenthesis)
According to Durbin-Watson test statistic, there is no autocorrelation at
5% level of significance.
The model explained 65 percent of the variation on participation of this
group.
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The permanent wage variable W* indicates significantly a substitution
effect on change of participation in the labour force. The relative income
W/W* is also positive but is not significant. The response of change on
participation of this group with respect to wage change is rather inelastic
(0.65) over part of four periods of lifetime. Change on labour supply
curve is sloped upward. This support the importance of relative wage
hypothesis. Individuals of this group participate in the labour market to
increase their opportunities for both more consumer goods and leisure
time.
Unemployment rate coefficient indicates also an added-worker effect, but
is not significant. On the otherhand, inflation variable coefficient
indicates a negative sign but is not significant. If this variable represents
demand side for labour then it decreases their opportunities to participate
in the labour market.
Time effect on the change of labour supply on this group is negatively
significant, that is in normal terms, following the peak of labour supply,
the later starts to fall, whereas wages may be increasing but at a slower
rate. However, the results reveal excess labour supplied by this group
associated with increase of unemployed inflation rate effect is negative
which confirms a deficiency of demand for labour of this group.
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8 - Bahraini Females Labour Supply Model (Secondary Workers)
The method of O.L.S. were used to fit the model. In order to solve a
positive serial correlation problem, differences and stepwise techniques
were applied. T time variable is also included. In Figure 6.10, the results
do not seem different than the previous group in Figure 6.9. Both groups
are secondary workers and are influenced by the same irregular long-run
fluctuations. In Figure 6.10, the residuals are smooth in the differenced
series.
Results of the model are as follows:
FL/P B = 20.515 - 0.707W* - 0.110 W/W* + 0.277U - 4.28T
diff 3 lag (5.22) (-2.57) (-0.92)	 (1.00) (-5.17)
R-sq = 82.8%	 F = 19.27	 DW = 1.52
(t-values are given within parenthesis)
There is no autocorrelation. The model for this group explained about 83
percent of the variation on labour supply. The coefficient estimate of
permanent (W*) wage variable significnatly indicates a negative sign.
The change on participation with respect to wage change is inelastic
(-0.71). The relative wage or income coefficient W/W* is also negative,
but is not significant. The income effect of wage change has
predominated on labour supply change over three periods of lifetime.
Change on Labour supply curve of this group is negatively sloped
backward.
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This means change on wage rate is sufficiently lower than required to
induce female to enter labour market equilibrium. Consequently,
secondary workers choose leisure or producing more children. The
findings support the importance of an efficient permanent wage for this
group.
Time effect on change of participation also supports the theory of
efficiency with respect to wage. The parameter is significantly negative.
Also unemployment rate change indicates added-workers but is not
significant. It is an evidence that employment equilibrium of this group is
very low.
However, the results of this model clearly reveal that although transitory
labour supply with respect to wage change is inelastic, which is a
character of involuntary unemployment, there is a tendency towards a
constant excess labour supplied by Bahrainis females.
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9 - Total Non-Bahraini Labour Supply Model
The model is well fitted by ordinary least squares. Although stepwise and
lag techniques are applied to the model in order to explore the data,
including the main four variables is well representing labour supply of
total non-Bahraini as illustrated in Figure 6.11. The plot and the
histogram of the residuals are almost normal. The chart of the residuals
reveals a smooth series across the zero axis.
Results of the model are as follows:
TNL/P	 =	 -0.734 + 0.106W* + 0.0695W/W*
(-11.22)	 (7.95)	 (1.50)
+ 0.0141U + 0.0893P/P*
(1.70)	 (2.09)
R-sq = 83.2%	 F = 23.56	 DW = 1.53
(t-values are given within parenthesis)
There is no autocorrelation. The coefficient of determination is highly
significant, it explained 83 percent of the variation on labour supply of
this group.
The coefficients of the variables are as expected all in a positive sign
apart from the constant parameter. The elasticity of labour supply with
respect to wage is (0.106). Change on relative wage shows a substitution
effect on labour supply. The curve is strongly positive upward on (b) as
depicted in Figure 6.12. B2 <B 1 , this supports the relative wage
hypothesis.
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This means, individuals of this group are willing to work even when the
wage rate is lower than clearing wage. It is relatively higher than the
wage would be offered to them had they worked in their homes. Some
individuals of this group supply their labour under disequilibrium wage
condition when W> W*.
Unemployment rate effect on labour supply is added-worker. The
inflation rate also positively influences labour supply of this group.
However, this variable may be represented as the excess demand for
goods, so it may be as an indicator for excess demand for labour of this
group, particularly those who are willing to supply their labour for lower
than market-clearing wage.
In conclusion of this model, although there is an excess of labour of both
supply and demand which is determined by market devices (price and
wage), there also is a constant labour supplied by this group presented by
domestic workers.
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10 - Non-Bahraini Males Labour Supply Model
Because the model of non-Bahraini males when first is fitted by O.L.S.
method shows a negative serial correlation, lag technique were applied in
order to obtain the best model representing labour supply change of this
group as a function of change on the explanatory variables. Adding four
lag periods presents the best model. In Figure 6.13, the plot and
histogram of the residuals show normality and the chart of the residuals
shows a smooth series across the zero axis.
Results of the model are as follows:
MNL/P	 =	 -0.109 + 0.00610W* + 0.00971 W/W*
add 4 lag
	 (-7.33)	 (4.15)	 (2.04)
+ 0.00235U - 0.00671P/P*
(2.60)	 (-1.44)
R-sq = 846%	 F = 20.58	 DW = 1.65
(t-values are given within parenthesis)
There is no autocorrelation. The coefficient of determination is highly
significant, it explains about 85 percent of changes of labour supplied by
this group.
Almost all the varaibles are significant. Elasticity of change on
participation with respect to wage change is 0.06% over four periods of
lifetime.
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The relative wage indicates significantly a substitution effect on change of
labour supply over four periods of lifetime. Change on labour supply
curve is upward sloped. This model supports the importance of
permanent wage hypothesis as B2 > B1.
Unemployment rate change effect on change of participation significantly
indicates an added-worker effect. On the other hand, inflation rate change
negatively influences change on participation. This finding is consistent
with the permanent wage theory. Individuals of this group consider the
permanent wage in light of the inflation rate, since their participation
elasticity with respect to wage change is very low over four periods of
their lifetime. However inflation rate variable maybe considered as a
signal for a loose labour market towards males non Bahrainis labour
force.
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11 - The Model of Females Non-Bahraini Labour Supply
In terms of this model which is fitted by O.L.S. method and in order to
explore the data, stepwise technique were applied, a good fitted model is
illustrated in Figure 6.14.
The results of the model are as follows:
FNL/P = 
-4.87 + 0.607W* + 0.481W/W* + 0.507U + 0.813P/1)*
(-6.85)
	 (4.19)	 (0.96)	 (5.61)	 (1.75)
R-sq -- 82.7%
	 F = 22.66	 DW = 1.41
(t-values are given within parenthesis)
There is no autocorrelation. The coefficient of determination significantly
indicates a good fit. The model explains about 83 percent of the
variation. The substitution effect of permanent wage is highly significant,
also relative wage is positive but is not significant. Labour supply curve
of this group is upward sloped. The model supports the importance of
relative wage or income theory.
Unemployment rate coefficient also signficantly indicates an added-
worker effect on labour supply of non-Bahraini females. Inflation rate
variable is as expectedly positive but is not significant. However if this
variable is considered as the excess demand for goods, it may be as a
proxy for excess demand for labour supplied by non-Bahraini females.
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Conclusion
In order to assess the results for all groups in a comparable way, table 6.1 provides
values of the parameters estimates of all variables included in the labour supply
model. We find that changes in participation in response to wage changes are almost
alike. The elasticity of labour supply with respect to wage changes is rather low
particularly for Bahrainis groups.
For Bahrainis secondary workers of age-group 15-19 and females, participation with
respect to wage changes is inelastic. Also in the aggregate model, participation with
respect to wage change is inelastic. Moreover the transitory labour supply elasticity
is either negative or positive but small. These results confirm the labour supply
function of both neoclassical long-run theory and keynesian short-run theory. In the
long-run it is generally assumed that the supply of labour is inelastic function of the
real wage rate. In the short-run, it is commonly assumed that the labour supply is
infinitely elastic at some rigid real or money wage rate. On the other hand the results
provide an evidence of inefficient wage that has prevailed in the Bahrain labour
market. Also the results support the relative wage theory.
In terms of the unemployment rate, clearly added-worker has a positive dominant
effect over all groups except for Bahraini group, unemployment rate parameters are
significantly negative. It seems there has been trends of increasing duration of
unemployment rate among Bahrainis that ultimately discourage them to search for
jobs. It is also evident that inefficient wage is one problem facing Bahraini groups in
the labour market. However, the results reveal a general trend towards excess of
labour supply, particularly by Bahraini groups. This excess is either variably affected
by increasing unemployment rates or constantly by increasing entrants to the labour
force, especially females. On the contrary, excess of labour supplied by non-
Bahrainis is affected by increasing demand for this group as the parameter of price is
significantly positive, but at the same time the constant parameter is decreasing,
probably by the effect of regulation tightening against foreign workers.
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Coefficients of the Variables
	 (F test, t-values within parenthesis)
P/P*W/W* D-WR-Sq
Table 6.1
Labour Supply Model
Least Square Estimates for Variables for the Groups
The
Groups Constant
TL/P
ML/P
0.977
(10.42)
0.948
(11.22)
-0.183
(9.34)
0.063
(7.43)
-0.004
(2.92)
-0.010
(3.24)
0.046
(2.98)
0.001
(0.18)
0.113
(2.26)
0.906
(51.40)
0.920
(45.96)
1.81
1.63
FLIP 3.639 -0.696 -0.499 0.237 0.774 1.40
(7.12) (-6.52) (-1.03) (2.64) (19.44)
TL/PB 0.001 0.160 0.051 -0.003 0.550 1.70
(0.41) (2.82) (3.54) (2.11) (7.75)
ML/PB 0.001 0.072 0.065 0.007 0.718 1.79
(0.48) (1.82) (6.41) (0.32) (16.1)
L/P15-19 0.274 -0.765 0.158 0.778 -0.408 0.591 1.81
(1.96) (-2.40) (0.94) (1.88) (-3.77) (5.43)
L/P65+ 31.870 0.647 0.262 0.269 -0.395 -7.60 0.650 1.74
(2.48) (2.57) (0.45) (0.96) (-0.74) (-2.48) (5.20)
FL/PB 20.515 -0.707 -0.110 0.277 -4.28 0.828 1.52
(5.22) (-2.57) (-0.92) (1.00) (-5.17) (19.27)
TNL/P -0.734 0.106 0.069 0.014 0.089 0.832 1.53
(-11.22) (7.95) (1.50) (1.70) (2.09) (23.56)
MN L/P -0.109 0.006 0.009 0.002 -0.006 0.846 1.65
(-7.33) (4.15) (2.04) (2.60) (-1.44) (20.58)
FNL/P
-4.870 0.607 0.481 0.507 0.813 0.827 1.41
(-6.85) (4.19) (0.96) (5.61) (1.75) (22.66)
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Unemployment
7.1	 Introduction
Unemployment has become the most economic problem facing the
Governments. Has unemployment become a crucial issue in Bahrain's
economy. In this Chapter and in order to answer this question taking into
account the findings in the previous Chapter, firstly some consideration is
given to the concept of unemployment and its relevant issues. The rest of
this Chapter contains background and then an unemployment model is
presented and analysed.
Considering the many explanations for unemployment the essence of the
Keynesian explanation for unemployment is that there is a path from the
fall of aggregate demand to the fall of output and unemployment. Firms
demand too little labour because individuals demand too few goods.
Keynes attacked what he called the classical presumption that persistent
unemployment is voluntary unemployment. He argued that in competitive
labour markets actual employment and unemployment reveal worker's
true preferences between work and alternative uses of time, no one prefers
to be unemployed if his real wage exceeds his marginal valuation of his
free time. Keynes found decisive evidence against the inference of
voluntary unemployment as a result of stickness of wages, presented in
the willingness of workers to accept a larger volume of employment at a
lower real wage resulting from an increase of prices.
When ever unemployment could be reduced by expansion of aggregate
demand, Keynes regarded it as involuntary unemployment. He expected
expansion to raise prices and lower real wages.
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Additional employment not associated with a path or real wages rising at
the rate of productivity growth leads to inflation. According to the natural
unemployment rate hypothesis, there is just one rate of unemployment
compatible with steady wage and price inflation, and this in the long run
compatible with any constant rate of change of prices, positive, zero or
negative. Only at the natural rate of unemployment are workers content
with current and prospective real wages, content to have their real wages
rise at the rate of growth productivity. Along the feasible path or real
wages they would not wish to accept any larger volume of employment.
Lower unemployment therefore can arise only from economy-wide excess
demand for labour. One answer to this problem is that the government
should step in and boost aggregate demand by manipulating the fiscal and
monetary instruments under its control, either increasing government
expenditure or raising the money supply. (Further details in the following
Chapter).
Against Keynesian view classical economists argued that any fall in
wages and prices would itself produce an increase in aggregate demand as
a result of a real balance effect, means that the fall in prices would
increase the real value of money giving rise to increased expenditure. The
classical view was that markets had a natural tendency to clear and that
the reason for might not do so was because of government regulations or
misperceptions by firms and workers about prices and wages. The
definite result of this view was that unemployment could be eliminated
either by removing the government distortion or that unemployment must
be voluntary, because agents formulated these wages and prices
expectations quite freely.
Early Keynesian theory has widely come to be regarded as deficit for it
contained no detailed microeconomic underpinning. In post-Keynesian
theory microfoundations were provided. Agents were viewed a pursuing
the same objectives and operating under the same constraints as in
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neoclassical theory, but in addition the possibility of rationing was taken
into account. Rationing arose due to the failure of wages and prices to
move to clear markets. Some economists argue that this in turn
highlighted a further weakness of Keynesian theory, namely its failure to
provide a theoretical explanation for the existence of rigid wages and
prices.
The Phillips curve was initially suggested to provide the microeconomic
foundations of Keynesian theory. It suggested the existence of trade-off
between money wage rises and unemployment and admitted the
possibility of persistent periods of unemployment. The neoclassical
theory emphasized that the trade-off proposed by Phillips curve could
emerge only as a result of misperceptions about changes in wages and
prices, this led to the development of "expectations augmented" Phillips
curve. But both the original and augmented Phillips curve had difficulty
accounting for developments in the world during the 1970's and 1980's.
At that time both wages and unemployment appeared to be rising, a
phenomenon that became known as 'stagflation'. Modern classical
economists found the development of contract theory and other
explanations of sticky wages and prices to illuminate this phenomenon is
required.
7.2	 Neoclassical Explanation of Unemployment and Job Search
A further neoclassical explanation of unemployment emphasizes the
consequences of information imperfections in the labour markets.
Information is no longer supplied immediately and costlessly to
individuals, instead they have to devote time and resources to gathering it.
A certain amount of search unemployment is there for normal. This
search explains why the rigidity and stickness of wages. An employee
will not necessarily accept a pay cut to retain a job, even though some
current wage 'income' is better than facing unemployment. An employee
130
correctly and sensibly believes he can with some search and evaluation of
alternatives get approximately his current wage at some other job.
If searching and finding out is more costly while employed, he may have
reason to choose temporary unemployment as an efficient way of
investing in information.
Information search by employers for best employees are the counterpart to
unemployment. An employer searching for more employees will come to
learn that a higher wage will get more employees. Employer search
activity will increase the incidence of job changes without the employees
having experienced unemployment, because employers will seek currently
employed labour and offer better wages. Uncertainty of the employer
about the quality of a potential employee induces a lower initial wage
offer. The best perceived offer to a prospecting employee will reflect
both the applicant's costs of canvassing all employers and the employer's
cost of learning more about the applicant.
Because of production conditions, the greater the rate of interproduct
demand shifts, the larger unemployment will be. In such cases
interproduct demand shifts will determine the degree of unemployment
that is associated with full employment. But if aggregate demand
changes, there will be a change in the degree of unemployment. A
decrease in aggregate demand and output causes an increase in
unemployment because more people will accept unemployment to engage
in search, but each unemployed person will look longer than expected.
Because markets are incomplete, agents cannot insure themselves against
the idiosyncratic risk they face in their job opportunities. Job
opportunities will diminish in the sense that lower wages are available
elsewhere. By the time people learn that the failure to find other equally
good job options as quickly as they thought reflects diminished
alternatives in general, which associate with the idiosyncratic risk. The
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slower rate of rise of best deserved options is at first taken as an unlucky
string of searches and no unemployment is extended in the expectation of
shortly finding that elusive best option. Then with each person looking
and searching longer the total number of unemployed at any one time will
get larger. Meantime aggregate unemployment rate rises. Each now has
the added task of revising his whole pattern of expectations. Whereas
agents formerly was searching for a higher formulated expected wage,
now must learn that the best option has deteriorated. It seems that
idiosyncratic shocks are important in determining the unemployment rate.
For example; Greenwood, MacDonald and Zhang (1996) estimated that
about only 1% point of the unemployment rate can be accounted for by
the aggregate shock of the economy. Gomes, Greenwood and Rebelo
(1997) estimate that about 0.6 percentage points of unemployment rate is
contributed by aggregate shocks, and about 0.5 percent points is
accounted by business cycle factors. Therefore they suggested that the
emphasis on stabilization policy as a remedy for unemployment may not
be effective.
However, if the decrease in aggregate demand is a continuing affair
(associate with a continuing fall in the stock of money) unemployment
will persist at the higher level during the continuing decrease of demand.
The greater the rate of decrease of aggregate demand the greater the
extent and average duration of unemployment. Also Gomes, Greenwood
and Rebelo (1997) estimated that output and duration of unemployment is
negatively correlated by about 0.83 percent. Holding aggregate demand at
its new prevailing level would reduce unemployment. But the costs of
that type of recovery may be greater than action designed to increase
aggregate demand back to the level that people expect.
Conversely, if the aggregate demand increase resulting from the increase
in money stock (unanticipated) job vacancies will be increased and this
will increase the search by employers for information about available
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employable resources. Meaning the alternatives are better than they
formerly were expected to be.
7.3	 Unemployment and Inflation
Changes in aggregate demand confuse the public. Each seller notices a
changed demand for his current product, but he cannot be sure if that is a
change also in aggregate demand which affects options elsewhere.
Whether he should shift to another option or should not if the demand
change is general, or stay where he is and change price. It is the crucial
question that is to be answered. Symmetrically, should an employee
switch jobs upon receipt of a superior offer or should he look over the
market more fully? given inter product fluctuations, any person who
refuses unemployment search for the best alternative option can be misled
into accepting another job too soon. Because of increasing demand, he
will more easily find a job with higher wages than he now gets. The
opportunity to search while not employed is better than the lack of an
opportunity to move to unemployment as a more efficient means of
search. Given interproduct demand shifts, the extent to which resources
are in their most valuable uses is reduced, because the public is fooled
into believing they have found the best available jobs, when in fact they
have failed to invest in enough search to find best available jobs.
In fact, constant per capita aggregate demand is consistent with falling
prices of final product. So falling consumer good prices in this case
reflect lower costs of production, not reduced profitability of production
and resources prices will not fall.
If there is an unanticipated inflation trend the increased unanticipated
aggregate demand per capita will reduce unemployment rate and maintain
it at its lower level. But if inflation is correctly anticipated, the rate of
employment implied for any given rate of change of aggregate demand
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will be lower than for unanticipated inflation and it will independent of
the anticipated rate of inflation. A reduction in demand for a firm
involves a lag of wage rate decreases behind prices, which is a rise in real
wage or relative wage rates. This rise implies lower employment because
of diminishing marginal returns to labour inputs. It follows that a general
economy-wide demand decrease does not imply a correlation between real
wage rates and depression (unemployment). Wage rates can fall as fast as
other prices and that fall is not necessary for unemployment. To see why
it does not cause unemployment, consider the following question: why
would a cut in money wages provoke a different response than if the price
level rose relative to wages when both would amount to the same change
in relative prices, but differ only in the money price? The answer is that
price level rise conveys different information and money wages
everywhere have fallen relative to prices. On the other hand a cut in one's
own money wage does not imply options elsewhere have fallen. A cut
only in one's person job is revealed. The money versus real wage is not
the relevant comparison, but the wage in the present job versus the wage
in all other jobs is the relevant comparison. This rationalizes Keynes'
definition of involuntary unemployment in terms of price level changes.
If wages were cut everywhere else, and if employees knew it, they would
not choose unemployment, but they would if they believed wages were
cut just in their current job. When one employer cuts wages, this does not
mean cuts elsewhere, his employees rightly think wages are not reduced
elsewhere. On the other hand with a rise in the price level, employees
have less reason to think their current real wage are lower than they are
elsewhere. So they do not immediately refuse a lower real wage induced
by a higher price level, where as they would refuse an equal money wage
cut in their present job. It is the revelation of information about prospects
elsewhere that makes the difference. This is consistent with 'Keynes'
definition of unemployment and with his entire theory of market-
adjustment process.
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7.4 The Structural Unemployment
As we have seen, the labour market is imperfect due to misleading
information. Therefore it plays an essential role in generating structural
unemployment. On principle structural unemployment is at zero excess
demand and it occurs because of normal labour market turnover (cycle) as
will be explained later in this Chapter. The slower that turnover proceeds
the greater will be the number out of work at the natural rate.
Unemployment due to these normal labour market flows is called by
economists "frictional" unemployment. But there will be some individual
workers for whom their own probability of receiving a job offer is close
or actually equal to zero. These workers are defined as the structurally
unemployed. The existence of these structurally unemployed individuals
with a zero offer probability will lower the aggregate offer probability.
Any increase in the extent of structural unemployment will therefore raise
the natural rate of unemployment.
The sum of frictional and structural unemployment is a measure of full
employment (equilibrium) unemployment as we saw in the previous
Chapter in total labour supply model. If this unemployment exceeds
vacancies available then supply exceeds the demand of labour.
Unemployment, therefore exceeds the full employment level by an
amount which is called non-natural unemployment.
Economists of market clearing view regard all unemployment at the
natural rate is voluntary. This notion emerges from the fact that any
workers choosing not to work at the market clearing wage do so because
that wage does not compensate them for the disutility of work. In the
case of structurally unemployed workers the situation is unambiguous.
There are workers who get no offers, they would accept any offer if only
they got one. In this case it is clear that such workers are involuntarily
unemployed and will remain so when unemployment is at its natural
135
level. For other workers the voluntary or involuntary unemployment
makes less sense. Generally all will be constrained by the rate of job
offers and to that extent some part of their unemployment duration is
involuntary in the sense that in the absence of this constraint, they could
freely choose the period spent out of work. As a result of this constraint
also, workers spend more time searching for employment than would
otherwise be the case. So some part of their unemployment spell can
therefore be regarded as involuntary. But of course, part of normal job
search is voluntary.
Other economists (Rowtharn 1980) suggest that structural unemployment
is the result of employers reorganising their production methods scrapping
equipment and eliminating excess capacity so the increases in the rate of
technical change are not offset by fails in the rate of capital. But the
effect of structural unemployment (of the Keynesian type) is the same,
that if unemployment is in excess of natural rate exists, it is converted into
structural unemployment and so it becomes part of the natural rate itself.
7.4.1. Causes of Structural Unemployment
It is well known that a decline in the secular rate of growth of
output could arise for any number of reasons. Clearly it could be
the consequence of a secular fall in rate of growth of aggregate
demand for good and services (non-market clearing or keynesian
view) or also as a consequence of increasing real wage levels
(market clearing view). Most literature has been concentrated on
the production sector and in particular industrial sector. In most
advanced industrial countries the effects on unemployment of the
decline in production sector jobs has been considered in a number
of studies, for example in Britain (has experience an increasing
structural unemployment rate). Nickell (1982) finds that the
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decline in production industry jobs has had a significant effect on
reducing the outflow probability of aggregate unemployment. This
raised the equilibrium (natural) rate of unemployment by 1.4
percentage points over the period 1969-1977. Junanken and Price
(1983) confirm these findings. It would seem therefore, that
declining output and employment growth and the consequential
increase in hiring standards in the production sector of the
economy have had notable effects on the natural rate of
unemployment.
Besides industrial component Nickell (1982) also present evidence
on the extent of structural unemployment in Britain caused by
regional and occupational components. In this Chapter we will see
that differences of unemployment rates among regions in Bahrain,
are much more marked in the 1991, these differences then led to
unemployment rates as two times as high in the Western region
compared with Hidd region. Nickell (1982) found about three
times as high in the North compared with the South in Britain.
Some economists like Bosanquet (1978) have found that age is
now a more important source of structural unemployment than
location or industry. In conclusion structural unemployment
causes needs further research.
In Bahrain a significant deterioration in the relative unemployment
position of young workers and this may cause increased structural
unemployment amongst these groups. This kind of structural
unemployment in which young workers with low probability of
employment become a large proportion of the total stock leads to a
decline in the economy wide average employment probability and
hence a rise in natural unemployment rate.
A further source of increasing structural unemployment may arise
from the changing duration composition of the unemployed stock.
Duration of unemployment has been rapidly rising amongst
specific age groups and in general average which means a dramatic
decline in re-employment probability. Although the evidence is
not at all conclusive, it would seem that workers may be scarred by
long unemployment. In some cases this may reflect the effect of
long unemployment on skills, attitudes to work and so on. In
addition employers may respond to this by assessing the training
costs of employing a long term unemployed person as being higher
than for some one currently or recently in employment. In this case
the firm will raise its hiring standard, as it is the case in Bahrain
labour market now which means further lowering to the offer
probability for the long duration unemployed [why this happens is
explained later in this Chapter]. There may also be a further
significant aspect to this behaviour. If employers regard (rightly or
wrongly) the long term unemployed as workers who have failed to
get a job because they are of a low standard he will not make offers
to them at all. Since there has been a general rise in the mean
unemployment duration length, this could lead to a fall in the
average offer probability and hence to an increase in the natural
employment value.
Nevertheless, what is clear so far is that it is not mainly their
location, their occupation or their professional experience that is
the problem for unemployed workers. If anything as Knight (1987)
suggests it is the age of the unemployed, those of age group
(15-19), and the debilitating effects of long periods of
unemployment on skills, aptitude motivation and acceptability for
work that causes their structural unemployment.
Further analysis in this Chapter will provide more evidence on the
significance of some of these factors which could be substantial in
causing structural unemployment. Also structural unemployment
can arise in Bahrain from secular stagnation caused by specific
sector like banks or general decline in employment in some
specific area like Western region. Generally it is of great
consideration the possibility that left untreated in a stagnant
economy non-natural unemployment can be converted into
structural unemployment that raises the natural rate. In Bahrain the
evidence is not clear cut but incidences that this is now a real
possibility. The argument rest upon the view that the aggregate
labour market clears very slowly or not at all and non-natural
unemployment persists for a long time. In aggregate labour supply
model in the previous Chapter we found that labour market in
Bahrain's economy took four years to clear, therefore. Even if real
wages were eventually to fall as the case in Bharian labour market,
this may not induce employers to employ workers who because of
age, and lack of skill or long periods of idleness are regarded as
having a low or even zero marginal product in their firm. Even the
efficient operation of the labour market price will not reverse the
increase in unemployment that has taken place. Market clearing is
only then achieved through an eventual increase in the equilibrium
market clearing rate of unemployment which is the case of
Bahrain's economy now as clearly proved by significant added
workers effect of unemployment in aggregate labour supply model.
In the absence of clear policy to deal with this form of structural
unemployment only death or retirement will reduce it.
7.5 The Costs of Unemployment
Unemployment has profound social and economic costs both for the
individual and for the community as a whole. The economic costs are
represented by the value of the forgone output of the unemployed.
Correspondingly for the individual income is lost and levels for both
goods and leisure are reduced and changed. The social costs are more
difficult to quantify but many are substantial both for the individual and
for the community. For the individual, it has been accorded that
unemployment leads to an increase in mental and physical illness.
Empirical work has also focused on association between unemployment
and mortality, suicide, crime, marital breakdown, divorce and child abuse.
In fact each of these areas researcher face difficulties in establishing the
directions of causability but the view is widely held that unemployment
was a contributory factor to the growth in each of these during the 1980's
in most of the advanced industrial nations. Central to this view is the idea
that employment provides both income and a set of relationships or
network contributing toward a structured, secured and meaningful life.
Deprived by unemployment individuals may suffer from stress and
anxiety, and as a consequence of this and lower income, may adopt
unhealthy consumption patterns, ranging from poor diet to drug and
alcohol abuse. From these individuals suffering community social costs
occur. Part of the community cost is represented by the impact of higher
unemployment and hence on the income (wage) and job prospects of
those currently in work, other by declining of the quality of the
community's labour force with increases in the average duration of
unemployment as the case in Bahrain's economy now. Social disruption,
mental health, sickness and mortality are other forms of community social
costs, for example: in Britain, a report from the select committee of the
House of Lords on Unemployment in 1982 concludes "anecdotal
evidence, supported by some research appears to confirm a casual link
(between unemployment and crime); and unemployment provides both
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motive and opportunity for crime, we believe unemployment to be among
the causes of ill-health, mortality, crime or civil disorder".
Our concern is the understanding of the explanation of the psychological
effects of unemployment. Obviously, psychologists of all generations
have been discovering the intricate intertwining of material deprivation
and the psychological experience of unemployment. It seems that almost
everyone involved with unemployed people has been struck by the role of
poverty in their distress. This includes social anthropologists, government
social dealers, leisure scholars, sociologists and social commentators.
In fact there can be little doubt that in the State of Bahrain unemployed
people (without any kind of unemployment benefit) do suffer from a
process of cumulative disadvantage and that their weak labour market
position leads to great financial difficulties and consequently to a
disturbing degree of social distress. Gallie and March (1994) conclude
"unemployment, then leads to social polarisation at the level of economic
and social experience and it heightens political radicalism" (Gallie and
March 1994: 28). Finally, what can we say about the unemployed as a
group is to address the question: is whether those who pay the costs of
society's economic difficulties are the same group of people across time
and whether they are a group with a distinct character at the bottom of the
heap, but they were not destined to be there, and under different labour
market conditions they would not have been there. The answer of this
question will be in the following part of this Chapter.
7.6 The Picture of Unemployment and Background 
During the 1950's and 1960's, the total number of unemployed in the State
of Bahrain was zero. But within just one decade, from 1971 to 1981 this
number jumped from 421 to 8241. The subsequent prolonged economic
expansion increased the number of unemployed to 14378 in 1991. In fact
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by the late 1980's, unemployment was still not a crucial policy issue in the
State of Bahrain. This was partially due to the lack of exact statistics.
Has unemployment become the most serious economic problem facing the
State of Bahrain? One way of answering this question is to compare
unemployment levels over time and between countries. In the early
1970's unemployment in the State of Bahrain was below 3 percent.
During the 1970's unemployment did rise but it was not as much as it was
during the 1980's when it grew fast. In 1981 unemployment rate was 3.2
percent, while in 1991 unemployment rose to 6.3 percent, almost doubled
within one decade. Unemployment rate of Bahrainis active population
(labour force) rose from 6.6 percent in 1981 to almost 15 percent in 1991,
as it is clear from Table 7.1.
Unemployment rates of Bahrainis are higher than those of the expatriate
(non-Bahraini). Bahrainis young people continue to experience a much
higher rate of unemployment than adults do. Table 7.1 shows that
Bahrainis of age group 15 to 19 have experienced a sharply increased high
rate since the early 1970's, it reached almost 64 percent in the early
1990's. Males age group 15-19 had 57 percent unemployment rate and
almost 28 percent for age group 20-24 in the early 1990's as stated in
Table 7.2. Women have suffered higher unemployment rates than men
have had.
Table 7.3 shows that Bahrain's women have had around 3 percent
unemployment rate in the early 1970's and very sharply increased
throughout the two decades, it reached around 25 percent in the early
1990's. Bahrain's young women (15-19 age group) have too experienced
a higher rate of unemployment than adult women have had, Table 7.3
shows that while it was around 7 percent in the early 1970's it climbed to
around 87 percent in the early 1990's. For women age group of 20-24 it
was almost 3 percent in the early 1970's, rose to almost 52 percent in the
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Table 7.1
Unemployment Rate of Bahraini Population (15 Yrs +) by Age Group for the
Census Years 1971 -1981 _1991
1971 1981 1991
Age Group Active Unemp Unemp Active Unemp Unemp Active Unemp Unemp
POP POP	 Rate POP POP	 Rate POP POP	 Rate
Total 38091 1416	 3.7 61199 4021	 6.6 90662 13394	 14.8
15-19 4024 429	 10.7 5289 1493	 28.2 4977 3178	 63.9
20-24 5987 336	 5.6 14146 1537	 10.9 15978 5440	 34.0
25-29 5280 123	 2.3 11712 460	 3.9 18613 2197	 11.8
30-34 4194 85	 2.0 7125 136	 1.9 15525 924	 6.0
35-39 4511 93	 2.1 4564 77	 1.7 11941 543	 4.5
40-44 3479 64	 1.8 4446 60	 1.3 7740 265	 3.4
45-49 3469 112	 3.2
..
4213 81	 1.9 4522 138	 3.1
50-54 3018 99	 3.3 3756 75	 2.0 4075 204	 5.0
55-59 1484 74	 5.0 2659 57	 2.1 3326 213	 6.4
60-64 1355 1	 0.1 1692 28	 1.7 2061 231	 11.2
65+ 1290 -	 0.0 1597 17	 1.1	 i 1904 51	 3.2
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Table 7.2
Unemployment Rate of Bahraini Males (15 Yrs +) by Age Group for the
Census Years 1971 -1981 -1991
1971 1981 1991
Age Group Active Unemp Unemp Active Unemp Unemp Active Unemp Unemp
POP POP	 Rate POP POP	 Rate POP POP	 Rate
Total 35884 1369	 3.8 51949 2645	 5.1 73118 9035	 12.4
15-19 3742 411	 11.0 4122 921	 22.3 3871 2213	 57.2
20-24 5365 320	 6.0 10272 903	 8.8 12135 3446	 28.4
25-29 4658 118	 2.5 9321 314	 3.4 13892 1299	 9.4
30-34 4067 85	 2.1 6246 120	 1.9 11639 592	 5.1
35-39 4355 90	 2.1 4202 73	 1.7 9649 415	 4.3
40-44 3354 62	 1.8 4211 59	 1.4 6760 242	 3.6
• 45-49 3380 111	 3.3 4050 79	 2.0 4130 131	 3.2
50-54 2949 99	 3.4 3652 75	 2.1 3877 198	 5.1
55-59 1445 73	 5.1 2619 56	 2.1 3235 209	 6.5
60-64 1316 -	 0.0 1672 28	 1.7 2038 229	 11.2
65 + 1253 -	 0.0 1582 17	 •	 1.1 1892 61	 3.2
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Table 7.3
Unemployment Rate of Bahraini Females (15 Yrs +) by Age Group for the
Census Years 1971 -1981 -1991
1971 1981 1991
Age Group Active Unemp Unemp Active Unemp Unemp Active Unemp Unemp
POP POP	 Rate POP POP	 Rate POP POP	 Rate
Total 1843 47	 2.6 9250 1376	 14.9 17544 4359	 24.8
15-19 282 18	 6.4 1167 572	 49.0 1106 965	 87.3
20-24 622 16	 2.6 3874 634	 16.4 3843 1994	 51.9
25-29 258 5	 1.9 2391 146	 6.1 4721 898	 19.0
30-34 127 -	 0.0 879 16	 1.8 3886 332	 8.5
. 35-39 156 3	 1.9 362 4	 1.1 2292 128	 5.6
40-44 125 2	 1.6 235 1	 0.4 980 23	 2.3
45-49 89 1	 1.1 163 2	 1.2 392 7	 1.8
50-54 69 -	 0.0 104 -	 0.0 198 6	 3.0
55-59 39 1	 2.6 40 1	 2.5 91 4	 4.4
60-64 39 1	 0.0 20 -	 0.0 23 2	 8.7
65 + 37 -	 0.0 15 -	 0.0 12 0	 0.0
-
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early 1990's. Comparing with youth unemployment rates in some
developed industrial countries, it was about 14 percent in North America,
in Italy (highest rate of the EC) it was around 31 percent and Finland
(highest of the EFTA) was around 31 percent in 1992. Comparing with
women unemployment rates, it was around 11 percent in North America,
around 60 percent in Ireland (highest of the EC), about 24 percent in
Norway (highest of EFTA) and only about 15 percent in Japan in 1992.
In the State of Bahrain, there is an evidence that a low structural
unemployment and cyclical unemployment is now growing in Bahrain's
economy as found in labour supply model in Chapter Six of this Thesis.
Within the State of Bahrain differences of unemployment rates have
grown higher among regions as stated in Table 7.4. Most of the regions
have experienced high unemployment rates and much more has been a
persistent is in Sitra. During the last two decades Bahrainis in Sitra
suffered a structural unemployment, it jumped from around 6 percent in
the early 1970's to 21 percent in the early 1990's. Jidhafs, Northern area
and Hidd have had a relatively high unemployment during the last two
decades but it was cyclical and may have converted into a structural
unemployment in the early 1990's. Women in most areas have suffered a
higher unemployment rates than men as stated in Tables 7.5 and 7.6.
Unemployment rose to around 51 and 48 percent in Western region and
Sitra respectively in the early 1990's.
The severity of unemployment depends not only on the risk of becoming
unemployed but also the probability of remaining so for a long time.
There are striking differences in the share of long term unemployment in
total unemployment. Around 77 percent of total Bahraini's unemployed
had been out of work for one year and more in 1991. Comparing with
other countries, about 40 percent of total unemployed had been out of
work for one year and more in the European community, around 15
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Table 7.4
Unemployment Rate of Bahraini Population (15 Yrs +) by Region for the
Census Years 1971 _1981 _1991
1971 1981 1991
Region Active Unemp Unemp Active Unemp Unemp Active Unemp Unemp
POP POP	 Rate POP POP	 Rate POP POP	 Rate
(1)
Hidd 10138 461	 4.5 1882 174	 9.2 2154 230	 10.7
Muharraq - -	 - 14123 942	 6.7 16900 2158	 12.8
Manama 13309 452	 3.4 16824 1142	 6.8 15830 2388	 15.1
Jidhafs 3773 74	 2.0 6391 379	 5.9 9741 1903	 19.5
Northern 1948 75	 3.9 3325 228	 6.9 5569 1039	 18.7
Sitra 2047 125	 6.1 3313 202	 6.1 5369 1133	 21.1
(2)
Central 2917 96	 3.3 2547 140	 5.5 5848 823	 14.1
Isa Town - -	 - 5996 387	 6.5 9552 1388	 14.5
(3)
Riffa 2042 94	 4.6 4349 308	 7.1 8664 883	 10.2
Western 1551 64	 4.1 2378 119	 5.0 3649 794	 21.8
Estern 2 _	 0.0 71 -	 0.0 414 22	 5.3
(4) (4)
Hamad Town - -	 - - -	 - 6973 633	 9.1
,	 Total 37727 1441	 3.8 61199 4021	 6.6 90663 13394	 14.8
(1) Includes Muharraq
(2) Includes Isa Town
(3) Includes Some of Eastern
(4) Not Yet Established
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Table 7.5
Unemployment Rate of Bahraini Males (15 Yrs +) by Region for the
Census Years 1971 -1981 _1991
1971 1981 1991
Region Active Unemp Unemp Active Unemp Unemp Active Unemp Unemp
POP POP	 Rate POP POP	 Rate POP POP	 Rate
(1)
Hidd 9622 445	 4.6 1507 87	 5.8 1625 123	 7.6
Muharraq - -	 - 11542 564	 4.9 12979 1291	 9.9
Manama 12314 433	 3.5 13732 741	 5.4 12339 1579	 12.8
Jidhafs 3738 74	 2.0 5911 266	 4.5 8329 1418	 17.0
Northern 1918 72	 3.8 3102 174	 5.6 4846 770	 15.9
Sitra 2037 125	 6.1 3218 175	 5.4 4857 889	 18.3
(2)
Central 2812 89	 3.2 2364 104	 4.4 4937 635	 12.9
lsa Town - -	 - 4709 232	 4.9 7252 807	 11.1
(3)
Riffa 1890 91	 4.8 3496 198	 5.7 6546 479	 7.3
Western 1551 64	 4.1 2308 104	 4.5 3291 612	 18.6
Estern 2 -	 0.0 60 -	 0.0 362 15	 4.1
(4) . (4)
Hamad Town - -	 - - -	 - 5755 417	 7.2
Total 35884 1393	 3.9 51945 2645	 5.1 73118 9035	 12.4
(1) Includes Muharraq
(2) Includes lsa Town
(3) Includes Some of Eastern
(4) Not Yet Established
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Table 7.6
Unemployment Rate of Bahraini Females (15 Yrs +) by Region for the
Census Years 1971 _1981 -1991
1971 1981 1991
Region Active Unemp Unemp Active Unemp Unemp Active Unemp Unemp
POP POP	 Rate POP POP	 Rate POP POP	 Rate
(1)
Hidd 516 16	 3.1 375 87	 23.2 529 107 20.2
Muharraq - -	 - 2581 378	 14.6 3921 867 22.1
Manama 995 19	 1.9 3092 401	 13.0 3491 809 23.2
Jidhafs 35 -	 0.0 480 113	 23.5 1412 485 34.3
Northern 30 3	 10.0 223 54	 24.2 723 269 37.2
Sitra 10 -	 0.0 95 27	 28.4 512 244 47.7
(2)
Central 105 7	 6.7 183 36	 19.7 911 188 20.6
Isa Town - -	 - 1287 155	 12.0 2300 581 25.3
(3)
Riffa 152 3	 2.0 853 110	 12.9 2118 404 19.1
Western 1 -	 0.0 70 15	 21.4 358 182 50.8
Estern - -	 0.0 11 -	 0.0 52 7 13.5
(4) (4)
Hamad Town - • -	 - _ -	 - 1217 216 17.7
Total 1844 48	 2.6 9250 1376	 14.9 17544 4359 24.8
(1) Includes Muharraq
(2) Includes Isa Town
(3) Includes Some of Eastern
(4) Not Yet Established
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percent in EFTA and Japan and only 11 percent in North America. The
incidence of long-term unemployment differs considerably by age group.
In Bahrain where youth population is the majority we found that in 1991
about 64 percent of long-term unemployment were young people (15-24,
age group) and that older people were at less risk of experiencing
prolonged unemployment. Comparing with some other countries many
young people still face prolonged unemployment, in Greece, Ireland, Italy
and Spain. The incidence of long-term unemployment among unemployed
youth ranges between 50 and 70 percent.
An important observation that I found particularly striking in the data of
State of Bahrain, is the remarkably inverse relation between duration and
turnover of unemployment in various cross sections, most notably across
age groups and regions. This leads to the conclusion that longer expected
duration of unemployment in Bahrain may discourage a certain group of
positively response to market signals as confirmed by Bahrainis labour
supply model in Chapter Six. This discouraged-worker effect may result
in a productivity loss in Bahrain labour market as found earlier in Chapter
Three of this Thesis. It is interesting to note that the data of duration in
State of Bahrain showed that between 1981 and 1991 the increase in
unemployment that occurred was mostly due to increased duration of
unemployment. It is an evident that Bahrain labour market is inefficient,
in the sense that job seekers are unmatched with vacancies. This supports
Beveridge Curve in terms of the relationship between structural
unemployment and vacancies as depicted in Figure 7.1. How structural
unemployment occurs over disequilibrium labour market.
In reality inflows and outflows of unemployment over equilibrium are
rarely equal. What happens is that stock of unemployment increases in
slumps economy and decreases in booms. In a slump the inflow will
exceed the outflow and unemployment rates will increase. To explain this
process in the Bahrain labour market, assuming initially the economy in
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the early 1980s is at full employment when the rate of unemployment is
natural (about 3 percent) and there is a once and for all increase in the
inflow unemployment rate, now there will be a shift in the Beveridge
Curve UV outward and an increase in unemployment above natural rate.
If this increase falls to its long run level the curve UV returns where now
the combination of unemployment and vacancies is above the stationary
level. What happens next, with unchanged offer and acceptance
possibilities, the time taken to fill a vacancy falls with a greater number
out of work applicants per time period increase and vacancies can be filled
more rapidly at the given hiring standard. The result is an eventual fall in
the stock of vacancies. The adjustment process will be complete at a
period where unemployment is in excess of the natural level. Only if there
is subsequently a boom, like the period from 1971 up to 1985, a
compensating and equivalent once and for all decrease in the inflow rate
will the process be set in reverse with a transitory shift in the curve UV.
Now vacancies will take longer to fill and the increasing stock of
vacancies will eventually restore the labour market to its original position
in early 1980s. If cyclical behaviour in the labour market is characterised
by these once and for all changes in the inflow rate we should expect
equivalent movements around the curve UV.
In fact in a recession like the one in 1986 this will not be the first
manifestation of the recession in the labour market. First response will be
a reduction in the vacancies by employers and then raising of the hiring
standard. This happens because of the reduction in the costs of search to
the employer. Now since the raising of hiring standard cuts the offer
probability for unemployed this will shift the curve outward with an
increase in unemployment. Since vacancies are also cut it ends up to long
duration of unemployment and increase in the stock of unemployed. In
other words an increase in structural unemployment with a total
unemployment rate (frictional + structural) of 6.3 percent in 1991, or
almost has doubled within one decade.
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UV Curves
The Beveridge Curve
Vacancies A
An increase in
	 Unemployment
structural unemployment
Figure 7.1
The Beveridge curve reveals that an outward shift or UV curve
indicates an increase in the frictional and structural components of
unemployment. Along the 45 0 line, a given level of vacancies is
matched by an equal level of unemployment. No matter how high
vacancies rise unemployment will never fall to zero and vice versa.
The outward movements of the curve means a reduction in labour
market efficiency of the State of Bahrain. Although vacancies
were rising, through the boom in early 1980s unemployed were
inappropriately equipped.
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7.7 Unemployment Model
7.7.1 Introduction
It has been accorded that in the State of Bahrain over the period
from 1930's to the beginning of 1980's, rates of unemployment
were natural (about 3 percent). But the situation has been sharply
different over the last decade particularly from 1981 to 1991. The
rate of unemployment rose and persisted, also the demographic and
social characteristics of unemployed people changed.
National unemployment rates have sharply risen over the last two
decades, it has more than doubled throughout the period from 1981
to 1991; it jumped from 6.6 to 14.8 percent.
In this part of the thesis, and in the light of findings presented here
and in previous chapters, we argue that the current persisting
national unemployment may have converted into structural
unemployment in Bahrain's stagnant economy. The findings so far
provide evidence that secondary workers and some primary
workers have become structurally unemployed. In other words,
their own opportunity of receiving a suitable job offer and getting
employed is very low. To find out who of these groups are more
likely to be structurally unemployed. The aim of the unemployment
model is to examine national unemployment rate as a function of
some factors that may cause structural unemployment. It has been
suggested in some research that the age of the unemployed and the
debilitating effect of long-term unemployment on their skills,
causes their structural unemployment, and that it is not only their
occupation or their experience that is the problem for unemployed
workers. Duration of unemployment as we have seen earlier in this
chapter is very high compared with other industrial countries which
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which have experienced structural unemployment. Unfortunately
duration of unemployment and occupation of the unemployed are
not technically convenient to be included in this model. Instead
educational attainment and occupational choice are included. Use
is made of cross-section data of Census 1991, with a total of 90662
observations.
The following transformed logistic model is estimated:
Log
1
	—  B o + B 1
 X 1 + B, X2 -F ... B16 X16 -F...-F B42 X42 E,
Where
represents the probability of being unemployed for a
person in i subpopulation, i = 1,2 ... 3150.
Bo 	 is the intercept.
B I .. B42	 are regression parameters of independent indicator
variables with the exception of X16 which is a
continuous variable representing the percentage of
expatriates.
7.7.2 Model Specification:
By letting Y, be a binary random variable takes the value '1' if the i
person is unemployed and '0' otherwise i = 1,2,...,n . Assuming
that Yi are independent.
154
exp(B0 +
.1=1
1+ exp(B0
 + BiXti)
1=1
711(X)- (1)
Let the probability for being unemployed of the ith person denoted
by 7r, relates to a set of predictors is the following functional form:
Where
X X 12 ,... X ip	 are explanatory variables.
B0 ,B 1 ,... B42	 are parameters.
Based on the equation (1).
g,(x)=
Therefore
1
1+ exp(B0
 + ZBiXo.)
g (X)
' — 	 B0+ B XI 1— 71-i (X)
	 J.1
and
7r.(X)
	B log 	 = 0 ± BiXo.
1— gi (X)	 j=1
The quantity  71; (X)  is known as the odds of unemployment and
1— 7z-, (X)
log (odds) is referred to as logit of unemployment. The parameter
B1
 
of the model measures the extent to which the explanatory
variables X . are associated with the logit of unemployment,
(2)
controlling for all other variables in the model. The categorical
variables are presented by a set of indicator variables.
The number of indicator variables is equal to the level assumed by
the categorical variables minus one. The definition of the indicator
variable depends on the type of model parameterization, which in
turn determines how the parameters are interpreted. The present
model uses full-rank centre-point parameterization in which the t-
level factor is represented by (t — 1) indicator variables such that:
1 for level i
= —1 for level t 	 ji = i,j = 1...2...t —1
0 for level]
For example, the first categorical variable AGEG is as follows:
1 if (15 - 19) age group
X, = —1 if (60+) age group
0 if otherwise
The second indicator variable is: sex has two levels so we must
have one indicator:
1 if male
X5 =
— i1 if female
The interaction terms of age group and sex (AGEG*SEX). We
have 4 indicators for age group and 1 for sex = 4 xl= 4. These
are:
X 6 = X 1 x X 5 ; X 7 = X 2 x X5; Xs = X3 x X5; X 9 = X 4 X5
Accordingly in this model the parameter B j is the difference
between the logit of unemployment corresponding to level j and the
mean logit of unemployment over all levels of this factor. In other
words, the reference for comparison is the mean logit, hence the
"notion" centre-point (Neter, Wasserrman and Kunter "Applied
Linear Statistical Models" Second Edition, 1985). The centre-point
parameterization is the default of the SAS procedure CATMOD
which has been applied for this model estimation. The constraint
under this type of parameterization is:
E B =0
J=I
Hence, the effect of the last level (t) can be measured indirectly as:
B, =—BB
1-1
Two methods of regression techniques are performed general
logistic and linear to fit the given data and to explain
unemployment rate of native Bahrainis by the function of age,
gender, marital status, educational attainment, occupational choice
and the immigration factor presented by percentage of the foreign
workers. To evaluate the fitting and the importance of the
explanatory variables; likelihood and ordinary least squares method
are used.
7.7.3 Definitions of the variables:
The response (dependent variables) is all Bahraini Labour force
aged 15 to 60 years old employed and unemployed (total of 90662
observations).
The co-variates (independent variables) are:
1 - AGEG Age groups as follows:
15-19 Secondary workers
20-24 Primary workers
25-29 Primary workers
30-59 Primary workers
2 - Sex
3 - MRTS	 Marital status: of those in the labour force as single,
married and divorced.
4 - PEREXPAT	 Immigration factor: represented by percentage
of expatriates.
5- EDUCAT Education factor, as follows:
Primary and below
Preparatory
Secondary
Above secondary
University
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6 - SPGM	 Specialization programme or occupational choice
groups: at those levels of education, specifically at
the three last levels, secondary, above secondary and
university. These specialization groups are:
General programmes
Business & administration and accounting programme
Trades, crafts and industry programme
Education sciences and teachers training
Humanities programmes
Mathematics and computer sciences programmes
^
Social sciences programmes
Medical diagnostics and treatment programmes
Natural sciences programmes
Engineering programmes
Miscellaneous programmes
7.7.4 The Results
First, the link between the dependent variable national
unemployment rate and each of the independent variables is
measured by constructing contingency tables. The results are
presented in detail in Appendix II. The coefficients of association
between unemployment rate and those explanatory variables are
presented in Table 7.7. The link between unemployment rate and
age of people in labour force as shown by the degree of association
is the highest and it is clearly consistent with other research
findings. Other variables indicated lower degree of linkage.
In the logistic regression model, a maximum likelihood ratio; 1.000
indicates a very good fit. The coefficients of almost all these
variables are significant as shown in Table 7.8a and b. In the
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Table 7.7
Coefficients of Association of Unemployment Rate
Covariates Coefficients Chi-Square
18223.027Age-Group 0.448
Marital Status 0.391 13825.901
Education 0.177 2825.744
Gender
-0.139 1752.866
Migration 0.103 963.069
general linear model, ordinary least squares reveal that the model
succeeded in explaining 27% of the variation in unemployment
rate. R-square is 0.27 as presented in Table 7.9. The coefficient
estimates of almost all the variables are also statistically significant.
The results are presented in detail in Appendix II.
Logistic regression model indicates a very good fit in describing
national unemployment rate function by the given variables
included in the model. R-Square in the general linear model
reveals a reasonable result taking into account the absence of other
essential economic variables e.g. wage and income. But it can be
said that all the results generally are good. The remainder of this
part is concerned with the analysis of the effect of each variables on
national unemployment according to the likelihood method of
estimation as presented in Tables 7.8a and b.
Age group parameters for the main effect show that when
controlling all other variables in the model, the estimated logit of
the unemployment rate in the age groups (15-19) increases by the
significant amount of 1.8381 and by the amount of 0.6819 for
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Table 7.8a
Unemployment Logistic Model
Estimation of the Main Effects
The Covariates Parameter
Estimates
Standard
Errors
Chi-Square Prob >
Chi-Square
Intercept -2.0074 0.1130 315.83 0.0000
AGEG:
15-19 1.8381 0.0869 447.23 0.0000
20-24 0.6819 0.0796 73.32 0.0000
25-29 -0.2713 0.0799 11.53 0.0000
30-59 -0.9436 0.0800 139.30 0.0000
Sex: -0.2616 0.0890 8.65 0.0033
MRTS:
Single 0.9915 0.0524 357.73 0.0000
Married -0.6408 0.0517 153.55 0.0000
Divorced 0.3155 0.0754 17.50 0.0000
PEREXPAPAT 0.0289 0.00120 5.83 0.0157
EDUCAT:
Primary & Below 1.1267 0.0802 197.57 0.0000
Preparatory 0.6725 0.0655 105.56 0.0000
Secondary 0.5354 0.0652 67.45 0.0000
Above Secondary -0.1370 0.0993 1.90 0.1677
University -0.5236 0.1703 9.46 0.0021
SPGM:
Secondary Level: 	
.
General 0.4437 0.1038 18.28 0.0000
Medical & Treatment 0.0549 0.1071 0.26 0.6084
Miscellaneous 0.4636 0.1087 18.18 0.0000
Above Secondary:
Business & Accounting -0.0427 0.03081 0.02 0.8899
Trade & Industry -1.0394 0.4694 4.90 0.0268
Humanities & Natural Science -0.4975 0.3201 2.41 0.1202
Medical & Treatment -0.3339 0.2236 2.23 0.1354
Engineering -0.0189 0.2658 0.01 0.9434
Education & Teacher Training -1.1789 0.2730 18.5 0.0000
Miscellaneous 0.0269 0.2356 0.01 0.9090
University:
Trade & Industry -1.0408 0.3965 6.89 0.0087
Humanities & Natural Science 0.1572 0.2585 0.37 0.5433
Medical and Treatment 0.8244 0.2447 11.35 0.0008
Engineering 0.5723 0.2574 4.94 0.0262
Education & Teacher Training -0.2177 0.3501 0.39 0.5341
Miscellaneous 0.3867 0.2657 2.12 0.1455
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Table 7.8b
Unemployment Logistic Model
Estimation of the Interaction Effects
The Covariates Parameter
Estimates
Standard
Errors
Chi-Square Prob >
Chi-Square
AGEG*SEX:
15-19 -0.5675 0.0869 42.62 0.0000
20-24 -0.3976 0.0796 24.95 0.0000
25-29 -0.2520 0.0799 9.95 0.0016
30-59 0.2765 0.0799 11.97 0.0000
MRTS*SEX:
Single -0.1488 0.0524 8.06 0.0045
Married -0.3023 0.0517 34.18 0.0000
Divorced 0.1731 0.0754 5.27 0.0217
EDUCAT*SEX:
Primary & Below -0.0838 0.0607 -	 1.91 0.1673
Preparatory -0.2375 0.0422 31.61 0.0000
Secondary -0.2264 0.0419 29.21 0.0000
Above Secondary 0.0789 0.0279 7.99 0.0047
University 0.1714 0.0586 8.57 0.0034
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Table 7.9
Unemployment General Linear Model
Employment Mean	 0.147708
Root MSE
	
0.303802
R-square	 F-value	 Prob > F
0.2672	 785.25	 0.0
Analysis of Variance
Source	 Sum of Squares 	 Mean Square
Regression	 3043.950	 72.4750
Error	 8347.777	 0.09929
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persons in the age group (20-24). But it decreased by the amount
-0.2713 and -0.9436 for persons in the age groups (25-29) and (30-
59) respectively. Sex parameter for the main effect shows that
controlling for all other variables in the model the estimated logit of
unemployment decreases by a significant amount of -0.2616 for
males. Conversely, it increases by the same amount for females.
In terms of interaction effect, evidently sex effect is not the same in
all age groups. The estimated logit of unemployment decreases by
the significant amounts of -0.5675, -0.3976 and -0.2520 for males
in the age groups (15-19), (20-24) and (25-29) respectively.
Nevertheless, it increases by the significant amount of 0.2765 for
males in the age group (30-59).
Marital status parameters show significant results. Married people
decrease the logit of unemployment rate by -0.6408. On the other
hand single and divorced people effects exert in reversal way, they
significantly increase the logit of the unemployment rate by 0.9915
and 0.3155 respectively. The results of the interaction procedure
reveal that men, both married and single, have a negative sign
while a positive sign for women. Divorced and widowed women
are more likely to work, but the coefficient is not significant. For
women the situation is partially differentiated by the impact of
illegitimate barriers not seen by employers including Government
as affecting the efficient working of the labour market. For
example less opportunities and less offers to women compared to
those for men. For more detail see Kaiksow [99] "Female Labour
Supply". Education variable coefficients indicate significantly that
people of low level of education (primary and below, preparatory
and secondary levels) are contributing to increasing the logit of
unemployment rate. The interaction coefficients of both variables,
education and sex, shed more light on this finding. It indicates that
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males of low levels are significantly contributing to decreasing the
logit of the unemployment rate.
Immigration variable (PEREXPAT) effect on national
unemployment showed a positive trend. The coefficient estimate
indicates that the amount of increase in the logit of the
unemployment rate is 0.00289 per unit increase in the percentage of
the expatriate workers. The result potentially confirms researcher
findings and prospect in earlier work [99]. Although there has been
an immigrant competitors against Bahraini natives, but, at some
specific occupations this competition is insignificant in Bahrain's
labour market.
In terms of specialization or occupational choice of individual
educational attainment it is found that by keeping other variables in
the model constant, specialization groups of lower level of
education increase the logit of unemployment rate. People of this
level are more likely to be exposed to unemployment. This result
seems normal, as at this level, teenagers are mostly unqualified.
The estimated logit of the unemployment rate at this level increases
significantly. But, by looking at the interaction effects of both
education and gender variables, we find that the logit of
unemployment rate in this group decreases significantly.
At the above secondary level (equivalent to A level or higher) the
coefficient estimates indicate negative signs for almost all
specialization groups except for miscellaneous. Those
specialization groups or occupational related groups (which include
Business, Humanities, Mathematics and Computer, Social Science,
Natural Science, Engineering and Medical programmes) may
decrease the logit of unemployment rate if only demand for these
occupations in the labour market is in excess of supply or at least
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equal to it. The coefficients of those covariates are insignificant
except for Education and Teachers Training, which significantly
decreases the logit of unemployment rate by the amount of-l.1789.
This means people joining Teachers' Training courses are more
likely to find jobs. Also looking at the interaction effects of both
education and gender, we find that the logit of the unemployment
rate increases in the male group by the amount of 0.0789, but is not
at a comfortable level of significance. The parameters attitude of
the occupational choice at the high level of educational attainment
indicate different signs. Although Trades and Craft and Industrial
-
programmes variable indicates a negative sign, it is statistically
insignificant. The Medical programmes parameter is significantly
positive by 0.8244. Education Sciences and Teacher Training
programmes exert a negative effect on the logit of the
unemployment rate, but it is not significant. Jobs for those groups
do not absorb all people graduated from those courses any more.
The remaining groups at this high level indicate a positive effect
but is not significant. However, these occupational choice groups
(including Medical, Humanities, Social Science, Business and
Accounting, Natural Science and Mathematics, Computer Science
and Engineering programmes) may increase the logit of the national
unemployment rate. Comparing this result with the interaction
coefficient of both education and gender, we find that males of this
group increase the logit of the unemployment rate by 0.1714.
Finally, the results confirm that there is an inverse relationship
between unemployment and vacancies and that labour supply is in
excess of demand in Bahrain's inefficient labour market. Having
examined labour supply and unemployment problems, I intend to
embark on an evaluation of some relevant policies which are
considered in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Unemployment Policies
Introduction 
In order for this thesis to be of greatest use to policy makers, this chapter
presents the essential unemployment policies based on the main economic
theories. The many alternative explanations of high unemployment mentioned in
the previous chapter are taken into consideration, and an important distinction is
made between the natural rate of unemployment and unemployment in excess of
that rate. Classical economists suggest that later unemployment is a random
occurrence requiring no government intervention and generally, the labour
market, like other aggregate markets will be in equilibrium. On the other hand,
the disequilibrium approach implies that non-natural unemployment can exist
and persist, and so requires corrective action by the government, although the
form of that action depends upon the causes of this unemployment.
8.1	 Market - Clearing Approach and Natural Unemployment
According to the new classical approach, the economy is in equilibrium
when its three market sector are cleared, or at their natural level: real
wage, interest rate and price level. When the economy is in equilibrium
there is no involuntary unemployment. Since the demand and supply of
labour are equal, unemployment is at its natural level, and those
voluntarily unemployed are because the real wage is either too low or too
high.
What happens in the case of disequilibrium in the labour market and can
this give rise to non natural unemployment? For example, suppose the
current real wage is higher than its equilibrium level, labour supply would
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exceed labour demand. In this case there would be unemployment in
excess of the natural rate. Would this rate persist? The classical market
clearing view is that it would not persist if market forces operate. In this
case the presence of excess supply of labour would drive back the money
wage and the real wage at its equilibrium which would be restored. Only
if there are impediments to this process, would this unemployment be
instantaneously eliminated. The only thing a government could do is to
eliminate these impediments. If it used an expansionary fiscal policy to
remove the non-natural unemployment, any extra expenditure would
simply crowd out existing expenditure and leave the demand for goods
unaffected.
Monetarism believes that in such circumstances if government increased
the money supply this would cause an increase in price level. If money
wages stayed at a disequilibrium level then real wage would fall and move
the economy back to equilibrium. If on the other hand money wages rose
as a response to price increase then monetary policy would be futile as its
fiscal policy.
It is more appropriate that fiscal policy should be concerned with the
elimination of unemployment while monetary policy should be used to
ensure that external balance is maintained, or secured when necessary. In
fact in a fixed exchange rate economy the traditional keynesian non
market-clearing approach is strengthened.
8.2	 Economic Policy and Non-natural Unemployment
As we have mentioned, new classical economists believe that demand
management is neither necessary nor effective. This belief rests on the
assumption that expectations are formed rationally and that markets in the
economy continuously clear. For example; Sargent [149] tested whether
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in practice economic policy changes are neutral unless they take the
private sector by surprise. He found that money supply and nominal
money wage do not significantly affect unemployment, and suggested that
neither did demand management. Anderson and Jordon [5] found that
although fiscal policy changes had little effect on output, unemployment
monetary policy changes had a significant impact. Espinosa and Russell
(1996) in a study integrated the model of neoclassical production and
capital with a model of monetary policy to measure its effects on output,
and concluded that a permanent easing of monetary policy implemented
by open market sales or by decreases in the required reserve ratio,
increases the rate of inflation and decreases the real interest rate. The
decline in the real interest rate produces a permanent increase in the level
of output, but ultimately temporary increases in the growth rate of output.
Under these conditions they suggested, the ratio of the increase in the real
interest rate to the associated decrease in the inflation rate can become
quite large, which means the effects of monetary policy on real interest
rates and output can be strong in relation to their effects on the inflation
rate. In other words, monetary policy can have substantial real effects.
Others like Artis and Nobay [12] undertook similar tests to those
performed by Anderson and Jordon and found different results. Not only
did fiscal policy exert a significant impact on output and employment, but
monetary had little, if any, effect. Andres and Nickel [6] came to a
similar conclusion. One explanation may be that the channels of
monetary influence are weak in some countries compared with other
countries. The conclusion from this evidence is that both fiscal and
monetary policy influence real output and employment.
In fact the position of the new classical economists is more subtle than
that of the traditional monetarists like Friedman. New classical
economists do not deny that policy changes influence the real sector of the
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economy but they argue that these changes must not be anticipated by the
private sector. If the policy change is known in advance its effects are
predicted and discounted so that no real changes take place. For example,
Barro [26, 27, 28, 29] and Barro and Munh [30] tested this hypothesis by
distinguishing between anticipated and unanticipated changes in policy
instruments. Similar work had been conducted by Demery [53]. Most
empirical studies found that only unanticipated monetary changes can
affect unemployment. This is consistent with the classical perspective on
unemployment, i.e. that demand management will only have an effect as
long as the private sector can be fooled. It is worth saying that this view
also suggests that the costs of such a policy will be increases in the price
level and in the rate of inflation.
As far as fiscal policy is concerned, Attfield, Emery and Duck's work also
provides some insights. They used governments' borrowing
requirements, which could be interpreted as an unanticipated
expansionary fiscal policy, which is associated with an unanticipated
expansion in the money supply. Consequently, the problem arises that if
unanticipated changes in policy have real effects, it is not clear whether
fiscal or monetary changes are ultimately responsible. In this respect
Andres and Nickell [6] indicate that unanticipated increases in
government's spending do reduce the unemployment rate, so fiscal
surprises may work as well as the monetary equivalents. This has been
confirmed by Pesaron [140] regarding the neutrality of demand
management. He indicates that the keynesian and classical alternatives
are both strong, with no clear superior. Also it could be inferred that the
lack of strong policy evidence provides indirect support for the superiority
of a non market-clearing approach to unemployment and of the
consequent existence of positive and persistent non-natural
unemployment.
170
8.2.1 Demand Management Policy
In fact, as we have seen, there is a sound theoretical and empirical
case for believing that the rise in unemployment in most industrial
and developing countries is partly non-natural in character. During
the 1970s most economists viewed unemployment as principally
the outcome of controllable fluctuations in aggregate demand. So
Keynesians claim that management policies should be sufficient to
eliminate the problem, particularly through the use of fiscal
instruments.
The experience of the 1970s in most industrial countries has led
many economists who accept the need for a demand expansion in
order to reduce unemployment to argue also for the use of an
incomes policy to supplement and support this kind of demand
management, as well as the creation, of trade, and the diversion of
instruments such as import controls or currency depreciation,
because of the persistent difficulty in achieving both internal and
external balance. Taking Britain as an example, because of the
persistence of a high unemployment rate since the early 1970s,
government policy managed to reduce this high rate by expanding
the aggregate demand for goods, cutting taxes, increasing public
investments and expanding the money supply. These are the
instruments of keynesian demand management policy assuming
that unemployment was largely keynesian. The only departure
from this diagnosis was the emphasis placed on regional incentives
to reduce "structural" unemployment in certain areas of Britain. In
the 1980s much has changed in many industrial countries including
Britain, partly as a result of the rise to power of politicians of the
right who have some ideological sympathy with the modern
classical economics. However eclipse of demand management and
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re-emergence of classical economic ideas have influenced even
governments in other parts of the world.
In the State of Bahrain, the need to control the public sector
borrowing requirement and the money supply became an important
objective of economic policy since the mid 1980s, which took the
form of cuts in public investment and spending. In general this
policy has rejected the notion that a reflation of demand via
increases in current public spending or public investment is a
viable solution to high unemployment, on the contrary, it considers
that too high a level of real wages is a major cause of natural and
non-natural unemployment. Implicit in this policy is the belief that
most non-natural unemployment is classical in character and can be
remedied by real labour cost reduction. (c.f. the next chapter for
evidence of this policy). One means to this end is to reduce the
disincentive to hiring, which new classical economists believe to
be an important feature of structural unemployment. Classical
economists do believe that real wages need to fall if equilibrium
employment is to be increased. Theoretically this is not an obvious
requirement, but in practice, labour demand should be sufficient to
increase both employment and real wages, as was the case in
Bahrain at the beginning of the 1970s (see Chapter Three for
evidence of this).
8.3	 Unemployment Policies
8.3.1 As fiscal policy and demand management, in terms of Bahrain
experience, involves tackling unemployment, the evidence
suggests that both of these policies were not directly targeted at
maintaining a low unemployment rate in the mid 1980s which has
contributed to the first rise in unemployment rate.
172
On the other hand the government's fiscal stance and the high
money supply had a profound effect on the level of employment in
Bahrain. What happened in fact is that the impact of other aspects
of policy has clearly offset the demand management effect since
1979. These other aspects are firstly, the relaxation of the policy
on foreign labourers, when the number of labour licences issued
for non-Bahraini went up by 51% from 1986 to 1987. These
licences continued to rise over the 1980s and early 1990s until they
reached a peak in 1992, of 59,746 corresponding to an increase of
almost 186% in relation to 1986. Secondly, another aspect is the
reduction in the inflation rate, which helped both trade
competitiveness and private consumption, which rose when a
ceiling rate on consumer loans was reduced from 15% to 12%
effect rate between 1988 and 1992, with a rising of maximum loan
limit from BD 20,000 to 40,000.
Obviously, this boost in private consumption would not have
occurred had consumer credit not become more readily available.
Then if this is the case, the relaxation by the government of the
stringency of credit control since 1988 is more important as a
complementary factor than the direct effect of the reduction in the
inflation rate. Whatever the cause, both private consumption and
trade competitiveness partially offset the reduction in aggregate
demand occurring through previous fiscal stringency. In this
regard it is worth considering the negative impact on private
consumption presented by non-Bahraini workers remittances out
the country which amounted to US$ 432m in 1996. However, as a
result of the boost to trade competitiveness export volumes rose,
which increased both output (especially in manufacturing) and
employment.
Other policies adopted in Bahrain in an attempt to restrain the
growth in real wages were the restraint of the public sector, and the
abolition of the earnings related supplement, i.e. a cut on some
allowances which are given strong emphasis in the classical view
of unemployment.
8.3.2 In general terms, other policies to generate equilibrium
employment, especially via the industrial sector, include:
I	 Giving help and incentives to enterprises, especially small
and medium-sized firms.
II	 Supporting the exportation and exploitation of new
technology.
III	 Easing the burden of regulations and simplifying the
planning system.
IV	 Breaking up monopolies and fostering competition.
V	 Releasing as much business as possible out of public sector
constraints into the challenge and opportunity of a free
commercial setting.
In the State of Bahrain, where some of these policies were adopted
throughout the 1980s, there is no clear cut evidence that their
implementation had a profound effect on the rate of national
unemployment. Despite the government's emphasis on the
Bahrainization of jobs, the number of registered unemployed and
job seekers has been increasing since 1989. The government
addressed the accelerated rate of growth in manufacturing via the
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international competition in this sector. In fact labour productivity
growth has not accelerated although it remains high compared with
other sectors in the economy. Generally, we have seen no
acceleration to the secular rate of labour productivity, which would
increase both equilibrium employment and real wage and so bring
the natural rate of unemployment back down to the levels of the
early 1980s, appears to have taken place in the 1990s. Rather low
productivity compared with other industrial countries, as referred
to in the earlier chapters, has actually caused a reduction in
equilibrium employment in comparison with the level in the early
1980s and so increased the natural rate of unemployment. (More
with prospects in the next chapter).
8.3.3 Other fiscal policies to reduce the rate of unemployment that could
be adopted through government intervention in the labour market
includes:
I	 wage subsidies.
II	 training programmes
III	 job-sharing, and early retirement programmes
IV	 public employment programmes
I - Wage Subsidies
There has been much debate about the advantages and
disadvantages of this instrument. Some economists regard it as a
remedy of the failure of Keneysian macroeconomics policy for
stagflation and slumpflation. Generally governments turn to job
subsidisation as a means of promoting or maintaining employment,
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whereby employers are given a subsidy for every employee
especially young workers under 19 years old and the long-term
unemployed during the first year of their employment. In the State
of Bahrain there has not been any experience in this regard,
instead, the Bahrain government has recently started to increase the
incentives towards Bahrainisation of jobs in the private sector by
tightening legislation on the importation of foreign workers.
In Britain for example, this scheme had a great success in
recruiting about a third of the relevant age group between the years
1982 to 1986. According to Burton [40], the employment
subsidies policy has been advocated on two grounds. First, that
these measures not only reduce unemployment but also
simultaneously reduce the rate of price inflation and the extent of
the public sector funding requirement, especially for countries that
have adopted unemployment benefit. Second, that governments
have subsidised capital rather than labour through investment
grants and other devices. Hence subsidies to labour offer a means
of rectifying a misallocation of resources created by previous
policies. On the other hand economists argue that although a ji•b
subsidy is capable of increasing or maintaining employment in
firms within its jurisdiction, the more fundamental question is
whether it has a positive effect on unemployment as a shole. In
fact it has been suggested that any subsidy can have only a limited
impact on domestic demand.
The principal effect is via prices, and prices cannot fall helm the
average costs of the marginal firm. Accordingly, since the
responsiveness of aggregate demand to changes in price is low, the
effect of any subsidy upon domestic demand is relatively small
Aggregate employment in an industrial sector will rise only t the
176
extent that average cost has fallen as a result of the marginal
subsidy.
But the existence of employment in subsidised firms occurs at the
cost of jobs lost in non-subsidised firms. This has been regarded
by economists as a distortion of labour costs structure in an
economy. A further limitation of a job subsidies policy is that it
might become a feature in the fiscal sense, and such pressures
could result in a long-term programme of support. Once the
government starts to spend extensively and predictably on job
subsidies, workers and firms will begin to formulate expectations
that undermine the effectiveness of the measures.
II - Training Programme
Generally, training programmes are important especially for young
workers. Although they are potentially intended as a means of
reducing unemployment, greater emphasis has been placed on the
pure training component of the policy. The purpose is to provide a
better qualified workforce. In the long run this policy, by affecting
overall economic performance, including the level of labour
productivity, should reduce the natural rate of unemployment.
In the State of Bahrain, a great deal of effort has been put into
training programmes as a structural measure towards the
"Bahrainisation scheme" for the period 1989-1994. The emphasis
has been placed on the pure training component rather than as a
means of reducing unemployment.
The principal aim of the Bahrainisation scheme was the creation of
20,000 job opportunities for Bahrainis entering the labour market
for the first time during the period 1989 to 1994. In order to
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achieve this aim, emphasis has been placed on providing the
necessary training opportunities for certain occupations which
should be accepted by Bahrainis and are more suited to their
nature. On the other hand the implementation of the
`Bahrainisation scheme' should not damage the effectiveness and
competitiveness of the national economy. An assessment of the
demand size, or the number of occupations by non Bahrainis which
should be replaced by Bahraini workers was performed by a
commissioned committee formed for this purpose, revealed that the
private sector employed 60% of the workers engaged in these
occupations. This indicates that the 'replacement process', via the
Bahrainisation scheme, would focus on private sector firms
employing ten workers or more, on the assumption that labour
productivity would remain unchanged.
One of the useful recommendations of the committee was to study
the possibility of setting up special projects for ensuring the
intensive employment of women, because the Bahrainisation
scheme revealed that there were no suitable job opportunities for
women. Further, the committee recommended the development of
some existing vocational training centers for example, the
conversion of the Hotel and Catering Training Center into a
college with a greater capacity for trainees, Bahrainis having
shown a limited interest in hotel and catering jobs, and these jobs
being consequently held by foreigners.
Generally, all courses have been provided at publicly owned skill
centers and colleges, courses typically lasting from a few months to
a year or more. According to 1993 figures the ratio of drop-outs
was almost 44 percent of total trainees.
III - Early Retirement
Early retirement is generally considered by many governments as a
labour market instrument during recession. Currently in the State of
Bahrain a new emphasis has been placed on a proposal for an early-
retirement scheme. So far early retirement schemes have been
introduced by large firms e.g. BAPCO and Gulf Air, the aim of the
scheme being to reduce costs of labour. Although it is not
compulsory many members of staff are being asked to benefit from
it, the scheme providing a full wage, with all benefits such as
medical entitlements and air tickets for the first five years before
the normal pensions applying at age 60, staff who have worked for
their firms for 20 years are eligible for this scheme. Under a special
arrangement the General Organisation for Social Insurance will pay
44 percent of the wage and the firms will pay the rest.
IV - Public Employment Programme
There are other types of schemes which have provided public
employment for the unemployed. In the State of Bahrain recently
the Modern Craft Industries Centre was established by the Ministry
of Oil and Industry, one of the objectives of this project being to
create job opportunities for Bahraini youth. At the beginning of this
project in 1991 a special training programme was carried out by the
Ministry of Oil and Industry in coordination with the Ministry of
Education, until 1993, when the later became fully responsible for
such training programmes. The project's central feature is to
enhance some cultured craft industries by encouraging unemployed
youth to participate in opening up their own businesses in the
Modern Craft Industries Centre. But lack of effective incentives to
those entrepreneurs; i.e. subsidies or an allowance scheme to help
them keep going has created long term difficulties. (Alternative
policies and prospects are dealt with in the next chapter: Conclusion
of this Thesis).
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CHAPTER NINE
Conclusion 
The results of this thesis confirm the results of other studies of life cycle labour
supply, showing that labour supply estimates react quite sensitively to economic
and stochastic assumptions. In the econometric model, we found that for our
groups, changes in participation status in response to wage changes are almost
identical. Despite the difference in risks and preferences, it apparently supports a
less flexible response to wage change. The elasticity of participation with
respect to the wage change is rather low for both groups; Bahraini and non-
Bahraini. For secondary workers, the participation with respect to wage change
is inelastic. Also in the aggregate model, the participation with respect to wage
change is inelastic. Moreover, the transitory labour supply elasticity is either
negative or positive, but small. However, the results revealed firstly, a general
trend of excess labour supply, particularly by Bahraini groups over equilibrium
and disequilibrium labour market. Secondly, the predominance of the relative
wage theory in the models. Thirdly, the prevalence of inefficient wages in the
labour market. Fourthly, a trend of increase in natural unemployment in groups
particularly between the ages of 15 and 19 and females, which exhibit higher
equilibrium levels of unemployment, and finally, the existence and persistence of
non-natural (disequilibrium) unemployment in Bahrain's economy due to a very
slow market-clearing process.
The results support a case for the inclusion of these variables in the labour supply
model: the permanent wage, the relative wage, the aggregate unemployment
rate, the inflation rate and trend.
The results add support to a labour market model along neoclassical lines based
on two facts: firstly that labour supply is largely a function of real wages,
secondly that it responds to an inflation variable.
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The results also support conclusions which are not generally included in
neoclassical labour supply function theories. Firstly, the model has found good
evidence of the responsibility of variation in labour demand for variation in
labour force. Labour supply as a function of unemployment in a slump economy
shows added worker effect for almost all groups, due to the increase of
unemployment stock. Secondly, a relative wage effect rather than the more
traditional permanent wage effect explains the labour market behaviour of some
primary and many secondary workers. Finally it should be recognised that
inflation may serve as an indication for labour market conditions.
The results have confirmed an important issue in terms of the characteristics of
the unemployed age being, among other factors, a possible problem, low
educational attainment and low or no skills among secondary workers, long
period unemployment and the debilitating effect on skills, aptitude, motivation
and acceptability for work among some primary workers, causing their structural
unemployment. Other important factors constituting possible problems are
specialization (occupational choice) and educational attainment of people
entering the labour market for the first time. The results support the Beveridge
Curve in terms of the relationship between unemployment and vacancies. It
appears that although the demand for labour in Bahrain's labour market rose
through the boom, the unemployed seemed inappropriately equipped or located
to fill the jobs that were emerging.
The results support the findings of many other research in terms of work
discrimination against females.
The results have remarkably showed that labour supply of Bahraini secondary
workers is partially competed by foreign workers in the labour market. On the
other hand the results revealed that labour supply is partially subject to other
un-measureable variables such as taste, and not only to external circumstances
such as labour market conditions.
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This conclusion, in the light of the findings in this thesis, in which
unemployment policies have been considered, will suggest and discuss prospects
for alternative policy initiatives that might be adopted to reduce unemployment
in Bahrain. As we have noted in the previous chapter, the evidence broadly
favours the adoption of a non market-clearing approach which confirms that non-
natural unemployment can exist and persist. In principle unemployment may
rise, both because of too high a level of real wages as well as a reduction in the
level of aggregate demand for goods. In the State of Bahrain the evidence
resulting from labour supply models in Chapter Six suggests that the former
cause was not valid while the latter was more important in the last decade. The
government has been seeking cuts in real wage growth since the last decade;
such a policy does not, of course, necessarily rely on disequilibrium argument;
from a classical equilibrium perspective real wage cuts are also necessary to
ensure a reduction in the natural rate of unemployment.
There has been an argument in the 1990s that firms face no long-run quantity
constraints in the market for goods and services, and the resulting unemployment
is natural in character. With excess labour supply resulting from added-worker
effect in the labour market for almost all groups, Bahrainis and non-Bahrainis,
primary and secondary workers, which is a feature of the aggregate labour
market (c.f. labour supply models in Chapter Six ) we argue the assumption that
full employment can be explained mostly in terms of factors determining labour
demand has become valid. This means that there is substantial non-natural
unemployment, or in other words involuntary unemployment which requires
corrective action by the Government. This is consistent with keynesian
unemployment.
In terms of the economy, prospects of regional classical economists were that the
1990s would be more promising than any time since the onset of the recession in
1983 throughout the Gulf countries. Signs of renewed economic growth in 1990
were somewhat evident. Bahrain's GDP growth rate was 9.6%, almost the
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highest since recession. Oil GDP growth rate was 39.7%, the highest since 1975.
With the rising oil revenue, it reached 61.6% of total Government income, the
highest since 1986 when oil prices had declined to $13.5 per barrel. But looking
beyond 1990, we found the picture completely different, in fact discouraging.
GDP growth rates have declined and continued declining. GDP growth rate
declined to 2.4% and 2.2% in 1994 and 1995 respectively. Oil GDP growth rate
declined to -2.8% in 1994. Perception that the 1990s would be more promising
was rationally due to a rise in oil prices when it reached an average of $22.2 per
barrel following the Gulf War.
There are four important main factors that regional classical economists regarded
as positive signs in 1990 and as bound to create some promising changes since the
beginning of the recession in 1983. Firstly, the return of confidence in the Gulf
markets would translate into expansionary business and investment, relaxed
consumer spending patterns, reduced the need for cost cutting and upturn in
employment opportunities. Secondly, secured oil revenues would make it possible
for the Government to implement their targeted expansionary budgets, thus giving
added boost to domestic economic growth. Thirdly, capital market activities
would pick up with stronger bond markets and intensified privatisation efforts as
more national and foreign institutions chose to increase their capital base through
share floatation. Lastly, higher commercial profits of banks benefiting from
stronger domestic activities, would surge in deposits and in a reduction in loan
provision due to a continuing uptrend in shares and real estate prices.
The research argues the validity of these factors in the light of some economic
indicators through the 1990s. Despite the emphasis of Bahrain government policy
on factors that attract banks and companies (such as Except Company registration
(EC), which enabled companies to incorporate in Bahrain without a Bahraini share
holding) growth rates of the finance and real estate services sector has sharply
declined, it reached 0.9% in 1991 and -0.8% in 1994. Also GDP growth rate of
trade has dramatically declined to -1.8% in 1993. Other evidence is the
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establishment of Bahrain Development Bank in 1992 aimed at supporting domestic
private investment in small and medium-sized industries, and at closing a major
gap left by commercial banks in the provision of long-term credit for domestic
projects.
In terms of government budgetary stance, it has deteriorated due to low oil prices
and increased defence expenditure. Budget deficit which has been financed through
placement of bonds and short term treasury bills with banks and pension funds shot
up to 71.8 in 1992 and to 130.2 in 1994. Recent improvements in 1996 are partly a
consequence of Saudi Arabia awarding Bahrain its 50% share of the revenues from
the Abu Safa oil field (owned 50/50 with Bahrain). These increased oil revenues
have underpinned government expenditure plans.
Given the previous discussion, it is evident that forecasts made by classical
economists regarding the promising years in the early 1990s are not valid.
Generally, classical economic analysis has always emphasised the role of the
market forces in attaining full employment through real wage cuts. In fact, the
evidence through this century suggests that market mechanism alone is unlikely
to bring about the adjustment of real wages needed to secure full employment.
In fact real significant wage reductions to reduce unemployment have to be
considerable and therefore difficult to achieve in practice. The argument is that
the relationship between labour productivity and the wage paid is positive.
Labour productivity is maximised at the efficiency wage, which minimises costs
per unit of labour employed. As a result, if a firm's wage is above the market-
clearing wage, the firm will not cut the wage to permit the removal of excess
supply, and involuntary unemployment will therefore take place.
Instead this research suggests that the most obvious alternative policy is to use
demand management instruments to reduce keynesian non-natural
unemployment. As we have seen there has been evidence that reduction in
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aggregate demand is the most potent cause of the rise in unemployment since the
mid 1980s. Firms are constrained by a deficiency of aggregate demand and so
there has been a consequent substantial non-natural keynesian unemployment.
The argument is that the equilibrium level of aggregate demand determines the
level of output and the effective demand for labour. If the effective demand is
less than the actual demand this means it is not sufficient to employ all the labour
that is willingly supplied. So the level of wages no longer determines the volume
of employment, employment is determined by aggregate demand and any
resulting unemployment will be associated with involuntary unemployment.
This means that unemployment can result from causes other than excessive wage
rates. Indeed, if policy were based on the assumption that unemployment were
due to excessive real wages, it would lead the economy entirely in the wrong
direction. Because this policy would cause further reduction in consumption and
the level of effective demand, which in turn would cause reduction in the amount
of output that could be sold. The solution to keynesian unemployment is not to
reduce wage rates but to increase the level of aggregate demand. If this is the
case a major demand expansion is required and this could significantly reduce
total unemployment. These instruments are available to the government.
Increases in public investment, or current expenditure and a relaxation of
monetary controls are the principal alternatives.
The increase in public investment is considerably more costly than the increase
in current expenditure, because of technical complexity and capital intensity
increases in capital investment (i.e. in the industrial sector). Also, there are
exceptional circumstances when increases in current expenditure are higher than
increases in public investment, especially when defence expenditure is unusually
high, but in general, increases in current expenditure are always a less costly and
more effective than other instruments in reducing unemployment. In this respect,
considering the period from the mid 1970s until the mid 1980s, most current
government expenditure was on labour intensive increases, therefore had an
immediate and substantial effect on employment. Imports and saving leakages
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may reduce secondary spending increases, but have no effect early on in the first
stage of the process. Although more costly, increases in public investment are
also effective if a substantial proportion of total public investment is
domestically produced. In terms of their direct employment effects, current
public expenditure increases were the most effective in increasing jobs, from the
1970s until the mid 1980s. But despite the intensive increase in capital
expenditure at the beginning of 1980s, the increase in jobs is extremely modest.
Of course this is not the only consideration in choosing between current and
capital public expenditure. The latter has a much greater impact on private
sector employment. However, both instruments according to economists view,
are generally more effective than any income policy as a way of stimulating
demand in order to reduce non-natural unemployment caused by deficient
demand for goods and services that has dominated Bahrain's economy.
However, recent expansion in government spending facilitated by Saudi Arabia's
award of its share from the Abu Saafa oil field is evidence that confirms the
research findings and suggestions as to alternative economic policies needed to
drive the economy towards increasing employment of nationals. Obviously
Bahrain's government has chosen increase in public investment rather than
increase in current expenditure as an instrument. The Hidd project, which is a
major industrial park and one of the cornerstones of short-term industrial strategy
is an example. Also Hidd-Manama bridge, which will link the industrial park to
other industrial and commercial centres in the archipelago. This instrument has a
great impact on increasing private sector employment. The government is clear
in its view that the private sector must be provided with the right conditions to
allow it to flourish. Currently, the main driver of economic growth in Bahrain is
government spending, but this is a situation which the government plans to
change in order to broaden the means of economic earnings. To do so, the
private sector is being encouraged to form joint ventures with international
partners. Recently, as part of government strategy to diversify the economic
186
bases, an expansion of the tourism sector, with an aim to making Bahrain the
leisure centre of the Gulf, appears to be one of the long-term industrial policies.
On the other hand, the need to control public spending and the borrowing
requirement with the objective of decreasing national unemployment, means the
intention of the government is to encourage the private sector to increase its
investment in the tourism sector as quickly as possible. As we have mentioned
in the previous chapter, this policy has implicitly rejected the notion that a
reflation of demand via increases in current public spending or public investment
is a viable solution to high unemployment. Rather, it has maintained the view
that too high a level of real wages is a major cause of natural and non-natural
unemployment. Such a policy has implicitly believed that most non-natural
unemployment is classical in character and can be remedied by real labour cost
reduction. In other words, that the solution should be left to market forces. This
is based on the fact that while the government is committed to the growth of the
leisure industry in Bahrain, it must have noted that prospective Bahraini
employees in this sector may not accept wage levels that are established below
their expectation.
The research argues the assumption underlying such a policy, which is not
compatible with industrial policies that reject the classical view of the capacity of
market forces to bring about spontaneously the kind of structural change required
to achieve a permanent reduction in equilibrium national unemployment.
Instead, the research suggests either a subsidy taking into account the advantages
and disadvantages of this instrument or national social insurance relief for those
prospective workers. The General Organisation for Social Insurance is
financially capable of being relied on. (Further details will follow).
Our concern here involves dealing with non-natural or structural unemployment.
The assumption on which these alternative policies are based is that in the
tourism sector policies involve dealing with structural changes either on the
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production process or on one of its components. Prospective workers in this
sector would be either inflow from unemployment, and possibly structural
unemployment, or graduates of the public training programmes, specifically "the
Hotel and Catering Centre". So in this case the most viable course of action for
market forces is to moderate wages.
What is left to be said is that if Manama is to remain as a prominent financial and
leisure centre in the Gulf, the government may take a more proactive role in
creating the right conditions for maximum provision of national employment.
Civil disturbances have cast a shadow over the changing economic conditions
over this decade, and while some believe that these disturbances may be
instigated from outside the country, research based on Chapter Seven suggests it
is more likely that the dissent is genuinely and purely directed at the policy as a
consequence of unemployment depression, to bring a solution to increased
national unemployment.
However, there are problems involved in any demand expansion, the most
frequently emphasised being the worsening of the balance of payments for
example, Bahrain's deficit resulting from capital expenditure increase in the mid
1980s.
In fact advocates of demand expansion usually argue for demand side
expenditure, changing policies like import controls to deal with this. Also there
has been argument for supply side industrial policies to generate net exports,
which are of more relevance to the long term. Others argue that higher interest
rates to attract a capital account inflow to offset any current account deterioration
are necessary in the short term. The problem with this is that high interest rates
may crowd out some private sector spending, reducing the impact of the demand
expansion.
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However, awareness must be present to ensure that these effects are not
substantial enough to make significant barriers to the unemployment reducing
effect of a demand expansion. There is a need to adopt one or all of these
policies to ease the adverse effect on the balance of payments that will result
from a demand expansion. This problem worsens when the demand expansion
policy is a unilateral one. Unless other countries are simultaneously adopting
similar policies, domestic imports rise much faster than exports. The consequent
deterioration in the balance of payments position could be dramatic.
Given the problems that result from a unilateral demand expansion, there is
obviously a strong need for an internationally and regionally coordinated system.
Clearly, however, if an increase in aggregate demand is thought necessary to
reduce non-natural unemployment in Bahrain, the probability of its success will
be greatly enhanced through a regionally coordinated system.
A further and associated problem is the impact of demand expansion on inflation
for example, the high inflation rate recorded during the boom years of the 1970s
and early 1980s. Some economists believe high inflation dampens to a
substantial extent both domestic and foreign demand for goods.
In conclusion, real wage cuts and demand expansion can both, in principle
reduce non-natural unemployment. The impact of the former is slight in
comparison with the latter. The need for demand expansion is also relatively
greater, since demand deficiency is a relatively more important cause of the
increase in non-natural unemployment, particularly in the 1990s. This kind of
macroeconomic policy is likely to require a step-up in policies dealing with the
balance of payments and inflation side effects. A policy for incomes and prices
may also have a direct and indirect impact on all types of unemployment in
excess of the natural rate.
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Although policies to reduce disequilibrium non-natural unemployment are
essential, it is clear that a substantial amount of natural rate (equilibrium)
unemployment would remain. It has never fallen to zero, as depicted in
Beveridge Curve in Chapter Seven. It is also evident that a significant
component of this unemployment is involuntary, in the sense that it is the
outcome of demand side decisions by employers. In this respect the necessity to
review the policy on importing employment has become seriously urgent.
Alternative Policies to Deal with Natural Unemployment
Accordingly, policies to reduce the equilibrium natural rate of unemployment are
also necessary to reduce unemployment to the levels reached in the 1970s and
early 1980s. The instruments of such a policy can be analysed from either a
stock or a flow point of view. In terms of the former, in order to reduce the
equilibrium natural rate of unemployment with a given labour force, equilibrium
employment must rise. This can happen either through a supply side decrease or
a demand side increase. A supply side decrease reduces real wages. On the
other hand in the case of demand side decrease real wages rise.
On the supply side the most commonly advocated policies are reduction in
population growth rate and further reduction in immigration. All of these
policies, with a given level of vacancies, will lower reservation wages and hence
increase the acceptance probability. Consequently, so far, these supply side
policies have had nothing more than a modest effect on jobs and unemployment.
Besides these policies, attempts at work creation and training programmes have
recently been carried out by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in
cooperation with a private consultancy agency., represented by the Bahrain
Institute For Training (BIFT). Throu gh this programme public vocational
training is provided for a period of 3-6 months to unemployed job-seekers, with a
wage rate of BD 80 per month for the first three months followed by a full wage
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for a trial period of six months at private firms, besides the sum of BD 2000 for
each employee to finance their training, payable by those private firms. In
addition private firms of 100 and above employees are obliged to pay an annual
vocational training levy of the sum of BD 6000 to BIFT. In fact, although in
budgetary cost terms this programme is relatively costly, we argue the extent to
what the increase on Bahrain Institute for Training and the Modern Craft
Industries Centre (MCIC) schemes would provide a job guarantee for the long
term unemployed. The great advantage of such programmes is that they can
have an immediate impact on the unemployed. Also, work creation schemes, i.e.
Community Programmes increased the labour demand and the offer probability,
by increasing the economy wide demand for employees. Hence such schemes,
which reduce the unemployed stock are reducing equilibrium unemployment. Of
course there may be some spill over into non-natural unemployment but the
principle effect is to reduce unemployment among those who have become
structurally unemployed because of their long term status as such.
In principle, real wages rise as a consequence of demand increase may have
additional demand side effects; but in practice this may not happen to a
significant extent because workers on such programmes, or those out of work,
will have little impact on real pay in the rest of the economy. The demand side
effects of any increase in real wages may be beneficial in that they stimulate
private spending.
In general there seem to be good grounds for a major expansion of such
programmes to provide suitable training and to provide job opportunities for all
long-term unemployed workers. Some major improvements could also be made
in such schemes. There should be no earnings ceiling, in order to make them
more attractive to adults, especially primary workers. This would provide long
term unemployed workers with a form of job experience that could further
enhance their long term employment prospects. However, the success of such
programmes or any other schemes of this type in achieving their goal of reducing
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natural unemployment depends mainly on firstly, the repatriation of competitive
foreign workers, secondly on the existence of demand expansion in the economy
and thirdly on the time dimension chosen.
If such programmes were expanded, some strategic attention would also need to
be given to the kind of jobs offered and to the provision of relevant adult training
in the scheme. A planned expansion of current government spending on BIFT
makes some sense, and would turn such schemes into training and work
experience programmes for youth and adults for whom the current job prospects
are nil. A BIFT programme could provide a transition between long-term
unemployment and long term employment but, of course, this requires a broader
view-point of the private sector than currently available.
Although work creation by a special programme is desirable because of the
strong impact on employment and because of the greater ease with which
training provision can be monitored within the public sector, an introduction of a
special programme would also generate jobs in the private sector, the
construction industry being particularly important in this respect. A special
programme could provide the job training in basic building skills that could then
be used in construction projects. This is much more likely to happen if such a
scheme is tied up with public investment projects such as Ministry of Housing
projects. If this were the case, any increase in the demand could then become
permanent.
In generating jobs within the private sector with a view to beating natural
unemployment in the State of Bahrain, the provision of suitable training
institutes is of paramount importance. In this regard, the extension of BIFT
schemes within planned strategy carried out by an Employment Department at
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, and in coordination with a High
Council for Vocational Training, is recommended. Apart from such extensions
having a short-run effect on labour demand and offer probabilities for new
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entrants to the labour market, which lower natural unemployment, there is also
potentially a longer-run impact. This is because of the impact of training on
labour productivity and on the long-run performance of the economy as a whole
(which affects natural unemployment).
Although the Government of Bahrain has introduced training and schemes via
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs there remain significant doubts about
the effectiveness of this policy, especially in terms of generating permanent jobs.
The principle of the training is not worth much unless participants can expect to
get a job at its conclusion. The success of training schemes requires a
complementary programme of demand expansion, especially for young Bahraini
workers. Otherwise the attitudes of workers on training schemes will be
adversely affected and any skills acquired there will depreciate with non-use.
The growth in demand for young workers requires, in addition to a general
expansion of aggregate demand, other measures such as an expanded job
replacement of foreign workers scheme.
The success of the training schemes also depends on the control of government.
It needs incentives and warnings. Unless the effectiveness of monitoring on
training schemes is improved, it is unlikely to meet the long-term employment
and unemployment targets. Training programmes by the Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs have failed to prevent a drop in apprenticeship training among
young Bahrainis. The solution to this problem requires such training to be
viewed as an entry route to apprenticeship, and for government subsidy to be
provided for all apprenticeship schemes in both the private and public sectors.
Other ways to enhance public training policy is a provision of credit for youth to
help them choose their career, and to provide the extra careers needed.
On the other hand, the control of training programmes is also important to
prevent a general expansion in demand, which can rapidly lead to severe excess
demand in certain sectors of the labour market. Planning a programme of
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training in tandem with a programme of planned sector demand expansion is
likely to prove essential for a sustained cut in unemployment. However, also
important for the long-term run success of these special programmes, is a public
employment service to provide careers advice and guidance for trainees, in
addition to a complementary expansion in job opportunities in both the public
and private sector.
There are other kinds of special schemes, supporting the case for further
employment incentives, including a higher labour tax on imported foreign
workers, payable by employers. We have already mentioned in the previous
chapters the effect of labour cost, especially fixed cost, on employment. High
costs reduce the demand for Bahraini employees and so reduce the offer
probability for unemployed workers. One of the components of these costs is the
national social insurance contribution and the work permit costs for foreign
workers. Increases in the latter reduce the advantages for foreign workers. Thus
reducing the wide gap between the cost of the national and foreign workers
stimulates substitution policy. Reductions in national social insurance
contributions would have a significant effect on jobs and unemployment, simply
because it applies to all Bahrain's workers and not to the marginal workers who
are about to be laid off or who could be employed. This would lead to many
economists arguing for the introduction of a marginal employment subsidy,
which would be paid to firms for additional workers hired. This increases the
offer probability, lowers natural rate unemployment, and has a particularly
pronounced effect on the private sector, especially in services and construction
sectors where employment growth is most rapid.
The research suggests a lump sum subsidy for all rises in the employment of
Bahrainis above some defined benchmark for each employer. A marginal
employment subsidy gives an obvious incentive to firms to substitute Bahraini
employees for foreign workers working in the private sector. It also reduces
labour costs, which boosts international competitiveness and ultimately
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aggregate demand. I lowever, we suggest the most effective subsidies would be
those carefully targeted at problem groups in the labour market, e.g. the 15-19
age group. This does stimulate employment increases at budget costs below
those of general macroeconomic demand management policies. A larger subsidy
could be paid for the employment of long term unemployed people or recent
graduates of public training programme; i.e. The Hotel and Catering Training
Centre. These subsidies would permit a major reduction in the natural rate of
unemployment. Cuts in employers' social insurance contributions could be
targeted in a similar way. A proposal that employers who employ a long term
(more than a year) unemployed worker should be relieved of national social
insurance contributions for these workers for a period of two years is also
recommended.
Work sharing or early retirement programmes are alternative ways of reducing
natural unemployment. The scope of this programme is rather limited, even
though successful. The idea is to reduce the starting age of eligibility of men and
women. It is to be voluntary, not to an enforcement of earlier retirement by
means of lowering the statutory retirement age. Gulf Air and Bahrain Petroleum
Company are good examples of companies with such schemes. To increase the
overall success rate of such programmes they could be made more attractive with
extra allowances, and by financial incentives for firms to adopt them. An
obvious advantage of the schemes is that they are much less costly than a general
lowering of the statutory retirement age.
The recent labour market conditions in Bahrain favour such schemes but clearly
there is some danger that labour productivity and output will fall as a result.
Since new workers are likely to be less productive and may require some training
or incur other induction costs for their employers, there is a case for paying firms
a lump sum to compensate for these expenses and to offset any adverse long-
term effects on the economy as a whole. However, such schemes could do much
to encourage the long-term unemployed.
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Currently, an obvious trend towards an undeclared policy of reducing women's
labour force participation in the State of Bahrain, has to be rejected mainly on
the grounds of discrimination. An alternative plan would consist in substituting
more employees for shorter hours of work, through a cut in the standard working
hours, which could prove an advantage in the private sector since a fall in actual
hours increases overtime, and overtime hours are more productive, as some
empirical studies have proved, e.g. Feldstein [70], so that this would raise the
overall productivity of labour. However, evaluation of labour market measures
through empirical research is essential, and therefore recommended in this thesis.
Our emphasis so far was on the labour market measures or policies to reduce the
natural rate of unemployment. Now we turn our attention to the goods market
and in particular to the role of industrial policy. The effect of industrial policy
on reducing unemployment in the long run, as mentioned in the previous chapter,
can be profound. In so far as it helps to generate additional aggregate demand
and hence labour demand, it reduces non-natural unemployment. Not only does
it help make domestic industry more internationally competitive, but also it
relaxes any balance of payment constraints on government induced by demand
expansion. For example, despite the significant deficit in the balance of
payments, the progress of competitiveness in the manufacturing sector,
particularly in the aluminium industry, has helped Bahrain's economy in
recovery remarkably. Balance of payments has turned from a deficit of Million
BD 155 in 1992 to a surplus of 39.8 in 1994. It also has long-run structural
effects on equilibrium employment and unemployment. If it succeeds, industrial
policy increases the pace of technical change, raises labour productivity and the
natural level of output. In the long run all these improvements increase job
opportunities, which in turn raise the offer probability for unemployed workers
(especially if combined with a training strategy, as was the case in the beginning
of 1980s). The policy should be clearly to reverse the effects of a decline in the
long run rate of growth of output and employment, which seem to have
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remarkable effects on the extent of the natural rate unemployment in Bahrain in
the 1990s, as we mentioned in the previous chapters.
Currently the emphasis on extending the scope of industrial policy initiatives is
targeted on the small and medium-sized industries in Bahrain. Although the
direct effects of improved industry production performance on job creation may
be small, the indirect effects could be great. The basis of this view is that labour
demand expansion in non-production industries is constrained by foreign trade
performance. Recently, as industrial policy was targeted at the exportable
industries, it succeeded in reducing the severity of an unacceptable deterioration
of the balance of payments, as shown earlier. The attainable level of non-
productive employment was increased by the relaxation of the importing
employment policy. As a result the economy wide demand for employees
increased and equilibrium employment rose, accompanied by a lower wage. This
was Bahrain's industrial policy during the last two decades. Obviously the
complementary policies in the direction of tightening foreign labour by means of
administrative and legislative burdens have had no clear demonstrative impact on
reducing national rate unemployment, which has, in fact, risen rapidly
throughout the last decade. It is equally unclear what the future impact of the
current industrial policy, aiming at privatization, will be.
Currently the Government of Bahrain has been pursuing a privatization policy in
a gradual and steady manner. First, some small government projects, for
example dairy produce, dates and fishing were privatized in 1994. Obviously,
the recent successful experiment of privatization of the communications sector
encouraged the government to announce a plan in March 1995 to sell the
government's share in a number of commercial banks and companies. It is
evident from these examples that there is a general trend in Bahrain towards
privatization.
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Despite the limited scale of privatization carried out to date, for more successful
privatization schemes it is suggested in this thesis that the government should
undertake the task of setting up projects and buying shares in companies and
banks in a bid to strengthen and underpin the national economy. At the second
stage, once these schemes and companies had proved their success, they could
begin to be diverted to the private sector, thus giving it a greater role in economic
development as a complement to the role played by the government. On the
other hand the private sector is requested to prove the ability to manage and carry
out vital projects to maintain employment levels among Bahraini nationals.
In this regard the Bahrain Stock Exchange should undertake a major
development and modernization programme aimed at developing its services,
thus enhancing its role in the implementation of privatization policies.
However, there are problems involved in any privatization expansion. These
problems can be summarised as an increase in the prices of commodities and
services produced by the privatized enterprises, and its resulting impact on
inflation. Other more important problems are rising unemployment levels as a
result of reducing the number of employees, and also the long period of time
taken by some privatized enterprises to consolidate their operations and improve
their profitability levels, influencing the growth rate of the economy.
Having shed some light on Bahrain's prospective policy which aims to privatize,
and create additional jobs for Bahrainis in a setting of economic growth, it is
remarkable that despite the recession, recent diversification policy, as mentioned
earlier in this thesis, achieved an increase of 9.3% annual growth rate in the
industrial sector through the period 1987-1994 accompanied by 8.7% annual
growth rate in the trade sector for the same period. The percentage contribution
of the manufacturing sector to total GDP accounted for 16.6% while crude oil
contributed a 17.1% of total GDP for the period 1987-1994. The non-oil GDP
contribution climbed from 68% in 1975 to 84.2% of total GDP in 1994. These
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figures reflect the great benefits that the industrial policy has achieved, taking
into account its role in increasing equilibrium employment in the economy as a
whole.
As we have seen, the evidence strongly favours the adoption of a non-market
clearing perspective of unemployment. There is a general presumption in favour
of industrial policies, which also rejects the classical view of the capacity of
market forces to bring about spontaneously the kind of structural change (the
development of new products and processes) that is required to achieve a
permanent reduction in equilibrium unemployment.
However Bahrain's industrial policy has not departed much from interventionist
industrial policies. According to the former policy, there are common themes
that characterise most industrial policies. One central theme is the need for a
conscious and planned strategy to encourage product and process innovation,
especially in the internationally trading production sector.
In this regard a policy for greatly increased levels of fixed investment is
generally thought important, and most interventionists favour the adoption of
more generous public support, like the 1970s budgetary projects. In addition
there is wide support for exploiting the existing financial institutions, like banks
and pension funds in order to finance the investments needed, as was the case in
the 1980s when public sector banking institutions played an active role. Another
solution is the creation of new institutions to provide investment finance such as
the establishment of the Bahrain Development Bank in 1990. However although
these higher levels of fixed investments are necessary, they are not a sufficient
condition for a successful industrial policy. In most industrial countries
considerable emphasis is therefore placed on the encouragement of research and
development, and the role of government in this matter is important. Whatever
view is taken, an industrial (supply side of the goods market) policy is of
considerable importance (particularly via the demand side of the labour market)
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in permanently reducing unemployment, especially of the type of equilibrium
natural rate.
A further alternative, and the most ambitious economic policy is Gulf market
integration. This will contribute to the strengthening of the competitive power of
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries against global markets and to the
easing of labour mobility through the GCC market. In this respect the real public
and political consciousness of the role of an integrated market is an essential
condition for ensuring sustained economic growth in the region. To achieve
such prosperous goals employment rights should be the basis of GCC market
integration, i.e. basic rights that provide the minimum form of social security
benefits. These rights can be divided into individual and collective rights, our
concern being mainly individual rights provisions, in terms of freedom of
movement, health and safety, working conditions, working hours, employment
status, security and equality of wage as well as in terms of equality of treatment
regardless of nationality, origin, beliefs and sex. The collective rights could be
much less specific and more conditional than the individual ones. However,
such measures need a great deal more empirical studies, it is arguable that the
State of Bahrain will benefit much more from such convergence, mainly because
of its limited markets (both in goods and labour).
Finally, because there is no single cause of unemployment, there is no single
solution. We saw in the previous chapter that unemployment varies with the
demographic composition of the labour force and the efficiency of search
activity. Unemployment may arise because workers and firms have incomplete
labour market information. Alternatively, individuals may choose to search more
thoroughly before accepting jobs, which may result in an increase in their
economic well-being in the long run because they find positions that are more
suitable for their tastes and skills. In this regard, the value of understanding the
economics of job search is fairly important in helping to sort out the social and
economic forces behind the relatively higher unemployment rates of youth.
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We saw also how search unemployment relates to the rate of inflation in the
short-term, while such a relationship disappears when employers and workers
fully anticipate the future course of inflation in the economy. Obviously, the
difficulty in obtaining such cooperation is fundamental to economics, as each
individual worker or firm acting in his or her own best interest, has a strong
incentive to ignore appeals to cooperate in anti inflation efforts. This is why
voluntary incomes policies would fail and governments are requested to impose
wage and price controls. In this regard the government's role in expanding
monetary and fiscal policies might be effective. By altering expectations of
future inflation, an incomes policy might persuade workers and firms to use
restraint in seeking wage and price increases, thus softening the impact of
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies on unemployment.
What is probably most interesting for policy-makers is that the increase in the
unemployment rate has been influenced by a factor generally outside the control
of government economic policy, that is the change in the age-sex composition of
the labour force. However, if policy-makers regard the failure of the labour
market to clear as a fundamental feature of the economy, a demand expansion,
preferably regionally coordinated, is a crucial ingredient for a policy to reduce
unemployment. There is also very good reason to believe that complementary
policies are needed to regulate the movements of real incomes, which have a role
in reducing both non-natural and natural unemployment. Policies that encourage
special programmes, particularly those with a strong well structured training
content, and industrial policies that encourage the development of new products
and processes, hold the key to a permanent reduction in unemployment.
The complex package of policies needed to reduce unemployment requires a
coordinated approach which recognises the complementarity of policy
instruments, each being designed to deal with different causes of unemployment.
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Findings in this thesis give very good reason to believe that a serious initiative is
needed to regulate the immigration policy, which seems to have a role in
reducing both non-natural and natural national unemployment. It is important to
remember that left untreated in a stagnant economy, non-natural unemployment
can convert into structural unemployment that raises the natural rate. Poor
unskilled individuals leaving the labour force because of the low wages offered
for the jobs open to them, rather than the complete lack of jobs and thus do not
reduce their need for income maintenance and for retraining to higher skilled
positions (social security supplementary incomes needed).
It is suggested in this thesis that in order to solve the unemployment problems
that have arisen in Bahrain, and to approach an active labour market, the public
and private sectors should work together to plan and implement job creation and
training programmes. To be successful, training programmes must be tailored to
meet the specific needs of business.
It is recommended in this thesis, that in order to achieve this goal much more
microeconomic empirical work is needed. Also further macroeconomic research
involving labour force and wages is needed to study their impact on
unemployment and the decline in private sector jobs particularly in the
production, trade and banking sectors. Other areas worthwhile investigating are
the personal and social impact unemployment has on the individual.
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Regression Analysis
Total Labour Supply
The regression equation is
dif41g16 = 0.977 - 0.183 log6 - 0.0042 logll + 0.0460 log8
Predictor	 Coef	 Stdev	 t-ratio	 p
Constant	 0.97741	 0.09381	 10.42	 0.000
log6	 -0.18336	 0.01964	 -9.34	 0.000
logll	 -0.00419	 0.08000	 -0.05
	 0.959
log8	 0.04596	 0.01543	 2.98	 0.009
s = 0.01298	 R-sq = 90.6%	 R-sq(adj) = 88.8%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE	 DF	 SS	 MS
Regression	 3	 0.0259725	 0.0086575
Error	 16	 0.0026948	 0.0001684
Total	 19	 0.0286673
SOURCE	 DF	 SEQ SS
log6	 1	 0.0243602
logll	 1	 0.0001176
log8	 1	 0.0014946
51.40
	
0.000
Unusual Observations
	
Obs.	 log6	 dif41g16	 Fit Stdev.Fit Residual	 St.Resid
1	 4.64	 *	 0.17473	 0.01429	 *	 * X
2	 4.64	 *	 0.17438	 0.01182	 *	 * X
3	 4.73
	
*	 0.15960	 0.01036	 *	 * X
5	 4.93
	
0.09707	 0.12292	 0.00940	 -0.02585	 -2.89R
	
20	 5.66	 -0.00552	 0.02006	 0.00388	 -0.02559	 -2.07R
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.81
Male Labour Supply
Regression Analysis
The regression equation is
nw3lag17 = - 0.948 + 0.113 nw3lag12 - 0.0102 nw3lagll + 0.00149 nw3lag8
+ 0.0639 nw3lag6
21 cases used 3 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant -0.94788 0.08445 -11.22 0.000
nw3lag12 0.11334 0.05013 2.26 0.038
nw3lagll -0.01016 0.05116 -0.20 0.845
nw3lag8 0.001493 0.008095 0.18 0.856
nw3lag6 0.063938 0.008609 7.43 0.000
s = 0.01077	 R-sq = 92.0%	 R-sq(adi) = 90.0%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE
	 DF	 SS	 MS
Regression	 4	 0.0213403	 0.0053351
Error
	 16	 0.0018574	 0.0001161
Total	 20	 0.0231977
SOURCE	 DF	 SEQ SS
nw3lag12
	 1	 0.0113555
nw3lagll	 1	 0.0001576
nw3lag8	 1	 0.0034244
nw3lag6	 1	 0.0064027
45.96	 0.000
Unusual Observations
	
Obs.	 nw3lag12 nw3lag17	 Fit Stdev. Fit Residual	 St.Resid
	
5	 0.202	 -0.32938	 -0.31019	 0.00602	 -0.01918	 -2.15R
	
24	 -0.004	 -0.19522	 -0.21585	 0.00541	 0.02063	 2.21R
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.63
R-sq = 77.4%	 R-sq(adj) = 73.4%
Variance
Regression Analysis
Female Labour Supply
The regression equation is
dif31g18 = 3.64 - 0.696 log6 - 0.499 logll + 0.237 log8
Predictor
Constant
log6
logll
log8
S = 0.07899
Analysis of
Coef
3.6395
-0.6958
-0.4992
0.23667
Stdev
0.5115
0.1068
0.4836
0.08967
t-ratio
7.12
-6.52
-1.03
2.64
0.000
0.000
0.316
0.017
SOURCE	 DF	 SS
	 MS
Regression	 3	 0.36380	 0.12127
	 19.44	 0.000
Error	 17
	 0.10606	 0.00624
Total	 20	 0.46987
SOURCE	 DF	 SEQ SS
log6	 1
	 0.30255
logll
	 1
	 0.01779
log8
	 1
	 0.04347
Unusual Observations
	
Obs.	 log6 dif31g18
	
1	 4.64
	
2	 4.64
	
24	 5.70	 0.0007
	
Fit Stdev.Fit Residual	 St.Resid
	
0.6600	 0.0801	 *	 * X
	
0.6186	 0.0607	 *	 * X
	
0.1556	 0.0381	 -0.1550	 -2.24R
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.40
Regression Analysis
Bahraini Labour Supply
The regression equation is
diflg33 = - 0.00199 + 0.0517 diflg41 + 0.160 diflg40 - 0.0036 diflg8
Predictor	 Coef	 Stdev
	 t-ratio
	
p
Constant	 -0.001986	 0.004842	 -0.41	 0.686
diflg41	 0.05174	 0.01461	 3.54	 0.002
diflg40	 0.16045	 0.05684	 2.82	 0.011
diflg8	 -0.00361	 0.03275	 -0.11	 0.914
S = 0.01342	 R-sq = 55.0%	 R-sq(adj) = 47.9%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE	 DF	 SS	 MS
Regression	 3	 0.0041906	 0.0013969
Error	 19	 0.0034237	 0.0001802
Total	 22	 0.0076143
SOURCE	 DF	 SEQ SS
diflg41
	 1	 0.0027237
diflg40
	
1	 0.0014647
diflg8	 1	 0.0000022
	
F	 P
	
7.75	 0.001
Unusual Observations
	
Obs.	 diflg41	 diflg33	 Fit Stdev.Fit Residual 	 St.Resid
	
2	 -0.917	 -0.05310	 -0.04944	 0.01311	 -0.00367	 -1.27 X
	
11	 0.120	 -0.03237	 0.00628	 0.00494	 -0.03865	 -3.10R
	
16	 -0.023	 0.03364	 0.00434	 0.00294	 0.02929	 2.24R
	
23	 -0.015	 -0.00001	 -0.00169	 0.01071	 0.00168	 0.21 X
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.70
Regression Analysis
Male Bahraini Labour Supply
The regression equation is
diflg34 = - 0.00162 + 0.0656 diflg41 + 0.0725 diflg40 + 0.0072 diflg8
23 cases used 1 cases contain missing values
Predictor	 Coef	 Stdev	 t-ratio	 p
Constant	 -0.001620	 0.003390	 -0.48	 0.638
diflg41	 0.06556	 0.01023	 6.41	 0.000
diflg40	 0.07253	 0.03980	 1.82	 0.084
diflg8	 0.00724	 0.02293	 0.32	 0.756
s = 0.009399	 R-sq = 71.8%	 R-sq(adj) = 67.3%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE	 DF	 SS	 MS	 F	 p
Regression	 3	 0.0042639	 0.0014213	 16.09	 0.000
Error	 19	 0.0016785	 0.0000883
Total	 22	 0.0059424
SOURCE	 DF	 SEQ SS
diflg41	 1	 0.0039691
diflg40	 1	 0.0002860
diflg8	 1	 0.0000088
Unusual Observations
abs. diflg41 diflg34 Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
2 -0.917 -0.06670 -0.06174 0.00918 -0.00496 -2.44RX
11 0.120 -0.02174 0.00726 0.00346 -0.02899 -3.32R
21 -0.013 0.01905 -0.00055 0.00258 0.01960 2.17R
23 -0.015 0.00048 0.00106 0.00750 -0.00058 -0.10 X
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.79
t-ratio
1.96
1.88
0.94
-2.40
-3.77
0.069
0.080
0.362
0.030
0.002
R-sq(adj) = 48.3%
MS
0.13862	 5.43	 0.007
0.02553
Male Bahraini Labour supply - Age Group 15 to 19
Regression Analysis
The regression equation is
df41g15 = 0.274 + 0.778 dif41g8 + 0.158 dif41g41 - 0.765 dif41g40
- 0.408 dummyT
20 cases used 4 cases contain missing values
Predictor	 Coef	 Stdev
Constant	 0.2742	 0.1399
dif41g8	 0.7785	 0.4140
dif41g41	 0.1581	 0.1681
dif41g40	 -0.7655	 0.3185
dummyT	 -0.4077	 0.1082
s = 0.1598
	 R-sq = 59.1%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE
Regression
Error
Total
SOURCE
dif41g8
dif41g41
dif41g40
dummyT
	
DF	 SS
	
4	 0.55450
	
15	 0.38298
	
19	 0.93748
	
DF	 SEQ SS
	
1	 0.04963
	
1	 0.00000
	
1	 0.14217
	
1	 0.36270
Unusual Observations
	
Obs. dif41g8	 df41g15	 Fit Stdev. Fit	 Residual	 St.Resid
5	 0.031	 -0.1141	 -0.0810	 0.1565	 -0.0330	 -1.03 X
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.81
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Male Bahraini Labour Supply - Age Group 65+ 
Regression Analysis
The regression equation is
df41g65 = 31.9 + 0.269 log8 - 0.395 log12 + 0.262 log41 + 0.647 log4OW*
- 7.60 logT
20 cases used 4 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P
Constant 31.87 12.86 2.48 0.027
log8 0.2694 0.2805 0.96 0.353
log12 -0.3946 0.5315 -0.74 0.470
log41 0.2619 0.5832 0.45 0.660
log4OW* 0.6468 0.2520 2.57 0.022
logT -7.604 3.062 -2.48 0.026
s = 0.07804
	 R-sq = 65.0%	 R-sq(adj) = 52.5%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE	 DF	 SS	 MS
Regression	 5	 0.158337	 0.031667
Error	 14	 0.085273	 0.006091
Total	 19	 0.243609
SOURCE
	 DF	 SEQ SS
log8	 1	 0.091194
log12	 1	 0.025614
log41	 1	 0.000162
log4OW*	 1	 0.003803
logT	 1	 0.037564.
5.20	 0.007
Unusual Observations
	
Obs.	 log8	 df41g65	 Fit Stdev.Fit
	 Residual	 St.Resid
	
1	 1.06	 *	 0.4012	 0.6018
	 *	 * X
	
2	 1.06	 *	 0.0654	 0.0989	 *	 * X
	
21	 1.75	 -0.3469	 -0.1887	 0.0384	 -0.1582	 -2.33R
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.74
Female Bahraini Labour Supply
Regression Analysis
The regression equation is
dif31g35 = 20.5 - 4.28 logT - 0.110 dif31g41 - 0.707 dif31g40 + 0.277
dif31g8
21 cases used 3 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio
Constant 20.515 3.927 5.22 0.000
logT -4.2842 0.8281 -5.17 0.000
dif31g41 -0.1098 0.1190 -0.92 0.370
dif31g40 -0.7072 0.2756 -2.57 0.021
dif31g8 0.2770 0.2776 1.00 0.333
s = 0.08801
	 R-sq = 82.8%	 R-sq(adj) = 78.5%
Analysis of Variance
MS
0.14926
0.00775
SOURCE
Regression
Error
Total
SOURCE
logT
dif31g41
dif31g40
dif31g8
	
DF	 SS
	
4	 0.59703
	
16	 0.12394
	
20	 0.72097
	
DF	 SEQ SS
	
1	 0.50126
	
1	 0.04183
	
1	 0.04622
	
1	 0.00772
19.27	 0.000
Unusual Observations
Obs.	 logT dif31g35	 Fit Stdev.Fit Residual	 St. Resid
	
4	 4.63	 0.6044	 0.6372	 0.0862	 -0.0327	 -1.84 X
	
18	 4.76	 0.2600
	 0.0917	 0.0267	 0.1683	 2.01R
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.52
Regression Analysis
Non Bahraini Labour Supply
The regression equation is
log50 = - 0.734 + 0.106 logNW* + 0.0695 loNW/W* + 0.0141 log8 + 0.0893
log12
Predictor
Constant
logNW*
loNW/W*
log8
log12
S = 0.01021
	
Coef	 Stdev
	
-0.73355	 0.06538
	
0.10616	 0.01335
	
0.06954
	
0.04627
	
0.014148	 0.008327
	
0.08929	 0.04275
t-ratio
-11.22
7.95
1.50
1.70
2.09
P
0.000
0.000
0.149
0.106
0.050
R-sq = 83.2%	 R-sq(adj) = 79.7%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE
Regression
Error
Total
SOURCE
logNW*
loNW/W*
log8
log12
	
DF	 SS
	
4	 0.0098239
	
19	 0.0019809
	
23	 0.0118049
	
DF	 SEQ SS
	
1	 0.0085324
	
1	 0.0007540
	
1	 0.0000828
	
1	 0.0004549
	
MS	 F	 P
	
0.0024560	 23.56	 0.000
0.0001043
Unusual Observations
	
Obs.	 logNW*	 log50	 Fit Stdev.Fit Residual 	 St.Resid
	
21	 5.19	 -0.13605	 -0.15688	 0.00311	 0.02084	 2.14R
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.53
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Regression Analysis
The regression equation is
nw41g51 = - 0.109 + 0.00610 nw41gNW + 0.00971 nw41gNWW + 0.00235 nw4lag8
- 0.00647 nw4lag12
20 cases used 4 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P
Constant -0.10947 0.01494 -7.33 0.000
nw41gNW 0.006098 0.001470 4.15 0.001
nw41gNWW 0.009707 0.004748 2.04 0.059
nw4lag8 0.0023471 0.0009044 2.60 0.020
nw4lag12 -0.006471 0.004480 -1.44 0.169
s = 0.001428	 R-sq = 84.6% R-sq(adj) = 80.5%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE	 DF	 SS MS F P
Regression	 4 0.000167737 0.000041934 20.58 0.000
Error	 15 0.000030569 0.000002038
Total	 19 0.000198306
SOURCE	 DF	 SEQ SS
nw41gNW	 1 0.000130847
nw41gNWW	 1 0.000000745
nw4lag8	 1 0.000031893
nw4lag12	 1 0.000004252
Unusual Observations
Obs. nw41gNW	 nw41g51	 Fit Stdev.Fit Residual 	 St.Resid
20	 10.5 -0.041285 -0.038563 	 0.000511 -0.002722	 -2.04R
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.65
Regression Analysis
Female Non Bahraini Labour Supply
The regression equation is
1og52 = - 4.87 + 0.607 logNW* + 0.48 1 loNW/W* + 0.507 10g8 + 0.813 log12
Predictor
Constant
logNW*
loNW/W*
log8
log12
s = 0.1109
Coef
-4.8680
0.6071
0.4806
0.50704
0.8128
Stdev
0.7103
0.1450
0.5026
0.09046
0.4644
t-ratio
-6.85
4.19
0.96
5.61
1.75
P
0.000
0.001
0.351
0.000
0.096
R-sq = 82.7%	 R-sq(adj) = 79.0%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE	 DF	 SS	 MS	 F	 P
Regression	 4	 1.11528	 0.27882	 22.66	 0.000
Error	 19	 0.23377	 0.01230
Total	 23	 1.34906
SOURCE
logNW*
loNW/W*
log8
log12
	
DF	 SEQ SS
	
1	 0.70789
	
1	 0.01446
	
1	 0.35524
	
1.	 0.03769
Unusual Observations
	
Ohs.
	
logNW*	 log52	 Fit Stdev.Fit Residual 	 St-Resid
	
21	 5.19	 -0.5917	 -0.8208	 0.0338
	 0.2291	 2.17R
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.41
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SAS
TABLE OF AGEG BY EMPLOY
AGEG	 EMPLOY
Frequencyl
Row Pct 1UNEMPLOYIWORKING I
1ED	 I	 I Total
15-19
	 I	 3178 1	 1799 1	 4977
63.85 I	 36.15
20-24	 I	 5440 1 10538 1 15978
34.05 1	 65.95 1
25-29
	 1	 2197 1 16416 1 18613
I	 11.80 1	 88.20 1
30-59	 1	 2287 1 44842 1 47129
I	 4.85 1	 95.15 I
60+	 I	 292 1	 3673 1	 3965
1	 7.36 1	 92.64 1
Total	 13394	 77268	 90662
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF AGEG BY EMPLOY
Statistic	 DF	 Value	 Prob
Chi-Square	 4 18223.027	 0.000
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	 4 15025.533	 0.000
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square	 1 15524.694	 0.000
Phi Coefficient	 0.448
Contingency Coefficient	 0.409
Cramer's V	 0.448
Sample Size = 90662
SAS
TABLE OF PERNBAH BY EMPLOY
PERNBAH	 EMPLOY
Frequency1
Row Pct IUNEMPLOY1WORKING 1
1ED	 I	 1 Total
0%-	 I	 24 1	 385 I	 409
1	 5.87 1	 94.13 1
10%-	 I	 3061 1 12382 1 15443
1	 19.82 1	 80.18 1
20%-	 I	 2959 1 16078 1 19037
1	 15.54 1 84.46
30%-	 1	 5028 1 26222 1 31250
1	 16.09 1	 83.91 1
40%-	 I	 1335 1 11306 1 12641
1	 10.56 1	 89.44 1
50%-	 1	 731 1	 8039 1	 8770
1	 8.34 1	 91.66 1
70%+	 1	 256 1	 2856 1	 3112
1	 8.23 1	 91.77 1
Total	 13394	 77268	 90662
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF PERNBAH BY EMPLOY
Statistic	 DF	 Value	 Prob
Chi-Square	 6 963.069
	
0.000
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	 6 1022.248	 0.000
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square	 1 749.156	 0.000
Phi Coefficient 	 0.103
Contingency Coefficient 	 0.103
Cramer's V	 0.103
Sample Size = 90662
236
SAS
TABLE OF MRTS BY EMPLOY
MRTS	 EMPLOY
Frequency 1
Row Pct	 IUNEMPLOYIWORKING I
1ED	 1 Total
NEVER MRD. 1 10853 1 21909 1 32762
I	 33.13 1	 66.87 1
MARRIED	 1	 2311 1	 53644 1	 55955
1	 4.13 1	 95.87 1
DIVORCED
	
1	 185 1	 1155 1	 1340
1	 13.81 1	 86.19 1
WIDOWED	 I	 45 1	 560 1	 605
1	 7.44 1	 92.56 1
Total
	
13394	 77268	 90662
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF MRTS BY EMPLOY
Statistic	 DF	 Value	 Prob
Chi-Square	 3 13825.901	 0.000
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	 3 13667.724	 0.000
Mantel-Haenszel'Chi-Square	 1 11224.808	 0.000
Phi Coefficient	 0.391
Contingency Coefficient	 0.364
Cramer's V	 0.391
Sample Size = 90662
SAS
TABLE OF SEX BY EMPLOY
SEX	 EMPLOY
Frequency'
Row Pct IUNEMPLOYIWORKING I
IED	 I Total
MALES	 I	 9035 I 64083 I 73118
I	 12.36 I	 87.64 I
FEMALES I	 4359 I 13185 I 17544
I	 24.85 I	 75.15 I
Total	 13394	 77268	 90662
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF SEX BY EMPLOY
Statistic	 DF	 Value	 Prob
Chi-Square	 1 1752.866	 0.000
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square 	 1 1571.429	 0.000
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square 	 1 1751.875	 0.000
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square	 1 1752.847	 0.000
Fisher's Exact Test (Left)	 0.00E+00
(Right)	 1.000
(2-Tail)	 0.00E+00
Phi Coefficient	 -0.139
Contingency Coefficient	 0.138
Cramer's V	 -0.139
Sample Size = 90662
SAS
TABLE OF EDUCAT BY EMPLOY
EDUCAT	 EMPLOY
Frequency I
Row Pct	 IUNEMPLOYI WORKING I
1ED	 I	 I Total
ILLIT	 I	 815 I	 7650 1	 8465
1	 9.63 1	 90.37 1
R&W+PRIM. 1	 2968 1 18885 1 21853
1	 13.58 I	 86.42 1
PREB+	 1	 2037 1 10626 1 12663
1	 16.09 1	 83.91 1
SECOND.	 1	 6825 1 24490 1 31315
1	 21.79 1	 78.21 I
ABOVE SEC. 1
	 389 1	 5438 I	 5827
I	 6.68 1	 93.32 1
UNIV.+	 I	 354 I 10104 1 10458
1	 3.38 1	 96.62 I
Total	 13388	 77193	 90581
Frequency Missing = 81
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF EDUCAT BY EMPLOY
Statistic	 DF	 Value	 Prob
Chi-Square	 5 2825.744	 0.000
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square 	 5 3198.141
	
0.000
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square	 1	 58.900	 0.000
Phi Coefficient	 0.177
Contingency Coefficient 	 0.174
Cramer's V	 0.177
Effective Sample Size = 90581
Frequency Missing = 81
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS
CATMOD PROCEDURE
Response: EMPLOY Response Levels (R)= 2
Weight Variable: None Populations (S)= 3150
Data Set: ONE Total Frequency (N) = 90489
Observations	 (Obs) = 90489
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE
Source DF Chi-Square Prob
INTERCEPT 1 315.83 0.0000
AGEG 4 2835.98 0.0000
SEX 1 8.65 0.0033
AGEG*SEX 4 330.18 0.0000
MATS 3 2302.17 0.0000
SEX*MRTS 3 49.55 0.0000
PEREXPAT 1 5.83 0.0157
EDUCAT 5 242.71 0.0000
SEX*EDUCAT 5 94.35 0.0000
SPGM(EDUCAT=4) 3* 116.10 0.0000
SPGM(EDUCAT=5) 7* 35.76 0.0000
SPGM(EDUCAT=6) 6* 49.15 0.0000
LIKELIHOOD RATIO 3107 2692.53 1.0000
NOTE: Effects marked with * contained 1 or more
singularities (i.e., redundant parameters).
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS
ANALYSIS OF MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES
Standard
	 Chi-
Effect	 Parameter Estimate 	 Error
	 Square Prob
INTERCEPT	 1	 -2.0074	 0.1130	 315.83 0.0000
AGEG	 2	 1.8381
	 0.0869	 447.23 0.0000
	
3	 0.6819	 0.0796
	 73.32 0.0000
	
4	 -0.2713	 0.0799	 11.53 0.0007
	
5	 -0.9436	 0.0800	 139.30 0.0000
SEX	 6	 -0.2616	 0.0890	 8.65 0.0033
AGEG*SEX	 7	 -0.5675
	 0.0869	 42.62 0.0000
	
8	 -0.3976	 0.0796	 24.95 0.0000
	
9	 -0.2520	 0.0799	 9.95 0.0016
	
10	 0.2765
	 0.0799	 11.97 0.0005
MRTS	 11	 0.9915	 0.0524	 357.73 0.0000
	
12	 -0.6408	 0.0517	 153.55 0.0000
	
13	 0.3155	 0.0754	 17.50 0.0000
SEX*MRTS	 14	 -0.1488	 0.0524	 8.06 0.0045
	
15	 -0.3023
	 0.0517	 34.18 0.0000
	
16	 0.1731	 0.0754	 5.27 0.0217
PEREXPAT	 17	 0.00289	 0.00120	 5.83 0.0157
EDUCAT	 18	 1.1267	 0.0802	 197.57 0.0000
	
19	 0.6725	 0.0655	 105.56 0.0000
	
20	 0.5354
	 0.0652	 67.45 0.0000
	
21	 -0.1370	 0.0993	 1.90 0.1677
	
22	 -0.5236	 0.1703	 9.46 0.0021
SEX*EDUCAT	 23	 -0.0838	 0.0607	 1.91 0.1673
	
24	 -0.2375	 0.0422	 31.61 0.0000
	
25	 -0.2264	 0.0419	 29.21 0.0000
	
26	 0.0789	 0.0279	 7.99 0.0047
	
27	 0.1714	 0.0586	 8.57 0.0034
SPGM(EDUCAT=4)
	 28	 0.4437	 0.1038	 18.28 0.0000
	
29	 0.0549	 0.1071	 0.26 0.6084
	
30	 0.4636	 0.1087	 18.18 0.0000
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
SPGM(EDUCAT=5)	 47
48
241
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS
ANALYSIS OF MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES
Standard	 Chi-
Effect	 Parameter Estimate
	 Error
	 Square Prob
SPGM(EDUCAT=6)
49
50
51	 -0.0427	 0.3081	 0.02 0.8899
52	 -1.0394
	 0.4694	 4.90 0.0268
53	 -0.4975
	 0.3201	 2.41 0.1202
54	 -0.3339
	 0.2236	 2.23 0.1354
55	 -0.0189
	 0.2658	 0.01 0.9434
56	 -1.1789	 0.2730
	
18.65 0.0000
57	 0.0269
	 0.2356	 0.01 0.9090
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78	 -1.0408	 0.3965	 6.89 0.0087
79	 0.1572	 0.2585	 0.37 0.5433
80	 0.8244	 0.2447	 11.35 0.0008
81	 0.5723	 0.2574	 4.94 0.0262
82	 -0.2177	 0.3501	 0.39 0.5341
83	 0.3867	 0.2657	 2.12 0.1455
84
LEAST SQUARE MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
General Linear Models Procedure
Class Level Information
Class	 Levels
	 Values
AGEG	 5	 4 5 6 7 8
SEX	 2	 12
MRTS	 4	 1234
EDUCAT	 6	 1 2 3 4 5 6
SPGM	 20	 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 23
Number of observations in data set = 90662
NOTE: Due to missing values, only 90489 observations can be used in this
analysis.
LEAST SQUARE MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
General Linear Models Procedure
Dependent Variable: EMPLOY
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value	 Pr > F
Model 42 3043.9502371 72.4750056 785.25	 0.0
Error 90446 8347.7771330 0.0922957
Corrected Total 90488 11391.7273702
R-Square C.V. Root MSE EMPLOY Mean
0.267207 205.6767 0.3038021 0.14770856
LEAST SQUARE MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
General Linear Models Procedure
Source DF Type I SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F
AGEG 4 2288.7446947 572.1861737 6199.49 0.0
SEX 1 141.7526958 141.7526958 1535.85 0.0
AGEG*SEX 4 132.6115935 33.1528984 359.20 0.0001
MRTS 3 306.1834717 102.0611572 1105.81 0.0
SEX*MRTS 3 7.1153976 2.3717992 25.70 0.0001
PEREXPAT 1 10.1400237 10.1400237 109.86 0.0001
EDUCAT 5 94.0152943 18.8030589 203.73 0.0001
SEX*EDUCAT 5 44.0546538 8.8109308 95.46 0.0001
SPGM(EDUCAT) 16 19.3324121 1.2082758 13.09 0.0001
Source DF Type III SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F
AGEG 4 741.79281596 185.44820399 2009.28 0.0
SEX 1 5.36223586 5.36223586 58.10 0.0001
AGEG*SEX 4 73.95607110 18.48901778 200.32 0.0001
MRTS 3 250.04331690 83.34777230 903.05 0.0
SEX*MRTS 3 6.40004719 2.13334906 23.11 0.0001
PEREXPAT 1 0.25612385 0.25612365 2.78 0.0957
EDUCAT 5 108.10857652 21.62171530 234.27 0.0001
SEX*EDUCAT 5 39.98307379 7.99661476 86.64 0.0001
SPGM(EDUCAT) 16 19.33241207 1.20827575 13.09 0.0001
LEAST SQUARE MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
General Linear Models Procedure
T for HO:
	 Pr > ITI	 Std Error of
Parameter	 Estimate	 Parameter=0
	 Estimate
INTERCEPT	 -.2563151178 B	
-4.62
	 0.0001	 0.05550658
AGEG	 4	 0.7104235851 B	 13.29	 0.0001	 0.05345868
5	 0.4281505960 B	 8.11	 0.0001	 0.05281450
6	 0.1880738297 B	 3.57
	 0.0004	 0.05267284
7	 0.0855866599 B	 1.63
	 0.1026	 0.05242369
8	 0.0000000000 B
SEX	 1	 0.2631855434 B	 4.58	 0.0001	 0.05744967
2	 0.0000000000 B	 .
AGEG*SEX	 4 1
	 -.3316444613 B	 -6.14
	 0.0001	 0.05405419
4 2
	 0.0000000000 B
5 1
	 -.3113431010 B	 -5.85
	 0.0001	 0.05324288
5 2
	 0.0000000000 B
6 1	 -.1987477916 B	 -3.75
	 0.0002	 0.05303687
6 2
	 0.0000000000 B
7 1	 -.0976497717 B	 -1.85	 0.0640	 0.05271133
7 2
	 0.0000000000 B
8 1	 0.0000000000 B
8 2
	 0.0000000000 B	 .	 .
MRTS	 1	 0.2498994713 B	 12.90	 0.0001	 0.01937916
2	 0.0668613832 B	 3.51	 0.0004	 0.01903137
3	 0.0898763096 B	 4.11	 0.0001	 0.02186092
4	 0.0000000000 B
SEX*MRTS	 1 1
	 -.1336734166 B	 -5.09	 0.0001	 0.02628461
1 2
	
-.0992830732 B	 -3.84	 0.0001	 0.02584837
1 3	 -.0230983087 B	 -0.76	 0.4449	 0.03023845
1 4	 0.0000000000 B
2 1
	
0.0000000000 B
2 2	 0.0000000000 B
2 3
	
0.0000000000 B
2 4
	
0.0000000000 B	 -
PEREXPAT	 0.0001672614	 1.67	 0.0957	 0.00010041
EDUCAT	 1	 0.2534058239 B	 14.57	 0.0001	 0.01739776
2	 0.2517639515 B	 17.35	 0.0001	 0.01450780
3	 0.2444181224 B	 17.04	 0.0001	 0.01434315
4	 0.1198169301 B	 7.62	 0.0001	 0.01571740
5	 0.0590715321 B	 3.18	 0.0015	 0.01857820
6	 0.0000000000 B	
-
SEX*EDUCAT	 1 1	 -.1506580380 B	 -9.70	 0.0001	 0.01553302
1 2	 -.1810985728 B	 -15.22	 0.0001	 0.01189829
1 3	 -.1835957806 B	 -15.50	 0.0001	 0.01184554
1 4	 -.1068605599 B	 -13.53	 0.0001	 0.00789875
1 5	 -.0279079844 B	 -2.56	 0.0105	 0.01091031
LEAST SQUARE MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
General Linear Models Procedure
T for HO:	 Pr > ITI	 Std Error of
['parameter Estimate Parameter=0 Estimate
1 6 0.0000000000 B
2 1 0.0000000000 B
2 2 0.0000000000 B
2 3 0.0000000000 B
2 4 0.0000000000 B
2 5 0.0000000000 B
2 6 0.0000000000 B
ISPGM( EDUCAT) 23 1 0.0000000000 B
23 2 0.0000000000 B
23 3 0.0000000000 B
19GWEDUCAT) 1 4 0.0564731482 B 5.02 0.0001 0.01124304
2 4 0.0106637698 B 0.92 0.3559 0.01155116
3 4 0.0600279110 B 5.11 0.0001 0.01175772
4 4 0.0000000000 B
5 5 -.0024203949 B -0.11 0.9118 0.02185724
6 5 0.0054195917 B 0.27 0.7873 0.02008870
7 5 -.0008579192 B -0.05 0.9631 0.01854985
8 5 -.0302345624 B -1.91 0.0563 0.01584299
9 5 0.0012941684 B 0.07 0.9459 0.01906238
10 5 -.0857122626 B -4.68 0.0001 0.01831822
11 5 -.0078890330 B -0.48 0.6333 0.01653791
12 5 0.0000000000 B .
13 6 -.0191363112 B -1.34 0.1813 0.01431621
14 6 0.0151927734 B 1.33 0.1825 0.01139595
15 6 0.0198347412 B 1.65 0.0985 0.01200643
16 6 0.0106059086 B 0.84 0.4005 0.01261554
17 6 -.0029540829 B -0.20 0.8446 0.01506762
18 6 0.0026636258 B 0.21 0.8301 0.01241475
19 6 0.0000000000 B
